

VOLUME XIV

WINTER 1954

NUMBER 4

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# Public Administration Review

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THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY  
FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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# *Public Administration Review*

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Volume XIV      WINTER · 1954      Number 1

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Published quarterly, in February, May, August, and November, by the American Society for Public Administration, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. Entered as second class matter February 7, 1947, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1897, with additional entry at Brattleboro, Vermont.

The contents of *Public Administration Review* are indexed in Public Affairs Information Service, International Index to Periodicals, and Index to Legal Periodicals. They are microfilmed by University Microfilms.

Subscriptions: domestic, \$8 a year; foreign, \$9 a year. No discount to agents.

Annual membership dues: sustaining members \$15 or more; members \$8; junior members (those 28 years of age or under) \$4; student members \$1. Of the amount paid for membership dues, \$4 is allocated to the subscription to *Public Administration Review*. Address: American Society for Public Administration, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

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# The Federal Career Service—What Next?

By HERBERT EMMERICH and G. LYLE BELSLEY

*Public Administration Clearing House*

**T**HREE are signs and portents that the American federal career service is in danger; and since this danger has become acute at a time of change in Administration, it is easy to think of it entirely in terms of political tactics. This, however, is to see only one phase of a complex situation; for the threat to the public service lies as much in attitudes and prejudices generally held as it does in any specific partisan action.

Moreover, since states and cities are apprehensive about what will happen at the federal level, the situation affects not only Washington but the entire nation. Indeed, because of the large participation of Americans in foreign affairs and in the work of international agencies, the situation can be said to have international repercussions.

What is the danger and what can be done to avoid it?

## I

**T**O PUT the subject in proper perspective, we should point with pride before we view with alarm. The fact is that there is an American public service to protect and defend. Seventy years of civil service reform, with extension of the merit system by every President since Chester Arthur, have developed a federal service possessed of competence, integrity, loyalty, and self-respect. Government has grown to unprecedented size and encompasses an immense variety of activities. Its agencies and bureaus operate in the most complex fields of human endeavor, with ramifications that affect the lives and property of people in every corner of the country and in many foreign lands. With these developments, thousands of good Americans of great ability and technical qualifications have found it possible to cast their lot with the federal service and to find in

it satisfactory careers to which they can devote their lives.

In proof, one has only to think of some of the great contributions that have been made to science, industry, agriculture, and to the American people generally through the service of the staffs of the Bureau of Standards, the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Public Health Service, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Geological Survey, and the great economic and statistical bureaus such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the former Bureau of Agricultural Economics on whose impartial determinations many wage rates and farm prices have depended. And these are just a few random samples cited for purposes of illustration.

The work of these and scores of other agencies of similar importance deeply affect the lives and fortunes of our people, and the economic progress of our free society. Many of them have developed a fine esprit de corps and their members are proud to be identified with them. Their progress and the quality of their personnel have been due not only to the influence of the more formal methods of competitive civil service but also to the active and vigorous interest taken in their competence and quality by the organized professions outside of the government. It would be unthinkable to return them to the incompetence of appointees under political patronage.

The dual problem of the American public service is to increase its flexibility and responsiveness to political change at the same time that its competence and stability are enhanced. In working to these ends, we proceed on the assumption that under the American system of government the head of the executive establishment is the President of the United States, that the Constitution requires him to see that the laws shall be faithfully executed, and that

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the primary duty of the political officials of his Administration and of the career service is to carry out his program competently, diligently, and loyally.

It is difficult to see how any President can discharge his great responsibilities effectively unless these points are clearly recognized and the integrity of the executive function is firmly preserved. It is equally difficult to see how the executive function can be held intact if the career service is weakened. Since the President seldom makes a good target for attack, those who would hinder the President often resort to attacks against the personnel serving him—both his political aides and career workers. Any significant intrusion, from whatever source or for whatever motive, upon the integrity, competence, or morale of the career service impairs the effectiveness with which the executive branch can operate and thus detracts from the strength of the institution of the Presidency. This is one of the reasons why all Presidents, since the adoption of the Pendleton Act in 1883, have protected themselves from pressures outside the executive branch by extending the merit system in the federal government.

It must be recognized at the outset that a new Administration succeeding one that has been in office for many years faces no easy task in taking control of a service that employs almost two and one-half million civilians and an even greater number of military personnel. One of these problems relates to the appointments that a new Administration must be free to make in order to be assured that its policies will prevail throughout the service. Estimates of the number of such appointments have varied from 700 to 5,000 positions, depending on the assumptions made by the estimator and the way in which the problem is defined. The higher figure includes many positions that would be used for purely patronage purposes and that clearly need not be changed in order to exercise control over the service. Figures near the lower limit seem far more realistically intended to assist the President and his principal aides in exercising policy and management control over the executive branch. For the most part, they concern the officers in top positions in Washington, and a few in the field.

The notion that a postmaster is a policy offi-

cial, and that every time the Administration changes thousands of them have to be removed, is obsolete. Increasingly the Post Office Department has come to be regarded as a businesslike service, which must be swiftly, competently, and economically managed, primarily by a trained career staff. Indeed, during the Truman Administration, a career man was appointed Postmaster General. This is a policy-determining position—practically the only one in the huge department—and placing a career official at the Cabinet level was carrying the principle of nonpolitical appointment too far.

Furthermore, in the extension of the civil service to career groups of employees, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations generally followed the practice of "covering in" by noncompetitive examination the incumbents who were qualified at the time of the extensions. A similar practice has prevailed under every President since the passage of the Pendleton Act. In fact, prior to about 1930, it was the general practice to "blanket in" incumbents without requiring them to qualify noncompetitively. The opposition has always feared that this practice increased the number of persons in the public service who would be unsympathetic to its programs when it was returned to power. However, with the years, as persons leave the service and vacancies are filled by competitive methods, partisan influence, if any exists, tends to diminish.

There are, for example, no factual bases for believing that there was a preponderance of Democrats in the civil service in the District of Columbia at the close of the Truman Administration. On the contrary, there is strong reason to believe that if one could determine how these civil servants would have voted in the 1952 election, it would be found that they did not vary greatly from the rest of the population. It is significant that the two counties in Virginia and the two in Maryland adjacent to the District of Columbia which are populated by a heavy proportion of federal employees voted overwhelmingly for Eisenhower in 1952. Three of them gave majorities to Dewey in 1948 and 1944, and the fourth was Democratic by a paper-thin margin in each of those years.

But even if the opposition, on coming to power, should find the civil service composed

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of a majority of employees who have voted against it, there is no evidence to support the belief that those employees will not respond to new policies and new approaches under new political leadership, provided that they know what the policies and programs are. The complexity and ramifications of the federal government are so great that political platforms can set forth only general attitudes and hopes. They are certainly not sufficiently clear or specific to guide the work of federal agencies and employees. We think it can fairly be said that a new Administration cannot begin to formulate its program until it is inaugurated and its principal aides are appointed and in a position where they can have day-to-day access to department files and day-to-day contact with department personnel. The exercise of the functions of office, and firsthand acquaintance with governmental problems and the pressures they generate, are great and necessary influences in policy formulation. Today the development of an Administration's program has to be an inside job that must be done largely after the political chiefs have had some time to get their feet under their desks.

During the first year of his Administration, President Eisenhower and his department heads in department after department appointed review committees to evaluate and make recommendations relating to legislative and administrative policies. Some completed their work only as the first year of the new Administration came to a close, and many were still at work as the second year opened. Until these policy recommendations emanate from the committees, are adopted by the Administration, and are passed by the Congress where legislation is required, there can be no real test of whether the permanent career service is prepared to follow a new line. In the meantime, thousands of loyal, intelligent federal officials have been frantically endeavoring to find out what the new line is. For the most part they are prepared to carry it out cheerfully and loyally. Where they cannot conscientiously do so, they must have the courage to ask for a transfer or to present their resignations; for there is no place for sabotage or contumacy or lobbying on the part of career officials against a known and clear policy of the responsible political administrators.

An immediate danger to the morale of the public service lies in the fact that many members of the new Administration made no effort to get government employees to demonstrate their loyalty and willingness to cooperate. At the beginning, in some agencies, the new officials brought with them a great distrust—some have called it a "built-in bias"—of civil servants. One of the important duties of a top civil servant is to draw on his long experience and to point out to political officers the rationale of existing policies and the possible difficulties in new proposals. But such action has too often been interpreted by new policy officials, not yet sure of themselves, as resistance. A few had brought with them the unfortunate prevailing stereotypes of federal workers before becoming acquainted with them, held them at arm's length, and failed from the start to try to develop good personal relations. This was a disappointing and humiliating experience for many employees. It resulted in needless feelings of fear and insecurity, and made no contribution whatever to effecting a smooth transition from the old to the new Administration. It undoubtedly contributed to delays in new program development. Time and familiarity seem to be correcting this situation.

The desire on the part of the Republicans to identify certain positions at the top of the federal pyramid which should be filled by persons sympathetic to their program is both natural and proper. But we seriously doubt that the new Schedule C category of exempt positions provides the appropriate means of achieving that desire or of facilitating the proper relationship between career employees and political officials. Schedule C is based completely on the so-called policy-determining and confidential nature of positions and through definition can be made to apply to far too many levels of the service. It is doubtful whether this is the most effective criterion for deciding what positions should be placed in the exempt category. Most career officials deal in confidential matters of many kinds and participate in the policy-forming process when in the ordinary course of their duties they make recommendations to their superiors. Employees far down the administrative line are performing functions of this kind all the time; they should not be obliged to occupy excepted positions in

order to do so. If policy determination is construed too inclusively, then this approach threatens to place beyond the reach of career workers too many of the positions of responsibility, interest, and importance which must be in the career service if it is to attract and hold competent personnel. In fact, the career service can be seriously stunted through such an approach.

The high-ranking official who has the power to decide what the department does or what it recommends to Congress should be done, who appears before congressional committees and the public as the protagonist of the policy, who is in the front line urging the policy, and who in every sense of the term is a political policy-determining executive performs the kind of function that should exempt him from the career service, and is the type of employee who should be appointed by the Administration. It is this different criterion, enlarged upon in subsequent paragraphs, that might well be substituted for the present Schedule C. While this criterion is subject to some interpretation, as is any except a rigid mechanical one, it would seem to be a more valid approach to this problem than the one now being used.

## II

As a further explanation of this general approach, it may be useful to give some attention to the position of bureau chief, in which great competence and experience must be combined with flexibility and responsiveness. One of the authors of this article paid particular attention to this problem in another place under the head of "The Continuing Pressures for Bureau Autonomy."<sup>1</sup> There he stated that "the forces of [bureau] autonomy operate constantly to impair the President's ability to supervise and direct the administration of the executive function." There is no question that the competence of government agencies has been greatly increased since the beginning of the century by the tendency to elevate to the level of bureau chief persons of great expertise who have the support of their professional groups outside the government. But the relationships of the bureau chief with

his outside professional constituency, with committees and subcommittees in Congress, and even with individual key senators and congressmen, make him peculiarly unresponsive to the head of the department of which his bureau is a part and to the President who has the ultimate responsibility for the manner in which he discharges his duties. This unresponsiveness is particularly marked in the services which have the greatest homogeneity of professional background, the greatest expertise, and the finest esprit de corps. The devotion of their chiefs to their own programs is frequently superb, but this very single-mindedness may interfere with their responsiveness to the program of the Administration as a whole.

This is a continuing problem which the Brownlow Committee and the first Hoover Commission both recognized. It occurs in the normal course of government operations without regard to partisan influences in the political party sense. It is not a matter of Republicans versus Democrats, or vice versa. In fact it will be misunderstood and not properly treated if it is viewed in such partisan terms.

Because of its relationship to problems of the career service, the time has come for a serious, high-level review of the role and status of the bureau chief. Bureaus differ in the complexity and controversiality of their programs; some are engaged in highly technical functions while others carry on more routine activities. Our concern here is with the bureau chief construed in the broadest sense of this term—the professional who is the administrator of a major operating program. Some of the propositions which such a review should include may be briefly stated.

The bureau chief, like other high officials in the career service, should be appointed by rank, and rank and compensation should inhere in him as a person. This rank and pay should follow him whatever his future assignments in the government service may be.<sup>2</sup>

The head of the department should have the right to appoint the bureau chief from anywhere within the career service (or in exceptional cases from outside), the only indispensable condition being that he possess competence and professional qualifications and

<sup>1</sup> Herbert Emmerich, *Essays on Federal Reorganization* (University of Alabama Press, 1950), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> G. Lyle Belsley, "Prescription for a Better Public Service," *The Federal Employee* (Nov., 1953), p. 7.

have the administrative ability to head an operating program. In the case of bureau chief positions, a good argument could be made for the use of Schedule B, which calls for an expert not competitively chosen but meeting the qualifications for the position determined by the Civil Service Commission. The bureau chief should be appointed by the agency head without Senate confirmation. If he is selected from outside the career service he should be subject to replacement at the discretion of the agency head. If he is selected from within the career service, he should retain his basic status and rights without gaining permanent tenure in his new position. If he is replaced as a result of a change of Administration and has civil service status, two courses should be open: (1) he should be transferred, with the rank and pay he has attained, to another position as an adviser, as a research worker, as the head of a mission, or as chief of a bureau or operating unit, or (2) he should be retired under special liberal provisions that are not bound by the limited formulas of the present Retirement Act. The only exceptions would be where serious deficiencies have been found in his conduct or performance which would require his separation from the federal service for cause.

These proposals would establish a new tradition for the position of bureau chief. The position would be one to which a member of the civil service could be transferred and from which he or she could be removed without loss of status or prestige, or to which in unusual cases a person from outside could be appointed. In either event there should be no diminution of the high technical standards which have been achieved for many bureau chief positions. Nor should sordid and petty grounds for removal, such as were put forward in the Astin case, be permitted to reflect on a service of high scientific integrity. On the other hand, there should be no implication that the position of bureau chief belongs as a matter of right to the member of the bureau with the longest term of service, or that his transfer is a reflection on his general usefulness to the service, or that the head of the department cannot at all times have in the post a man of his own choosing on whose personal and departmental loyalty he can fully depend.

At the same time, the political and policy-

determining role of the bureau chief should be diminished. Relations with congressmen and congressional committees should be handled not at the level of the bureau chief but at the level of the office of the secretary of the department and primarily by one of the assistant secretaries whose function is principally political and policy-determining. The policy officers, not the bureau chief, should make the final determination of the department's programs and policies and should espouse and defend them before congressional committees and the public. The bureau chief should have a more anonymous role. He should have the job of expertly operating the service under his jurisdiction and of making technical recommendations to the head of the department. While he could accompany the political officer to the hearings of congressional committees and assist him in his testimony, he should handle himself in such a way that he would not be personally identified in the congressional or public mind primarily with advocacy of particular programs. The political officers of the department or agency, and not the bureau chief, should be the defenders and symbols of the Administration's policies.

If this practice were adopted, it would go far toward establishing a clear distinction between the political policy-determining officers on the one hand and the experts and career men of the government on the other hand, because it is at the point of contact with major segments of the public and with the legislative branch in particular that their proper roles are frequently confused.

Admittedly this approach would place a great burden on the political officers of departments. It would also presume longer service than the customary one or two year service of assistant secretaries in Washington and a far better command of subject matter in many fields than is now expected. These are not undue burdens. They are the price these officers must pay if they are to discharge fully and properly the political-policy role which their appointments imply. This approach would make it incumbent on political organizations, educational institutions, and on business and the professions to furnish enough competent leaders qualified for such top political-policy assignments.

A corollary of this proposal is, of course, that the President and his agency heads must be in a position to appoint a sufficient number of competent aides to discharge these important political policy-determining responsibilities. And under no circumstances should they depart from the high tradition of appointing competent chiefs to head complex bureaus which render vital service to the American people.

Parenthetically, it should be said that it is neither good management nor good politics for an Administration to permit the appointment of "congressional commissars" in controversial agencies. Such a practice destroys morale by breeding sycophancy and paralysis among the personnel, and defeats control of the service by the executive. As a rule such agents report to a single senator or congressman and cannot be said to represent the will of his committee, his party, or the Congress as a whole. The result politically is frequently to antagonize all the other members of the Congress in the vain attempt to appease just one.

The changes that have been suggested in the foregoing paragraphs would, we believe, considerably strengthen the responsiveness and flexibility of the public service. They would be a move in the direction of developing a clearer working relationship between political officers and career employees. But simultaneously, the stability and competence of the career service should be enhanced. Unfortunately, some recent practices and proposals have tended to weaken the service and others have threatened to impair its standards.

### III

**T**HREE are proposals pending in Congress and in certain agencies, for example, which can be classified simply as unvarnished attempts to return great blocks of career positions to a system of patronage appointments. There are strong representations from some quarters that not enough positions have been placed in Schedule C and that the Civil Service Commission has held the line too fast. There are increasing numbers of attacks on the personnel of federal regional offices, practically none of whom have the responsibility for policy determination or for the political de-

fense of departmental programs. Indeed many regional officials have been baffled by want of instruction on how to operate their offices during the period that new policy has been in the process of formulation. An educational campaign is needed to acquaint the Congress and the general public with the fact that the federal service has become too big and important, and its functions too delicate, to expect that when an Administration changes there will be new faces in every field office.

There are unhappy indications that persons cannot be appointed or promoted to certain positions in the classified civil service unless they pass a partisan "political test." But a career service based on merit cannot be developed within a system of political clearances. Furthermore, the reopening of a group of civil service positions to political endorsement does not give the chief executive and his department heads greater control of the executive establishment. On the contrary, it is notorious that employees appointed in this manner frequently lack not only the competence and the industry necessary to discharge their duties, but also rely on political influence after their appointments have been obtained and are not subject to departmental discipline.

Perhaps the most alarming threat to the federal career service as a whole is the pervading sense of insecurity and lack of morale. This cannot be attributed to any single cause. Problems growing out of the loyalty and security program constitute one of the causes. There is no question that the government is justified in times like the present in making sure of the loyalty and discretion of its employees. However, continual investigations, periodic reinvestigations under a slightly different form, and the tremendous pressures emanating from the public hearings of congressional committees on loyalty and security have had a depressing effect on the morale, independence, and spirit of even the loyal and discreet government servants. No employee knows when an anonymous, unsupported denunciation may be made against him that will cause him to be subjected to long periods of interrogation, usually private but occasionally public. Now that the review and appeals boards have been decentralized to the departments, there are varying practices in regard to these cases. The in-

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vestigations and hearings go on day by day in hundreds of cases, and it is certain that unless they are properly conducted they will continue to spread a pall of fear throughout the federal service. Certainly the system can be improved and strengthened, and certification made final, unless really new and serious evidence crops up.

One of the greatest dangers that may result from a situation where employees feel harassed and fearful is that, taking no chances on being suspected of harboring disloyal or indiscreet thoughts, they will play safe by parrotting only what they feel their superiors want to hear. They will not take the risks involved in proposing new and different approaches to problems with which their agencies are faced, and will generally tend to protect themselves by voicing no disagreement with views that they may believe harmful to the programs in which they are involved or to the nation as a whole. In these circumstances the imaginative, inquiring mind, so badly needed in the complicated federal service, will be smothered. Competent and intelligent persons will increasingly decline opportunities for federal employment. The political policy-determining officials will be forced to depend to a harmful extent upon the work of timid or sterile minds.

The following paragraph is an excerpt from a remarkable letter to the editor of the *New York Times* (printed in its issue of January 17, 1954), written by a distinguished group of former foreign service officers consisting of Norman Armour, Robert Woods Bliss, Joseph C. Grew, William Phillips, and G. Howland Shaw:

The conclusion has become inescapable, for instance, that a Foreign Service officer who reports on persons and events to the very best of his ability and who makes recommendations which at the time he conscientiously believes to be in the interest of the United States may subsequently find his loyalty and integrity challenged and may even be forced out of the service and discredited forever as a private citizen after many years of distinguished service. A premium therefore has been put upon reporting and upon recommendations which are ambiguously stated or so cautiously set forth as to be deceiving.

At least part of the problems relating to the loyalty and security of federal employees can be corrected if the President and his depart-

ment heads stand firm in support of the President's announced belief "that the primary responsibility for keeping out the disloyal and the dangerous rests squarely on the Executive Branch," and if they make it clear that the programs to carry out this responsibility will be managed by that branch.

We believe that the suppressed but nevertheless real problems of morale and fair play in the administration of the loyalty and security program are at present sufficiently serious to justify the appointment of a high-level commission of distinguished citizens to review the procedures and to make suggestions for their further improvement.

Another factor contributing to a feeling of insecurity and to a lack of morale among federal employees is the reduction in the size of the federal establishment that has taken place or is threatened in the future. There is probably no way of having first-rate morale in a service in which reductions in force are taking place. Certainly an Administration committed to an economy program has every right to reduce the size of its force. In many cases reductions are made by not filling vacant positions. Also, there has not been a great cutting back in the total number of employees. Individual readjustments are not too difficult when there are plenty of employment opportunities outside the government in a period of general prosperity. But there are certainly many shortcomings in the present reduction-in-force procedure, and there is reason to believe that the complicated system of "bumping," combined with provisions for veterans' preference, causes unnecessary insecurity and anxiety for many more employees than the one that is being terminated. A great deal of good can be done if department heads will announce when the reduction program is completed so that those who remain will know that the operation, for the time being at least, is over.

When all of the actions affecting the federal service—adopted independently and with little regard for one another—are looked at together, it becomes evident that if they are weakly or unwisely administered they will be subject to abuse and will render employees vulnerable to political pressures and their positions open to patronage appointments. In their combined effect, they are a potential threat to the normal

security of employees. For example, the department head now has the final authority to rule that a civil service position is sensitive and then, under loyalty and security procedures, some of whose governing standards are so broad and general as to be unclear and confusing, to discharge the career incumbent of the sensitive post on security grounds. The authority of the department head to initiate the placing of positions in Schedule C makes it possible, with the approval of the Civil Service Commission, to remove almost any position from the competitive civil service. Some of the causes of uncertainty on the part of employees date back to the previous Administration. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, many positions in permanent agencies have been filled by temporary appointments. They are basically vulnerable to patronage pressures. Promotions, on other than a temporary basis, have also been restricted.

A number of suggestions can be made for correcting some of the shortcomings we have mentioned. It has already been suggested that in the case of high-level professional and administrative personnel rank and salary be vested in them personally. A person of established rank and good record in the career service whose position was abolished could remain for a reasonable period in a temporary assignment until a new berth was found for him without dislocating another competent, loyal employee. Questions of seniority and veterans' preference connected with reduction-in-force practices should again be reviewed for the purpose of strengthening the possibility of retaining the most efficient employees in the federal service. In fact, veterans' preference provisions are responsible for many of the rigidities and complexities in the civil service system for which it is constantly criticized. A thorough and frank review of these provisions and their effect on the public service is in order. The practice of making long-term temporary or indefinite appointments should be discontinued, and artificial restrictions on promotions should be lifted. The Civil Service Commission, which has made a number of important improvements in its internal organization and operations, must continue to take a firm stand

against patronage inroads into the career service under guise of Schedule C appointments.

While strengthening the merit system and improving the morale and security of its personnel, the federal government should not close the open back door. It is important that there be some decent and proper method of dropping persons who have not shown ability to perform competently in government work—but not because of a desire to replace them with patronage appointees.

The federal government needs also to keep open at all times the side door for the administrative middle man, as Don K. Price has called him, who is neither political nor permanently identified with the career service. The employment of businessmen and of trained research personnel from the universities and private institutions, and the free flow from private life to government and return, is one of the outstanding ways in which the American public service differs from the closed services of the older European countries. This free flow brings freshness and life into our public administration; it also brings back into the stream of private life and to business corporations and universities a better understanding of the problems, complexities, and excellencies of the public service. In spite of many weaknesses of the dollar-a-year and without-compensation systems, they had the overwhelming strength in times of national emergency of performing precisely these functions—although their continued use in nonemergency periods may raise a number of serious problems. The increasing use of part-time consultants from professional and private life on a per diem basis or on governmental advisory committees has also had some of these virtues.

#### IV

ANOTHER danger threatening the federal service is the possibility that it cannot be staffed at the level of competence its vital operations demand. There are, of course, dozens of improvements needed in the service if it is to attract and retain the best people. Some of the more important ones may be briefly reviewed.

Executive and professional salaries continue to lag seriously behind salaries for comparable work in private life and behind increases in the cost of living. An increase in the salary levels of department and agency heads and their principal subordinates, of members of key commissions and boards, and of the personnel in the higher ranks of the career service is sorely needed. The correction of the present situation is, of course, related to pay rates in the legislative and judicial branches. The members of Congress are very sensitive to criticisms leveled against them when they raise, or even discuss the possibility of raising, their own salaries. They are also reluctant to increase the pay of higher employees in the executive branch to a level out of balance with their own compensation. At its last session the Congress established a special commission on judicial and congressional salaries for the purpose of reviewing the adequacy of the pay of members of the Judiciary and the Congress and of reporting to the Congress at its following session. Hearings which this commission held throughout the country indicated a growing realization on the part of all segments of the community that congressional and judicial salaries are inadequate. The commission, in turn, recommended on January 15 a substantial increase in judicial and congressional salaries, bringing the latter up to \$27,500. A readjustment of pay in these two branches is long overdue and should be followed by a readjustment in the higher reaches of the executive branch.

The opportunities for promotion in the federal career service should be defined and expanded. Present arbitrary limitations that have been established by congressional riders should be eliminated. A governmentwide interexchangeable pool of top career men is needed. The Civil Service Commission, in conjunction with the operating departments and agencies, needs to develop a more effective system for facilitating transfers and promotions across agency lines that will break down the barriers of prejudice and tradition that have frequently confined promotional opportunities to the personnel employed in bureaus or work units where vacancies occur and will make for greater use of qualified persons in the service. To be most effective, this system should

be accompanied by a more intensive program of personnel development and training, particularly executive development, than has heretofore been available on the civil side of the executive branch.

Another problem of the public service is that its prestige has suffered new blows in the continuing defamation to which it is subject. Misconceptions about "working for the government" are so prevalent that gifted and promising young people are failing to enter the service, and many who are already in it, in excellent standing, are voluntarily leaving it. It is in the beginning grades that this situation is most serious.

For twenty years the Junior Management Assistant examination and its predecessors have been the outstanding device for recruiting young university graduates with excellent records in scholarship and campus leadership for entrance into a career in the general civil service. With the aid of interne and training techniques, demonstrated so successfully over a period of years by the National Institute of Public Affairs, direct contacts with university presidents were maintained, and year after year a fresh crop of gifted and eager college graduates were brought into government service, to its great stimulation. Educational officials developed a new attitude toward and interest in the general civil service as a useful and satisfying vocational choice for college graduates. This movement, the result of a joint effort of the universities and the foundations, made a significant contribution to the quality and prestige of public service as a career for young people. It was a nonpartisan movement, entirely free from politics.

Today, unfortunately, American universities and foundations are beginning to wonder whether public service continues to be a career to be recommended to college graduates. College officials and students alike attest to the declining interest of students in employment in the federal service and to their concern that satisfactory careers can no longer be found there. In a time of general high employment, other avenues seem more promising and less risky. Many of the able young officials who have entered the civil service through the route of the JMA, with high idealism and motivation, are frustrated and insecure. Even

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more alarming is the marked falling off of the number of college graduates who are willing to become candidates for the JMA examination. The number dropped from over 21,000 in 1950, to about 15,000 in 1952, to 8,300 in 1953. There has been a similar drop in the number of candidates for other entrance-type positions.

There is a waning interest also in government as a vocation in other career services which are prestigious and have attracted able and vigorous talent. The growing doubt among Armed Forces personnel about the military service as a respected career has been recognized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has led to the establishment of a special *ad hoc* committee to consider and report on this problem. The committee concurred in the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and concluded that "unless the present trend of career personnel leaving the service can be reversed, most serious consequences to the National defense effort will result." In his message on the State of the Union, President Eisenhower recognized this problem, stressed that "a professional corps is the heart of any security organization," and recommended as one way of retaining in the career service of our Armed Forces "a more generous use of benefits important to service morale."

For many years the Foreign Service examination attracted candidates of high quality, but there is a growing impression that many of the best qualified students are no longer applying and, indeed, that the universities are less enthusiastic in urging them to do so. Talented Foreign Service officers are resigning, at a time when the foreign responsibilities of the United States require the best we can command. There is increasing difficulty in recruiting able people in our temporary and technical missions abroad.

In these vital fields, so important to our security and prestige at home and abroad, these tendencies need to be taken into account, their causes identified, and steps taken to turn the tide. The universities, the professional societies, and the foundations have a special duty not to let this situation—in which they have demonstrated so much leadership and in which they have a considerable stake—deteriorate to the point where the public service becomes permanently eroded.

A new Administration has a responsibility as well as an opportunity to redefine and clarify the prospects that a life career in the public service offers to promising people who have invested a large amount of time and money in training themselves for useful and satisfying careers. And the attitude of the public toward such people needs to change. Why should not every student who passes the exceedingly difficult JMA examination, for example, receive as much notice and honor in his home town and campus press as the young folks who have won the coveted 4-H awards?

## V

MANY of these things seem simple enough to do; but is the climate right? Rowland Egger<sup>4</sup> and others have asked this question recently in connection with governmental career programs. The frankest and easiest reply is that it is not. But this should not lead to a doctrine of despair and inertia, or it will never be right again. Unlike the weather, this is a kind of climate over which man has considerable control. It would be unpardonable exaggeration to wring our hands and to cry that all is lost. In fact, there is such a large area of accomplishment, opportunity, and hope in the career service that is firmly grounded in our institutions, that a resolute effort to change attitudes for the better has excellent possibilities of success. However the current crop of graduates may regard the public service, it is true that the government continues to present a challenging and attractive career opportunity to young Americans, including those who have had exceptional advantages in education and training. It is particularly suited to those who do not frustrate easily; for, like every vocation, government service has its special hazards and heartaches.

No better brief statement concerning public service careers, their satisfactions and also their hazards, can be found than a recent advertisement in the "career series" sponsored by the New York Life Insurance Company. This statement on the government service was written in a remarkably temperate and balanced vein by Robert Moses, himself an able and dis-

<sup>4</sup> Rowland Egger, "Is the Climate Right?" *Personnel Administration* (July, 1953), pp. 1-5.

tinguished career man in government, at present commissioner of parks for New York City. That a private corporation should sponsor such a series of paid advertisements, and should include therein two full pages of description of government service as a career opportunity for young Americans, is in itself a promising sign. Such a thing would have been inconceivable twenty-five years ago.

Heartening, too, is an article in the November, 1953, issue of *Fortune* magazine, entitled "This Is a Bureaucrat." It describes the work, life, and attitudes of a distinguished civil servant, Roger W. Jones, assistant director for legislative reference of the United States Bureau of the Budget. The editors of *Fortune* put the following lead before this article:

Just because you once had a run-in with some officious functionary in Washington, you may not know all about bureaucrats. Some of them you'd be lucky to have in your own management. Here, the story of one civil servant who gives the public an ample money's worth of service.

The federal service should be a source of pride to the American people, and articles of this kind tend to correct the sensational news stories about occasional cases of disloyalty and dishonesty which, as every one knows, make headlines more often than do stories of the day-by-day competent and loyal work which characterizes the public service. A businessman returning from a period of Washington service recently told us that he would hate to be called to account for every action in the business or private lives of his 5,000 employees, yet in the federal government the slightest transgression of a minor official may at any moment become a threat to an otherwise well-run Administration.

And it is primarily the press and the citizens themselves who must take a different attitude toward government employees if the climate of public service is to become healthful. They must cease to regard government officials as a pariah caste. They will not get cheaper government, lower taxes, or better service by spreading the canard that everyone on a public payroll is incompetent, lazy, disloyal, or abnormal. The morale of a public service in a free society needs to be high, and its morale depends greatly on the esteem in which fellow citizens

hold it. The press can make a major contribution in this matter by a more positive approach. Why should not all Americans show a sense of pride in our "civic victories," as Richard S. Childs calls them, rather than continually concentrating on efforts to disclose and castigate the occasional transgressions and shortcomings in the public service? How can we continue to spread the gospel of the American way of life among other nations if we continue indiscriminately to deride our own public service?

## VI

**I**N THE last twenty years there have been three landmarks of advance in the public personnel field. In 1935, the privately financed Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel reported its belief that civil service systems had a larger mission than the negative one of preventing patronage appointments—that they had the positive duty to make a career opportunity of the public service. This major finding of a distinguished group had an enormous influence on civil service systems at all levels.

In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management, all three of whose members had participated on the Commission of Inquiry, carried this concept still further. The committee asserted the need for spreading the career system "upward, outward, and downward" and posited the function of personnel management in the federal service as one of the primary and indivisible duties of the Chief Executive. It invented the concept of an Executive Office of the President in which the personnel function for the first time was given institutional recognition within the White House.<sup>5</sup> This concept, too, has had great influence in other jurisdictions, and the formula of the personnel officer as an aid to the mayor, the city manager, and the governor in carrying out one of the principal elements of administrative management has been widely accepted.

The first Hoover Commission in 1947 reaffirmed these postulates, and went further in proposing new approaches to decentralized

<sup>5</sup> President Eisenhower has carried this concept one step further by designating the chairman of the Civil Service Commission as his personal adviser and representative in civilian personnel matters.

personnel operations in a vast establishment, with central leadership, policy determination, standard setting, and audit. It emphasized constructively the need for an intimate relationship between personnel management and general management of a program as a whole. Many of its recommendations for the federal service have been adopted.

The second Hoover Commission might well concentrate on the two related problems expounded in this paper: the opportunities and rational limits of a well-regulated career service, and the solution of the problems of morale which is the necessary foundation for attracting talent to and retaining it in the public service.

Pending such studies, an Administration manned by many industrial leaders can well afford to turn its attention to the morale-build-

ing attitudes that are needed in the federal departments—attitudes which they have fostered so diligently in their own corporations. The new Administration in its first year was necessarily preoccupied with securing new men for high posts, with abolishing positions, with firing people, and with the difficult process of learning about its job and re-evaluating programs. The time has now come for giving new encouragement and positive, inspiring leadership to what is by and large a magnificent civil service, for re-thinking the political and expert roles of the respective members of the cast of characters, and for advancing and extending the merit system, both for the temporary recruits who wish to serve their country and for the vast body of earnest men and women who have identified their lives and careers with government service.

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#### Combining Administrative Traditions

Another problem in international administration is closely connected with the ways in which such an administration is influenced by different administrative traditions and national legal ideologies. I would like to give you a practical example of significance. In the United Nations Administration as it is now set up, you find a blend between administrative traditions typical of various parts of the world. For example from the American administrative practice the United Nations has derived a tradition calling for a high degree of specialization, from the European side a tradition calling for a high degree of permanency of employment and professional flexibility. The American system of specialization, as is well known, creates a need for a comparatively larger number of officials. But this number varies from time to time both upward and downward as changes are made in policies and programs and this in turn leads to less emphasis upon, and fewer safeguards for, permanency of tenure. The European system, on the other hand, works with a smaller number of officials and the employees are supposed to be able to adjust to a variety of different responsibilities. This European system makes it possible to give to employment a high degree of permanency, wherein the tendency to rigidity is counterbalanced by the flexibility of service. When you combine such traditions, as is being done in the United Nations, you are really trying out a new technique, natural in the light of prevailing circumstances, but fraught with difficulties, and so far insufficiently explored. By methods of trial and error we have to work towards an equilibrium between the various elements, adjusted to the special needs of a universal international administration.

—Dag Hammarskjold, "The United Nations and the Political Scientist,"  
47 *The American Political Science Review* 976-77 (December, 1953).

# Professionalization in the Public Service: Too Little or Too Much?

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## *The Rise of Professionalism in the Public Service*

**I**N THE 1936 edition of that admirable reference volume, *The Municipal Yearbook*, a new section was begun, entitled "Professionalization of the Municipal Service." This section was composed of twenty-four pages and discussed eleven types of professions among municipal employees. Some of these were old professions, which had been organized for many years; others were much newer. School superintendents, city managers, librarians, public works directors, municipal finance officers, recreation directors, public welfare directors, assessors, purchasing agents, fire chiefs, and police chiefs were listed, in that order.

That the "professionalization" of the public service at all levels has proceeded apace, before that date and since, few would question. By 1939, the *Yearbook* listed nineteen types of professions and spoke of their "rocketing membership." There are more and more different professions. Old professions are branching and becoming differentiated. Vocations that might once have been classified in the "skilled trade" category are being promoted to the "professional" level. The firemen and policemen apparently were already on their way in 1936. The foresters and agriculturalists and librarians and sanitarians have sought and attained the desired status. Completely new professional areas have arisen, partly splintered off from established professions and partly syntheses of older skills and groups: penologists, personnel technicians, traffic controllers, and many others.

Career opportunities in some of the professions are entirely or largely confined to the

public service. The military and the foreign services are obvious examples, along with fire and police, probation, and city management. Public employment predominates to only a slightly less degree, however, in the professions of teaching, social work, and librarianship. Others, of course, are very strong and old professions which have substantial career opportunities in both public and private service; among these are law, medicine, engineering, and accounting.

The growth of professional organizations of public servants is an indication that both the professions and their memberships are multiplying. The National Association of Assessing Officers, organized in 1934, had 150 members in 1936 and 1,550 members in 1952. The National Probation and Parole Association, organized in 1907, had 12,000 members in 1936 and 34,000 members in 1952. The National Education Association (perhaps the oldest of the "public" professional associations), organized in 1857, had 191,000 members in 1936 and 450,000 members in 1952. The Municipal Finance Officers Association of the United States and Canada, organized in 1906, had 475 members in 1936 and 2,500 members in 1952. The International City Managers' Association, organized in 1914, had 308 manager members in 1936 and 813 manager members in 1952. The American Society of Planning Officials, organized in 1934, had 500 members in 1936 and 3,000 members in 1952.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a profession as "a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others or in the practice of an art founded

upon it." R. H. Tawney adds that "it is not simply a collection of individuals who get a living for themselves by the same kind of work . . . it is a body of men who carry on their work in accordance with rules designed to enforce certain standards both for the better protection of its members and for the better service of the public."<sup>1</sup>

The 1936 *Municipal Yearbook* (pp. 211-12) listed the following traits as characteristic of professional groups of public officials:

1. An organized body of knowledge which is made available to its members.
2. The establishment of standards of competence for entrance and promotion in the service and persistent effort to secure the general acceptance of these standards.
3. Responsibility for the development of training opportunities for present and prospective members of the profession.
4. A well-developed sense of the dignity and worth of public service.
5. A deep feeling of obligation to serve the public honestly and well.
6. A code of ethical conduct the violation of which by any member will serve to bar him from the profession.
7. An organization established for the promotion of these objectives.

It would be a brave soul indeed who would try to compile a list of professions, or to designate any exact criteria for exclusion or inclusion.

#### *Attitudes toward Professionalization*

THE standard and orthodox attitude toward the rise of professions in the public service has been enthusiastically favorable. To quote the 1936 *Yearbook* again: "One major hope for the success of democracy as an effective philosophy of government lies in the professionalization of public officials. . . . Experience in the past, analysis of the present, and forecast of the future combine to suggest that self-control by professional groups of the officials themselves is the key opening the door to effective democracy." (p. 211)

Leonard White commented in the 1926 edition of his text: "Unlimited opportunities for the elevation of the public service to the ranks of a recognized profession . . . await

<sup>1</sup> R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (1920), p. 92.

cultivation," and added, in his conclusion, that one of the main lines of development which might be expected in the future was "the emergence of the specialist and the expert, the origin of significant economic and professional organizations of public employees. . . ."<sup>2</sup> By the time the 1939 edition came out, he had added a complete new chapter on professionalization and public service associations, which he concluded by saying:

In brief, as long-range implications of the trends of the last quarter century are examined, the importance of the growth in numbers and influence of the professional, scientific and technical groups in the public service assumes large proportions. The competence of the public service is favorably affected; its impartiality and objectivity are more nearly assured; its capacity to serve long-time programs intelligently is increased; its prestige is elevated. Without any conscious effort on the part of government, professional and scientific ideals have taken possession of substantial parts of the civil service. This is clear gain.<sup>3</sup>

It became standard practice to emphasize the great value of *professional responsibility* as a prime addition to or substitute for legal and political responsibilities, with their obvious inadequacies. John Gaus spoke of the "'inner check' of the pride of its members . . .," and of "the responsibility of the civil servant to the standards of his profession, in so far as those standards make for the public interest. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

Observation has produced enough evidence to convince most of us, I think, of the general accuracy of these evaluations. Any of us who have ventured in and around our county courthouses very much cannot fail to have marked the contrast between those offices where professionalism is little advanced—usually the offices of the sheriff, the tax assessor, and the road commissioners (if they have offices)—and those offices, like welfare, health, and agriculture, where professional standards and training are much more clearly in evidence.

In spite of the generally rosy optimism to-

<sup>2</sup> Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (Macmillan, 1926), pp. 381, 475.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* (2d ed., 1939), p. 425.

<sup>4</sup> John M. Gaus, "The Responsibility of Public Administration," in John M. Gaus and others, *The Frontiers of Public Administration* (University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 41, 59. The qualifying phrase in the quotation should be noted.

ward the process of professionalization, doubts and questions have not been entirely absent. Leonard White, who had looked forward with considerable anticipation to professionalization in 1926, and welcomed it with open arms in 1939, apparently had some questions in his mind in 1942, when he wrote:

The place of the professional group in this gradual clarification of function in the total task of administration is far from clear now, and its future trends are obscure. That each of the professions (excepting perhaps theology) will place its special competence at the service of government in larger measure seems certain. That the tone of the public service will be elevated as the professions impress more and more upon it their professional ideals is clear. But the extent of the contribution of the several groups to overhead management is not clear, and present trends give no conclusive clue to the future.<sup>5</sup>

It is perhaps symbolic that the section on professionalization of the municipal service, so bravely begun by the *Municipal Yearbook* in 1936, was dropped in 1940 in favor of a plan which included any information dealing with this process in the various sections dealing with particular functions.

Although the advantages of the process are almost overwhelmingly obvious, it seems clear that professionalization tends to lead to a stratification of the governmental community, to separatism as between governmental functions, and to a danger of undue control by special publics rather than by the whole public.

#### *Doubts and Questions*

**L**AUDABLE though many of the goals and ambitions and standards of a profession may be, the interests of a profession do not always coincide with public interest, and there may be occasions when the profession tends to pursue its own rather than the public goals. As Tawney put it in 1920, "all professions have some rules which protect the interests of the community and others which are an imposition on it."<sup>6</sup> The state of Alabama has perhaps gone

<sup>5</sup> Leonard D. White, "The Public Service of the Future," in Leonard D. White, ed., *The Future of Government in the United States* (University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 203.

<sup>6</sup> Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

about as far as a state can go in placing its trust in a profession by virtue of its 75-year-old designation of the Medical Association of the State of Alabama as the State Board of Public Health. The constitution of this Medical Association (which, under the law, is the State Board of Health) states very clearly the two kinds of goals when it lists as the purpose of the organization: "to combine the influence of medical men of the State for the purpose of protecting their legitimate rights and of promoting the sanitary welfare of the people."<sup>7</sup> It would be difficult to frame a more succinct statement of purpose, or one which poses the dilemma of professionalization any more clearly.

These professions, with their special interests and their alliances with special publics, raise the problem of the relationship of government to interest groups in a very special way. Forming, as they frequently do, an impeccably correct and proper link between governmental personnel and groups wanting or needing something from government (as all groups do), they present a type of *built-in* representation of a special type of special interest.

This problem is acutely presented when one of the tasks of a professionally oriented section of the bureaucracy is the full or partial control of the profession itself. The State Board of Public Health, in Alabama, a governmental-yet-private agency, is also the board of licensing for the medical profession. This is a very common practice, and the problems it produces can be imagined. In many of these instances, of course, we have incorporated into our governmental and social structure a not-too-modernized version of the medieval guild.

Furthermore, while most governmental agencies have or tend to develop separatist tendencies, these tendencies seem to be inherent in an agency where professionalism has taken hold.

Partly this special insistence on independence is caused by the resistance of the traditional political structure, particularly at the local level, to the development of the kind of training and personal mobility associated with the professions. Persons wanting to gain the obvious and alluring advantages of professionaliza-

<sup>7</sup> Constitution of the Medical Association of the State of Alabama, Article II, Section 7.

tion in the prison systems, for example, or the recreation departments, or the schools, have felt it necessary to insist, as a first step, that the only way to overcome the resistance of the political officialdom was to "separate out" the particular service or function in order to permit recruitment of professional people and training of new professionals and to secure the desirable combination of tenure and mobility.

More important as a reason for this separationism, however, is probably the intrinsic character of a profession. The thing that makes a profession is that it is something different, that it is based upon a special lore which must in some measure be esoteric and not available to any Tom, Dick, or Harry. The status or social esteem which professionalization brings depends upon difference, on separatism. In defending the independence of the State Health Department in Alabama, a former state health officer put it this way: "the philosophy of this scheme of organization rests on the irrefutable postulate that, in the administration of a service so highly technical as the public health, those charged with the responsibility and authority for such administration should possess the requisite training and knowledge of the sciences embraced by such technical service."<sup>8</sup> Or, as the authors of the article on "Professions" in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* say: "this recognition [as a profession] may be hindered by dependence, which militates against group consciousness since it is only under the stimulus of the latter that the practitioners associate together and become a profession in the full sense of the word."<sup>9</sup>

This desire for independence, motivated often by desire for status but justified on the grounds of the possession of the peculiar lore, is one of the powerful disintegrating forces acting upon governmental organization. Although it frequently knits a particular professional group—and the function associated with it—very closely together, it shatters general political control. The extreme example, probably, is one of the biggest and oldest professions—public education. Here professionalism

<sup>8</sup>Quoted in Robert T. Daland, *Administration of Public Health in Alabama* (a manuscript to be published soon by the Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama), p. 336.

<sup>9</sup>A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, "Professions," in 6 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* 478.

has led to a whole series of separate governments. To use my own state as an example again, the governing body of the University of Alabama is a largely self-perpetuating board set up by the state Constitution, and in some respects it is on a par with, rather than subordinate to, the Governor and Legislature of the state. I must confess that as a member of this particular profession I am sometimes grateful for this insulation from normal political control.

If this professional independence becomes strongly entrenched before integrating forces are introduced, the task of bringing the threads of government into some sort of unified pattern may well be almost impossible. It is difficult to conceive how a county manager, for example, can possibly engage in any real direction of the welfare and agriculture and health and school people presumably working for the county government.

Although there is much truth in the exultant cry of the 1936 *Yearbook* at the discovery of professionalization as "the key opening the door to effective democracy," this key also raises some rather grave questions for democracy. Is specialized competence attainable only at the expense of democratic control? Must professional responsibility be a substitute for rather than an adjunct to responsibility through hierarchy to the electorate? First, there is some feeling (with clear lines of descent from Jacksonianism) that this whole business of setting some people apart from other people on the grounds that they have been anointed with some special oil does violence to fundamental American precepts. Opposition to an "administrative class" in the American civil service, or the establishment of an administrative staff college comparable to the one in Great Britain, has been based on these grounds. Second, the strengthening of these new priestly castes challenges rather strongly various of the other dogmas of the public administration fraternity—the single executive, the council-manager plan, the executive budget, central control of purchasing, the basic tenets of the reorganization movement.

Recognition of the mixed motives leading to the desire of professional services to be removed from or kept out of "politics" is accompanied by considerable skepticism as to the

feasibility or desirability of such an escape. A state health officer in Alabama, opposing the appointment of laymen to the State Board of Health, says that the fundamental objective of the Alabama system "was to divorce public health from politics and the spoils system, and to keep it free of eleemosynary sentimentalism and specious quackery of social reforms."<sup>10</sup> It may be suggested that professionalism, in getting "out of politics," is merely substituting for the open and often earthy politics of an un-educated electorate and its all too human leaders the concealed but sanctified politics of a priesthood.

Not only may there be qualms at the walling-off of these hallowed preserves from normal democratic controls; the question may properly be raised with regard to whether, within the temple walls, there is liberty, equality, and fraternity. To use again the example of the old and respected profession which is operating the governmental health program of the state of Alabama: the governing body of the Medical Association of the State of Alabama is a bicameral Medical Legislature which would resemble the United States Congress if the United States Senate were larger than the House of Representatives, and if vacancies in Senate seats were filled by election in a joint session of Congress.<sup>11</sup> The ordinary professional practitioner is far removed from the seats of power. The founder of this system said that "the secret of her [Medical Association of the State of Alabama] success is the unrivalled excellence of her organization, and the thoroughness of her discipline, almost like that of an army."<sup>12</sup>

The effect of the burgeoning and strengthening of the professions upon intergovernmental relations has many ramifications. As an inter-level coordinating device, within a single function or a single professional activity, the professions are of almost incalculable importance. The professional link between the forester at the federal level and the forester at the state level, between the social worker at the state level and the social worker at the local level,

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in Carey Stabler, *History of Public Health in Alabama* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1945), p. 169.

<sup>11</sup> Daland, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Daland, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

can bridge the gap between Washington and Montgomery, between Montgomery and Double Springs, perhaps even better than the conditions that go along with the dollar. Many a state highway engineer is much more intimate with the engineers in the Bureau of Public Roads than with anybody in the Governor's office, and to compare the relationships which a county welfare director has with her fellow welfare workers at the state office to those which she has with the county governing board is almost ludicrous.

Furthermore, it seems that the growth of centralization and the growth of professionalization have a closer relationship than being merely coincidental in time. Weldon Cooper, in a letter concerning this subject, writes of "the heavy hand that the professional at the state level lays on local government officials. The oracle speaks and the underlings obey, even though they often don't quite know what it is he says." Frequently, also, it has seemed that the only way to professionalize a service or function, and get the advantages incident thereto, is to transfer it to a higher level of government. One of the reasons for the transfer of the road-building function from the local level to the state level in North Carolina and Virginia and other states must surely have been to get a higher degree of professional competence. Many another function, inadequately and inexpertly performed at the local level, is being shoved up to a higher level in search of enough know-how and expertise to provide an acceptable level of performance.

#### *Advantages and Disadvantages*

IT MAY be of value to attempt a sort of rough summing up of the advantages and disadvantages of this process of professionalization in the public service. It is made with a full realization that no such summary can be complete, and that some of these items may be much the same thing stated in different words.

The following may be listed as advantages of the process:

1. Professionalization tends to promote respect for and recognition of technical expertise. In a world so dominated by technological complexity and change, the importance of this consideration is beyond all measurement.

2. The increase of technical competence, based upon higher levels of education and training, may have a transfer value in producing a higher degree of respect for facts and rationality and high standards even in areas other than the professional one immediately at hand. This, it may be suggested, is perhaps at least part of the reason why, from time to time, an extremely broad-gauged generalist is brought up through the path of a professional training.

3. The professions tend to produce a group concern for and enforcement of minimum standards, both of technical performance and of ethical conduct. In view of the inadequacy of other controls, the importance of this group discipline is difficult to overestimate.

4. Professionalization provides a degree of insulation from pressures for discrimination and unfair treatment of clientele—protection based upon training, status, and group cohesive support.

5. It may be that the relative independence of the professions helps to avoid direct democratic control in some areas where such control would be of doubtful value. Is it appropriate for a city council to decide that one high school text is better than another?

6. Professional organization serves as one of the strongest vertical and horizontal connecting links—from level to level and unit to unit—within the same function. It certainly facilitates communications and the spread of new developments in the particular function or service.

7. Professional systems make for a higher degree of interchangeability of personnel among governmental units and provide an almost indispensable setting for the development of various "career" services.

8. Activities in professional associations provide incentives for the continued acquisition of knowledge and skill by individuals in the service.

9. The interchange of information and ideas and the promotion of study stimulated by professional channels push forward the boundaries of knowledge about techniques and about public problems. The development of certain groups from the purely social to these really professional levels has been characterized as a progression from "rum-drinking to research."

10. The professions provide an "in-group" loyalty and *esprit de corps* that serve in some measure as substitutes, in getting and keeping public employees, for other rewards that are frequently not forthcoming to public servants.

11. Professionalization helps provide a satisfaction to workers that is a value goal in itself. Two sorts of satisfaction may be distinguished here—one summed up in Veblen's phrase "the instinct of workmanship" and the other in John Collier's "through your societies shall you live."

Among the disadvantages and question marks concerning professionalization may be listed these:

1. The welfare of the professional group inevitably competes at places with the welfare of larger portions of the population. At times this may be the welfare of the clientele; much more frequently it is the welfare of the supporting taxpayers.

2. Through professional ties, the members of the bureaucracy may be unduly identified with a *portion* of the clientele of the government agency, or of the public, thus making impartiality and even-handed treatment more difficult, or allowing special publics to have undue influence or special access.

3. Professionalization insulates not only from the particularism and favoritism of politics, but also from political control in the public interest. It frequently does this by the use of the greatly frustrating curtain of a profession of special knowledge unavailable to the layman yet somewhat mistrusted by him. This special knowledge resembles at times the mystifying lore of the medicine man and the priesthood.

4. Professions are perhaps frequently lacking in internal democracy. As voluntary groupings, they are somewhat exempt from scrutiny as to the democracy of their own power structures.

5. Professionalism limits the extension of public service at times by insistence on certain standards, or on certain personnel qualifications, when those standards or the personnel with those particular qualifications are not available.

6. Professionalism may diminish the trans-

ferability of personnel within a jurisdiction and limit the full utilization of the competencies of all the actual and potential participants in a governmental enterprise. For example, only those anointed as social workers can move into and work for a public welfare agency. At times, this approach produces a sort of stratification which cripples rather than helps the public service.

7. The particularism and separatism inherent in the "special" competence of a profession increase the difficulty of coordination of governmental functions. This can be said in many different ways, and has been suggested in several ways in earlier pages in this article.

8. At times, professionalization tends to weaken local control and local civic participation in certain governmental functions.

#### *Cycles and Tendencies*

THERE may be certain regularities in the pattern—almost a cycle—with regard to the relationship between professionalization and central democratic control, which is the key problem. When a service or a function is dominated by the petty, particularistic, traditional, spoils type of politics, and a need and demand for improvement of the service develops, the initial impetus will be in the direction of separation—a separate board, special tenure protections, special merit systems, narrow and technical qualifications for office, earmarked funds, and so on. With separation and independence, professionalism may be introduced and grow. After the quality of performance in this particular function has been improved, and after it is realized that more and more of these functions are being separated out, the need for some kind of integration will become more pressing than was the need and demand for professionalization in the particular service. Then, through a reorganization, or through institution of the city manager or county manager plan, the professionalized service can perhaps be brought once again more nearly within the orbit of central democratic control.

Two examples may be helpful here. In many jurisdictions, it has appeared that the only way to professionalize the personnel function was to break it away from the politicians, set up a separate and independent agency, and proceed

to professionalize it. Only thus could any personnel work worthy of the name be done. Then, as professionalization sets in, more separatism develops along with the acquisition of special techniques until, as Wallace Sayre put it, we have the triumph of technique over purpose. Then the need for integration, for the realization of the general governmental goals, begins to outweigh the need and demand for technical expertness.

In the prison departments of many states, a similar cycle, somewhat less well advanced, can be discerned. The prisons, ridden with spoils politics and parole patronage, have been pulled out from the old political controls in order that some semblance of professionalization may be introduced. As the professionalism develops, the need for integration may emerge and a reorganization pull the function back into the main structure.

There is no intention of suggesting that this "pattern of development" is anything like universal. But in many cases there seems to be a need to separate and professionalize to bring order out of chaos; then the professionals must be again brought to heel by the politicians through organizational control and responsibility. There may be a real danger that the reaction against independent professionalism in those areas advanced in the cycle may hinder the only movement offering real hope to those still in the mire of amateur, petty, parochial politics.

An interesting question may be raised at this point. What is the effect of the development of professional public administrators (not social workers or foreign service officers, but public administrators) on this process? At times the public administrators have taken off down the same track as the professionals of other types. Especially is this true where they have become concerned with the professionalization of the auxiliary services—personnel, finance, property control, and so forth. The separatism and cult characteristics of personnel administration are among the most marked of any of the public service professions. William W. Shaw, personnel director of the city of New Orleans and broad-gauged political scientist by original training, argues very persuasively in a recent issue of *Public Personnel*

*Review*<sup>13</sup> that personnel is something special and apart which cannot be entrusted to the popularly chosen executive.

But the tendencies now present and emerging in general public service training, and in the general literature of public administration, seem to be in the opposite direction. Politics has been allowed to get back into public administration; we have backed away from insisting that public administrators must keep politicians at arm's length; we are admitting that city managers make political decisions; we are teaching students by a case method which certainly does not leave them convinced that professional public administrators can ever be separated from general democratic control.

It may be that the development of professional generalists (if that is not a contradiction in terms) is one of the most hopeful avenues for countering some of the disturbing trends produced by the professionalizing process. The rise of hospital administration as a profession, for example, is challenging some of the special prerogatives of the medical profession and the nursing profession and the pharmacists in the public hospitals. The rise of city managers has taken a great deal of the wind out of the sails of the professionalized and separatist personnel workers.

Perhaps, if we can professionalize our generalists before the professionalization of our specialists has fully crystallized, in a particular jurisdiction or area, then the separatism with which the professions have tried to protect themselves from the unprofessionalized politicians can be tempered. In other words, if a county manager or a city manager or an "enlightened" governor's office and staff have the reins, technical competence and professionalism in the particular services and functions of government may be developed without so much urge for insularity and dismemberment. It may be suggested, however, that this amelioration will be in degree only, since not all of the forces leading to professional independence will be removed by the existence of professionalism in the central office.

<sup>13</sup> William W. Shaw, "Independent Civil Service Commissions and Executive Power," 14 *Public Personnel Review* 113-16 (July, 1953).

#### *Lines of Development*

WHAT, in conclusion, may be offered as appropriate lines of development with regard to public service professions and professionalization? What things can be done, and should be done, about the professionalization of the public service? To attempt to answer these questions, of course, is somewhat rash, but a few suggestions may be ventured:

1. The development of the characteristics of professionalism among public employees where those characteristics are absent, or slow in developing, should be encouraged. It certainly seems clear that the wave of professionalism should be ridden and directed, not stemmed. We must continue to promote the professionalization of the public service, while recognizing that professionalization in the public service poses various problems.

2. The professionalization of those who tend to be generalists should be especially promoted. Hospital administrators, for example, tend to be generalists in comparison to doctors and nurses and pharmacists and laboratory technicians. City management is perhaps the best example of the development of a generalist profession.

To those who fear that the development of an administrative class, or a special group of general administrators, is contrary to the democratic fiber of American life, it might be said that the American democratic fiber is much stronger than they think, and that we can go far in the direction of distinguishing and dignifying generalist administrators without endangering any basic patterns in our society.

3. Every effort should be made to try to incorporate at least a breath of generalism into professional education.

4. Unreasonable dogmatism with regard to the integrative doctrines of public administration may not be wise. It must be recognized that advocacy of a single executive, the subordination of all or most administrative agencies to a single focus of power, the executive budget, and so on, are sometimes in conflict with the development of professionalization which, it has been suggested above, is still a desirable goal. There may be circumstances in which the circuitous route is more appropriate—where professionalization is more urgently

needed than integration. If integration can be accomplished first, or insisted upon when and where it is possible, many problems will then be short-circuited. It is inconceivable, however, that the welfare workers, the agricultural extension people, the health people, the professional educators can be hauled back into the orbit of a county board while that board is still rural and amateur and concerned with petty personal politics. But whenever there is anything of substance to integrate around, it seems desirable to bring as many governmental functions as possible, including the professional ones, as close to the common center as possible.

5. Every encouragement should be given to the continuation or development of concern by laymen for professional problems. Advisory and governing boards in professional agencies, for example, should have as much lay participation as possible. Public health is too im-

portant to be left to the doctors, and public education too important to be left to the schoolteachers. Occasional or frequent surveys or studies of professional programs by lay groups may have great value.

6. Attempts by political governing officials to coordinate professional activities would seem desirable, even where the attainment of any real coordination or control over the professional functions seems unlikely. It would seem desirable, for example, for governors to invite even those professional agency heads over whom they have little control to staff meetings or cabinet meetings, and for county governing bodies, or mayors, or managers to make such efforts as seem reasonable to bring the professional agencies within their orbits. Contact between the professional and the politician may broaden and enlighten both—and this statement is probably the best observation with which this paper could be concluded.

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#### The States in the Federal System

. . . My own value choice at this period of American history is in favor of strengthening the position of the forty-eight commonwealths in the federal system. My reasons are three-fold. In the first place the federal government needs help. It has become so involved in world responsibilities, the conduct of foreign affairs, the maintenance of the armed forces, the production of atomic weapons, the support of the internal economy, and many other inescapable domestic functions that at best it stands in danger of the neglect of matters other than the most urgent, at worst in danger of administrative collapse. In the second place our traditional forms of democracy are jeopardized by the tendency to remove decisions on public policy and its application from the localities and states to Washington. Finally it can be argued that the risks involved in the concentration of power are not to be accepted lightly. The concentration of economic power necessarily involves a corresponding increase in political power, but the doctrine of competition in an open market has an application in the field of government as well as in business. A quasi-monopoly of public power may have dangers as well as a near monopoly of economic power.

—Leonard D. White, *The States and the Nation* (Louisiana State University Press, 1953), pp. 4-5.

# Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility

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## I

**N**O PROBLEM is more momentous for the modern democratic state than its capacity to develop rational, responsible, goal-oriented policy. In many fields, including the most crucial ones, foreign policy and defense, the staff work on which well conceived public policy must depend can scarcely be supplied elsewhere than in the great government departments. To only a somewhat lesser degree this is true of agriculture, finance, commerce, and labor. Accordingly, a major task of administration is the formulation of policy proposals for consideration by the political executive and the legislature. The capacity of our administrative organizations to perform rationally and responsibly the task of formulating the policy alternatives for politically responsible superiors is the major criterion of organization efficiency. The beginning of wisdom in administrative analysis consists in a realistic assessment of the capacity of the organization to think.

The conception, now formally abjured, of the separation of policy and administration has obscured the vital "thinking" role of organized bureaucracy in government. The doctrine of the political supremacy of the elected over the nonelected branch of the government has inspired the delusion that to be politically supreme the legislature must not only make final decisions on policy but must also have primacy in the whole process of policy formulation—that the bureaucracy should be an instrument rather than a brain. The necessities of the case have forced the abandonment of this view save as folklore and political metaphysics. In practice it must be recognized that the bureaucracy is a part, and a highly important

part, of the collective brain that somehow thinks or emotes a government policy.

The attempt of some writers, influenced by logical positivism, to construct a value-free science of administration may well have the unintended and logically unwarranted result of reviving the policy-administration dichotomy in new verbiage. Policy would become a matter of determining values, a legislative-political matter; administration would consist in the application of the values set by the political branch to sets of facts ascertained by the administrative. In this reasoning, administration could arrive at determinate answers without being sickled o'er by the pale cast of policy thought.

However attractive an administration receiving its values from political policy-makers may be, it has one fatal flaw. It does not accord with the facts of administrative life. Nor is it likely to. In fact, it is highly dubious even as an ideal. Though the quest for science, mathematical precision, and certainty has an undeniable psychological appeal, it runs the risk of becoming a fastidious piece of ivory-tower escapism.

It is this psychological thrust of logical positivism as vulgarized in the social sciences that constitutes its greatest danger to responsible inquiry. Ever since Hume's successful attack on natural law, the problem of how to relate values to some satisfactory process of verification or validation has haunted political theory. As Sabine has justly pointed out, the unintended result of Hume's analysis, and one which doubtless would have surprised him, has been a luxuriant growth of irrationalism or

superrationalism leading in turn to romanticism and authoritarianism.

The current popularized version of logical positivism in the form that it has taken in political science, and more particularly in the field of administration, concurs in this end result. It does so by accepting the doctrine that only propositions of logic and factual propositions have meaning—at least for science. The consequence of this position is an acceptance of the realm of values as an area largely beyond the scope of rational inquiry. Such a view of the nature of values comes perilously close to saying, "Of the important we can say nothing of importance." Yet in any fair view of the facts of administrative life the establishment of policy consensus and the search for politically acceptable values is a highest priority endeavor. To abandon this process as something essentially arbitrary and capricious, beyond, above, or below reason, is as fatal to significant inquiry in politics as in ethics. Only an empty manipulation of logical concepts can result from this evisceration of the subject. A meaningful study of administration cannot shy away from values. They are at the heart of the political process.

While Hume and the logical positivists cast the realm of values into a nonrational if not irrational or superrational limbo, others, whom they have justly criticized, have confounded values and, in consequence, politics with science. It was a major contribution of Hume and the logical positivists to point out the distinction between propositions of value and scientific propositions. Plato and latter-day Platonists have assumed that politics was or could be a science. While Plato's conception of science as a body of eternal dogmatic truths led straight to the autocracy of a ghostly hierarchy foreshadowing the philosopher kings of the *Polis-bureau*, even a modern conception of science as tentative and hypothetical would do similar, if less baneful, violence to the subject of politics. Values are the essence of politics. Ergo, politics is not a science. But, and here is the important point, to say that politics is not a science is not to cast it out of the field of knowledge into some arbitrary intellectual no man's land of whim and caprice.

In the occasions of life, we deal with values and in our dealing with them give them much

thought. This experience is not a realm devoid of reason and evidence, but a realm in which reasoned argument has an efficacious place. Investigation of this experience will show that though it may not be scientific, we nevertheless do have knowledge in the value-laden field of politics; and exploration of our procedures may lead to evidentially tested proposals for their improvement.

The view of administration as sheerly instrumental, or even largely instrumental, must be rejected as empirically untenable and ethically unwarranted. This rejection will entail abandonment, on the one hand, of Herbert Simon's quest for a value-free administration and, on the other, of the over-simplified dogma of an overloaded legislative supremacy of his logical comrade in arms, Charles Hyneman. These two views fit like hand in glove. Legislative supremacy provides Simon with value premises, which can then permit a value-free science of administration the esthetic delight of unique and verifiably determinate problem solutions through the application of the value premises to the fact premises laboriously gathered by the administrative tribe.

But, alas, we know this institutional divorce, however requisite for a value-free science of administration, does not exist. And, with deference, it seems rather doubtful that much would be gained by altering the facts to fit the theory—if, indeed, there were any remote chance that the public and publicly responsible officialdom would consider it. Instead, we may be wiser to seek so to structure our administrative operations as to reflect the values and the facts that, given the nature of our society and its problems, should enter into the formulation of the policy alternatives to be considered and adopted by the legislature and the political executive.

If one of the most important tasks of administration is conceived to be the formulation of policy proposals to solve problems, interesting consequences for organization follow. In this view, the rational organization of government would reflect the major problem areas whose boundaries have evolved from and been defined by socially felt needs and the state of relevant technology for meeting them. Organization would be structured to ask the questions and provide the facts necessary for solutions.

Thus, analysis of the administrative adequacy of State Department organization would concern itself in part with the capacity of that organization to develop and test the theories implicit in its foreign policy proposals and to extract meaning from the experience with those proposals when they were put into practice. Adequate organization would require that every major question have an institutional protagonist, the securing of every important piece of factual information be an assigned responsibility, and every important point of view have a spokesman built into the proposal-formulating process.

The nature of the policy to be formulated implies the theoretical, factual, and value premises necessary for its rational and responsible development. The institutional structure can then be considered in terms of personnel possessed of values, drives, and skills so structured as organizationally to simulate a reasoned inquiry. The test of organizational rationality is the capacity of the organization to make explicit and controlling the theory on which its actions depend, to spell out and test the crucial hypotheses involved in the theory, and to amass and focus the facts needed to test the hypotheses. Such an organization can have experience that approximates the self-correcting discipline of a science. From the point of view of goal-oriented behavior and problem-solving capacity, it is an ideal.

In the political context, and because it is politics we are dealing with, the model of scientific procedure—the formulation and testing of hypotheses—is only partially relevant. Politics is not a science, but to be consequent it must employ science and logic in the pursuit of its purposes. The structuring of organization must be concerned with the reflection of values and their implementation. Much of the implementation and a great deal of the critical work in the shaping and reshaping of values will depend on scientific determination of relevant factual propositions. But values cannot be verified as can propositions of fact, and therefore an enterprise so importantly concerned with the process of valuation as is administration requires an organization differently structured from the sciences and yet disciplined to the utilization of their results.

## II

VALUE in politics and administration is most often expressed as a kind of will—be it that of political superiors, the legislature, the sovereign, or the people. The pyramidal form of most ideal organization charts, the preoccupation with the location of authority, and the structuring of a tight paper-chain of command evidence basic concern with administration as "will" organization. The concern with legitimate hierarchy is similar in nature to the legalist's devotion to sovereignty. It amounts to a search for an absolute, a first principle, from which all else may flow with the appealing logic of a deductive system. The Hoover Commission provides a useful contemporary administrative *summa theologiae* on this point and a forceful tract in favor of administrative monotheism. Its evangelists have preached up and down the land the gospel, "Give the President the power to act." One might almost echo, "In his will is our peace."

Charles Hyneman in his iconoclastic days laid irreverent and effective hands on this dogma in his able attack on the theology of "Administrative Reorganization" in the *Journal of Politics* (February, 1939). However, in his recent work *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* he would substitute the supremacy of the legislature as a first principle for the supremacy of the administrative commander in chief. Here he suffers some uneasiness over the separation of powers dogma and the President's Jacksonian claim to represent the people. In the main, however, he is willing to sacrifice the gospel of the unity of the executive to the necessities of congressional supremacy.

The proponents of executive unity and the concentration of administrative authority do so in the name of the same ultimate to which Hyneman appeals—the will of the people or, more precisely, in Hyneman's terms, "giving the people what they want." This position envisages sound organization as being structured to carry out a legitimate will. The legitimacy of the will, like the concept of sovereignty, provides the basis for a logical deductive system moving from the first principle—be it the will of the people via Congress, or the will of the people via Congress through President, or the will of the people via President. In any event,

the prime problem of administration is to give effect to this will.

Like sovereignty, however, the will of the people is an abstraction. It serves many purposes, such as conferring political legitimacy on the acts and commands of differentiated groups. In many instances it performs the function that Herbert Simon ascribes to authority. The symbol plays an exceedingly important role in our political culture but it clearly cannot be taken at face value. The will of the people is always expressed by some of the people. It is process rather than substance. Making it a mundane voice of God is explicable as a political folk way, a part of the culture, but not as an absolute. In any case, the symbol works in various ways its wonders to perform; and it is not limited to any single channel.

What should concern the administrative analyst is the use to which the symbol is put. As an absolute, it encourages the development of a ghostly hierarchy to monopolize its consultation and to give forth ex cathena pronouncements in its name. Considered as procedure, however, it can be tested by its fruits and evaluated as can any other problem-solving device. So viewed, it will be found to do socially useful work—to solve problems. For any value system, however, much of what can readily come to pass under its aegis will be abhorrent. The crucial question will be not the metaphysical essence wrapped up in the phrase "will of the people" but, in Bridgman's terms, the operations subsumed under the concept. It makes a world of difference whether the "general will" is arrived at from counting the votes, from the intuitive genius of the *Fuehrer*, or from the dialectical analysis of the *Politbüro*. Procedures rather than substance are the major concern. By and large we must rest content with accepting the evidence that over time certain procedures produce beneficent results and others do not.

John Dewey in his address at the Harvard tercentenary, discussing the social necessity of authority and the menace of authoritarianism, pointed to the method of science as the solution. In science authority emerges from procedures whose results all can respect. Without a structured legitimate will, the enterprise of the sciences escapes anarchy and secures the discipline of an authority that all can accept

without loss of human dignity or intellectual self-respect. A cooperating organization can operate successfully without a commanding hierarchy. Is this a special case of human behavior, or does it have implications for public administration? Science at least provides us with an example of organized human activity that solves problems without a formal directing hierarchy. In Earl Latham's sense, there is neither hierarchy nor hieratics in physics, but there is a very real organization product.<sup>1</sup>

The organization of a science is interesting for the student of administration because it suggests a basis of cooperation in which the problem and the subject matter, rather than the caprice of individual or collective will, control the behavior of those embarked in the enterprise. Thus physics and chemistry are disciplines, but they are not organized to carry out the will of legitimate superiors. They are going concerns with problems and procedures that have taken form through generations of effort and have emerged into highly conscious goal-oriented activities. One may ask to what extent these scientific undertakings offer lessons for the conduct, let us say, of the Departments of State and Defense. Do the organizational aspects of the sciences as cooperative problem-solving activities have meaning for public administration, or are we confined to utilizing their substantive conclusions and an occasional technique? This question bears on the larger one of the conditions under which islands of rational goal-oriented behavior—technologies—emerge in our culture. Government is but one of the possible, though perhaps one of the more difficult and certainly one of the most important, areas for such development.

Emphasis on the will aspect of organization to the exclusion of other considerations obscures the necessary conditions for the successful solution of problems. To the discipline of the "will of the people" and of legitimate superiors there needs to be added the discipline of facts and tested procedures. Thus a consensus on procedures might be developed that would compel, at least to a degree, a meaningful formulation of proposals in terms of their necessary implications. A military proposal, for example, might then have to be spelled out

<sup>1</sup>"Hierarchy and Hieratics" in *Employment Forum* (April, 1947).

in terms of costs, manpower, casualty estimates, necessary civilian controls, and the like in a way that would increase the play of such objective considerations in the decisional process. An organization in its routines and its personnel—their training and values, professional and political—can be so structured as to maximize the likelihood that decisions will be made as a result of full consideration of the relevant facts, hypotheses, and values involved. One might well strive for the acceptance of a "minimum administrative due process" that would be a highly differentiated analogue of judicial due process, and for similar reasons.

This view would seek to modify the notion that the way to get responsibility is to make certain officials responsible in a neat hierarchy of command. While such a conception is not without merit, it is not a sufficient guide to organization structure. If decision is accepted as the key function of administration, then the decisional process is our central concern. This process is the locus of responsibility and we may speak of responsible and irresponsible procedures. The assurance of responsibility lies only partly in the ability to fix on some determinate individual the praise or blame for a decision; it must also rest in confidence that goal-oriented tested procedures have been followed in arriving at the decision in question. Among these procedures, of course, is free and effective criticism. Also, the real possibility of changes of personnel held personally responsible is an indispensable part of popular influence on the process of decision. But this process needs refinement if it is not to be exploited as a device for sacrificing scapegoats rather than for solving the public's problems.

The same kind of confidence that can be placed in the decision by appropriate members of the medical profession on the therapeutic value of penicillin could in principle be placed in decisions in public administration—for example, the estimate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Soviet military capabilities at a given time and of the deterrents required to insure our national security. In the two cases confidence is warranted not merely because the judgment comes from authorities clothed with professional prestige but far more because of the procedures presumed to have led to the decisions. Factors which would vitiate the de-

cision, such as bias, corruption, or ignorance, would apply equally in either case. The integrity of the process is more structured in the one case than in the other and the public expectation, both elite and mass, that it should be so structured is far greater. This is but to say that our social technology for the objective and professional control of medical estimates is greater than that which now obtains for military estimates.

The obvious superiority of the expert to the layman has been raised from Plato on as an argument against lay control of government and in behalf of variant forms of aristocracy, oligarchy, or dictatorship. The dilemma of lay control versus expert knowledge may be partially resolved by lay determination of broad objectives and procedural control over the expert. In a sense this is the eternal problem of what value and role to assign public opinion in politics. Here, Aristotle's estimate seems sounder than Plato's. Because the logical positivism vulgarized in political science would place values in some nonrational limbo, we are psychologically if not logically in danger of returning to the Platonic dilemma of "The Laws" or of bowing down before an irrational "public will." An expert blindly taking orders from an irrational popular mandate may be a caricature of the problem, but it comes too close to home for comfort.

We are all in some sense at the mercy of the generals, but equally we are all in some sense at the mercy of the physicians. We should like to have the one group win our wars and the other cure our ills. In either case our likes are a necessary but insufficient cause for their own fulfillment. There is an objective environment whose possibilities are more or less competently and objectively mediated by the experts to the public. Quackery in the case either of the military or of medicine is more likely to be controlled by procedures internal to the discipline than by public will.

However, an informed public opinion is a necessary support for the maintenance of the discipline. Some states of public opinion will permit any form of quackery. Even medicine could be debauched by a public insistent on magic remedies. In this sense, Barnard is right that the customer is an important component of the organization. What the public demands,

expects, and can be made to believe possible is a major determinant of the alternatives of policy. A disciplined public opinion that has been trained to insist on the observance of tested procedures and the production of evidence and reasoned alternatives by those who would lead it is an important factor in sustaining rational administration. A public opinion that believes in political gold bricks will find plenty of politicians to purvey them. In an atmosphere of such make-believe, realists may well suffer the fate of Cassandra or, losing their scruples, join in outbidding one another in miraculous remedies. A sign of maturity in individuals and groups is recognition of their proneness to folly and adoption of procedures to guard against it.

We think it is no shameful derogation of sovereignty to bridle its exercise with constitutional procedures that have been found salutary. However laden with archaisms and irrelevancies, the procedures of the courts are in large part rationally related to the solution of the peculiar problems that fall under their jurisdiction. Even the procedures of a legislature are limitations on its simple exercise of power that have been found wise. The arbitrary right to hire and fire, once the most prized prerogative of business management, has in progressive concerns been proceduralized in the hands of personnel departments. In area after area recognition increases that group will, if it is to be effective, must be disciplined to the real possibilities of the situation, and that this implies the co-sovereignty of the problem and its objective components in the determination of policy. What the people want is important. What the facts will allow is also an essential determinant of the alternatives that should enter into and determine the public's choice. This element—providing the facts—has been generally recognized as a major contribution of the bureaucrat to the formation of public policy. Some have even seen it as giving a baleful policy initiative, if not control, to the expert.

### III

ONCE the fact is faced that the bureaucracy is not, and cannot be, a neutral instrument solely devoted to the unmotivated presentation of facts to, and the docile execution of

orders from, political superiors, a more realistic picture of its problems and potential can be had. Constitutionalism itself demands that the political will be limited by procedure. An important addition to the constitutional arsenal lies in the potentialities of administration. The concept usually applied to political superiors vis-à-vis administration has something in it of the metaphysics of free will: only unchecked supremacy is compatible with sound doctrine. Power must be commensurate with responsibility. Simon has assailed this concept, but it persists. Actually, unfettered freedom is incompatible with the growth of technology. Knowledge expands power, but in doing so, imposes limitations. In one sense, a well-conceived personnel policy is a limitation on managerial freedom, but its adoption removes other limitations and so enhances freedom of action in desired directions.

For good or ill, we know the fund of knowledge in the bureaucracy will be a source of power. Damning or denying this power accomplishes little toward the major task of increasing the probability that public policy will be informed and responsible. The whole purpose of the Weather Bureau would be subverted if superiors dreamed they could give any orders they pleased. The Bureau of Labor Statistics was badly mauled because of suspicion of the integrity of its cost of living index. The Council of Economic Advisers became so openly an instrument of presidential propaganda as to minimize its value as a means of securing consensus on basic economic data and the approximate dimensions of our economic problems. The recent assault on the Bureau of Standards in the name of the policy supremacy of the Secretary of Commerce has critically impaired the agency's capacity to present a common ground of scientific fact within the government and for the broad public. Ability to stipulate with confidence the kind of basic facts these agencies were intended to provide is essential to even the beginning of rational policy discussion. As Walter Lippmann has wisely said:

. . . when full allowance has been made for deliberate fraud, political science has still to account for such facts as two nations attacking one another, each convinced that it is acting in self-defense, or two classes at war each certain that it speaks for the common interest. They live, we are likely to say, in

different worlds. More accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in different ones.<sup>2</sup>

A common and rationally warranted conception of the world—the relevant facts—is basic to communication and rational discussion in government as elsewhere. Without some accepted means of stabilizing the conception of the environment with which policy is intended to deal, we are lost in the world without coordinates of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-four*. To be sure, this is a free-wheeling world of rhetoric and emotion that many find congenial and that most politicians are adept at exploiting—a world in which solid facts evaporate and special devils and angels exercise occult or heavenly powers. The elimination of this world of the comic books, with its moralistic technology of "the good guys and the bad guys," from its predominant role in the rhetoric of public policy formation is a major requisite for the rational and responsible development of policy.

Administration has a great contribution to make in providing an alternative view of reality to the tempting, popular, and presently politically rewarding comic-book interpretation of history. The gradual restriction of mythical thinking in the field of politics seems no more insuperable a problem in principle than that which has been met with considerable if imperfect success in medicine. It is possible to build administrative structures whose accounts of the facts will provide a salutary limitation to the range of policy proposals that politicians will find it politic to espouse. To the extent that the procedures used in developing the facts attain public acceptance, as may for instance the statistical work of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, public support of these procedures and the accounts they provide will in turn compel debate on agreed facts and so limit alternatives by some meaningful test of feasibility.

The enormous power that substantial control of the accepted version of the facts gives to any group must be faced. Even with the best intentions, facts are rarely presented in a fashion that is neutral to all the parties at interest. Indeed, if they are to do any useful

office in clarifying the real alternatives of public policy, they must foreclose some alternatives, and in doing so give umbrage to their proponents. The danger that the fact-gathering process will be corrupted is always present. Such remedy as we have is a consensus that there is integrity in procedures and that these procedures exert a control over the practices and values of personnel engaged in the enterprise. That such consensus is possible, to a degree at any rate, is exemplified by the bar and the bench. Reliance on hierarchical control by interested political superiors, except within housekeeping limits and in case of provable breach of professional behavior, would taint with misplaced partisanship a function whose success depends on a general consensus of lack of such bias.

Fact-finding agencies may be established that can achieve some broad acceptance and confidence. The process is slow. But at least in principle we may recognize the necessity of structuring into administration the means to provide a neutral summary of the facts that can serve as the common ground for rational discussion. While this is of exceeding importance for collaboration between the executive and the Congress and for the general realism of public debate, it is also of great concern for coordination of activity within the executive itself. Each agency is prone to develop its own research and intelligence section, not merely to be informed, but even more, to avoid being controlled by a source of facts that is suspect and to provide a rationalization for its own policy preferences. A great forward step in coordination would result from the development within the executive of institutions capable of providing a minimum factual consensus in terms of which policy differences would have to be argued.

One leader, one President, is no substitute for one view of the world with which administration must deal. Structuring a hierarchy is no substitute for structuring a reasoned consensus in the facts. While it is an understandable feature of interagency rivalry that each agency should fabricate its own figures and at times throw dust in the air, it would seem, though difficult, the part of wisdom to reduce these competing versions of reality to as near a consensus or a clear statement of differences as

<sup>2</sup> *Public Opinion* (First American Pelican Books ed., 1946), p. 14.

accepted technology will permit. It is doubtful that this can or should be accomplished by hierarchical command alone, but there are fruitful possibilities that what cannot be accomplished by fiat may be accomplished by a professional consensus that will permeate all the agencies and in time extend to press and public.

It may be accepted that the integrity of the expert's role as the source of fact should be protected, though how and to what extent remains a problem. But when the reality is faced that the facts produced may not be politically neutral, and that in consequence political superiors may well wish to control their production, a grave problem is presented: in what degree should political superiors be compelled by custom and/or institution to run the gauntlet of facts produced by personnel who are professionally and procedurally, but not politically, responsible? The question is twofold. First, should they be compelled? And second, if they should be, how is it politically feasible to do so? There seem strong reasons for believing that, if properly structured, an enforced confrontation of policy proposals with a professional estimate of relevant reality would be salutary. If public acceptance developed it would be feasible. It is already practiced in varying degrees in particular areas of government operation. Taking a point from administrative law, though one in which there has been more form than substance, one might strive for acceptance of the view that policy should be grounded on substantial evidence and that evidence should be the product of professional procedures.

While any rigid dichotomy between fact production and policy proposal is bound to prove tenuous, there is a reasonably clear distinction between such agencies as the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Bureau of Standards, on the one hand, and the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Agriculture, on the other. The former labor under very little pressure to produce major policy proposals; the latter are expected to produce answers to the most significant problems of our times. Interpretation of a most significant sort is required of the second group, as well as production of crucial facts.

The policy proposals which the departments present to the President and the Congress are, except for end runs, initially policy proposals made within the departments to political superiors. The structuring of this process to insure, to the extent feasible, conscious and reasoned choice among carefully worked out alternatives should be a major objective of administrative technology. Today, the dominance of political superiors and a tight chain of command are the normal emphases of political theory. If, however, political superiors and their subordinates can be looked upon as a problem-solving team engaged in working out the terms of a continuing adjustment of group values to a dynamic environment, a new view of the most helpful role of subordinates may be achieved. The roles of subordinates in the policy-formulating process are determined by the ability of our technologies to grasp the environment and the nature of the problems that determine the tasks of the administrative organization. The technologies and the objective problems provide, within limits, some element of determinateness to what kind of organization would be most likely to cope effectively with a given set of objectives.

#### IV

THE progress of administration as an applied science depends on its capacity to influence the climate of relevant opinion in the direction of political superiors disciplining themselves to restraints on their area of choice. In recent years the fear has been expressed that the men of the Kremlin would be deceived into dangerous adventures by agents falsely reporting to them what the agents believed agreeable to their masters' views. The disciplining of the desires and inclinations of the superiors to the unpleasant realities is a job for administrative structure, staffing, and procedure. It requires the building into the organization of a system of values and procedures that will enforce the presentation at the highest level of all the relevant facts—and their most significant possible interpretations.

Actually, an organization capable of presenting to political superiors an objectively controlled picture of the facts and a fair range of possible problem solutions, whose feasibility

had been tested so far as practicable, would greatly increase the superiors' real range of choice—although it should be noted that psychologically the awareness of alternatives exercises constraint as well. This constraint in our value system, however, should be salutary. The slow but hopefully constant pressure of Project Lincoln, the Marvin Kelly Report, and Project East River indicates both the possibilities and the limitations of the presentation of unpleasant realities to political superiors. The organizing, strengthening, and regularizing of this process is a major task that consists in large part of creation of public expectation and elite public pressure.

If the problems and the existing state of technologies are important determinants of the desirable structure of organization, the values of the community that enter into public opinion are equally significant facts to be considered. Indeed, to get a fair representation of the alternatives an *advocatus diaboli*, and one acting more than pro forma, will be necessary for a reasoned decision among all the alternatives. Even the most convinced anticommunist Secretary of State might wish sources of information on China beyond those provided by the orthodox supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. While final decisions must and should rest with political superiors, by custom and practice they should come only after the painful and salutary routine of examining alternatives and objections. To get these, organization must be structured for variety of points of view so that significant values in the community are necessarily considered in the formulation of policy proposals.

In his richly perceptive article on "Legislative-Executive Relationships in Budgeting as Viewed by the Executive," in the Summer, 1953, issue of this *Review*, Frederick J. Lawton describes interest and value representation in the budgetary process. As described, this process is a good example of at least an embryonic structuring of organization rationality. Hierarchy is accorded a major function of introducing perspectives and priorities appropriate to the various levels of administration into the budgetary process. The process is described in terms of a dynamic interaction between levels, organizations, programs, and interests. Ideally the resulting work program and allocation of

the nation's resources would represent proposals that have been arrived at after a full hearing of competing claims, views, and the relevant facts. Few, however, who have struggled with the process of budget formulation in Washington would believe that there exists a well-structured, self-conscious, going concern for the clear formulation, on the one hand, of the "program of the President" and, on the other, for the formulation and testing of estimates from below in terms of diversified community needs, political demands, and objective facts.

Interaction is the fact and the budget is largely as Herring describes it.<sup>3</sup> We need a theory to describe and improve on the existing facts of interaction. It is a gain that Paul Appleby, Herbert Simon, and others have shown that interaction between the levels of administration is not something to be deplored and corrected but a necessary and vital fact of administrative life. What are the consequences of this constitutionalizing of hierarchy? What implications does it have for the theory of the mandate that a new administration should have administrative power commensurate with its programmatic responsibility?

The answers to such questions may be highly conservative, smacking of Burke, the Federalists, and John Stuart Mill. The phrases that leap to mind are "a permanent settled will over a transient inclination," "constitutional settlement," "due process," "balance of interests." These constitutional arrangements we think of as ordinarily being embodied in the separation of powers, judicial review, and federalism. However, if we recognize the bureaucracy as becoming increasingly the policy-maturing, policy-proposing branch, both in the initiation of legislation and budget estimates and in the discretionary administration of legislation, the advisability of building constitutionalizing elements into the bureaucracy will seem of prime importance. The deficiencies of the legislature as both a thought and a will organization in Graham Wallas' sense lead to the growing power of the executive. The inevitability of this development leads straight to the consideration of the adequacy

\* Pendleton Herring, "The Politics of Fiscal Policy" 47 *Yale Law Journal* (March, 1938).

of the executive branch for performing the political, policy function of proposing an agenda to Congress.

We would all recognize the deficiency of a one-party legislature, yet many of us would applaud, and are applauding, a one-party top-level bureaucracy. It may seem a forcing of the analogy to suggest that a loyal opposition in the upper levels of the bureaucracy could serve a function well nigh as socially useful as that performed by the loyal opposition in Parliament. We have only begun to think of how best to staff and organize administration if a major part of its job is to propose policy alternatives—alternatives that have run the gauntlet of facts, analysis, and competing social values built into the administrative process.

If it is sound to present political superiors in the departments with alternative problem solutions and to structure organization so to do, it might be well to consider the implica-

tions of this arrangement for executive-legislative relations. Much congressional frustration seems due to the lack of ability to make a choice in deciding programs. Congress can wreck a program, it can whittle one down, but it cannot have a well-worked-out program unless it accepts the one program presented to it by the executive. The same reasons that dictate that political superiors in the departments should be compelled to make a choice between reasoned alternatives may well apply to departmental presentations to Congress. If Congress is to make reasoned choices it would seem that it should have before it the reasoned alternatives. However, political necessities may preclude the executive from presenting anything but one program to the Congress. If this is the case, and it well may be, a vital part of rational decision and community representation must be structured into administration if they are to occur at all.

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#### Administrative Reform

Apart from these bodies set up within the Administration, successive Belgian Governments since the liberation have appointed commissions of inquiry to report on the defects of organisation in the public service and on the measures to be taken to remedy them. They, however, mainly because of their purely advisory character, are bound to remain largely ineffective. The shortcomings of our public services are well known, and given a little technical knowledge they can quickly be analysed. The real difficulty is not only to decide on the remedies but also to apply them. Indeed, as has already been said, these, if the causes of the trouble and not only the effects are to be reached, require a modification of the present administrative structures and of the legal basis on which they are founded. . . .

The necessary impetus, even in the matter of administrative reform, must come from an authority situated at the highest level. It therefore appears essential that for as long as required a Minister without portfolio, close to the Prime Minister and with sufficient authority and executive power, should be appointed to take charge of administrative reform. In order to secure the necessary powers Parliament would have to pass a law giving the Government general authority to modify existing legislation by decree, in so far as this was necessary to carry out measures of sound administrative reform.

—André Molitor, "Administrative Reform and Retrenchment," *8 O & M Bulletin* 7 (October, 1953).

# Technical Assistance in Public Administration: The Domestic Role

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**I**N THE summer of 1951 five young professors left the Bosphorus and Turkey on a new mission for their homeland. Aided by funds from the Economic Cooperation Administration they were going to the United States to study public management. Their ultimate destination was Los Angeles, where the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California was establishing a special 18-month technical assistance training program.

Prior to that time the Economic Cooperative Administration (later renamed the Mutual Security Agency, and still later the Foreign Operations Administration) had brought many public officials to this country. But this was the first time that the ECA had made arrangements with a United States university to carry out such a protracted technical training program in the field of public administration. For this reason the project has attracted considerable attention. This paper describes the origins, development, and results of the program.

## I

**S**INCE the end of World War II Turkey has become a focal point of United States attention in the Middle East. Undoubtedly the government's original interest was largely due to Turkey's strategic importance in cold war planning. As one writer has reported:

. . . Beyond Turkey, in the Arab states and Iran, there exists the most dangerous power vacuum in today's world. This area, spreading from Egypt to the Afghan frontier, has only nominal armed forces, mostly with dubious equipment and doubtful morale. Israel apart, its peoples are so impoverished

they have little will to defend their homelands. So feudalistic and corrupt are its governments that they are difficult to help from the outside. Its natural defenses are negligible. Worst of all, the Islamic nationalism that pervades the whole region is being channeled more and more into specific hostility toward Great Britain, the United States and the West generally. . . .<sup>1</sup>

Although the Soviet threat originally was the bonding agent between Turkey and the United States, relations between the two countries have broadened into what might now be identified as a developing mutual respect. Turkey has shown what a few well-placed dollars in economic aid and technical assistance can do to raise the standard of living of a nation. The change has been most spectacular in agriculture where the land planted to cereal has increased in the past four years by 50 per cent. Turkey, long a cereals-importing country, exported two million tons in 1952 and expected to export three million tons in 1953. These improvements are being further accelerated by new flood control and irrigation systems, hydroelectric and fertilizer plants, and educational programs in scientific methods.<sup>2</sup>

The dynamism which permeated the economy of the country, however, had not had a similar impact on the governmental bureaucracy. Writing in 1951, Hedley V. Cooke said:

. . . The Turkish bureaucracy still does not operate entirely along lines which Max Weber would regard as "rational," that is, based on ability and

<sup>1</sup> William H. Hessler, "Danger in the Middle East: No Ramparts, Few Watchers," 7 *The Reporter* 5 (September 2, 1952).

<sup>2</sup> "The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Turkey," 191 *Atlantic Monthly* 15-16 (June, 1953).

readiness to render substantial service along specialized lines. But although there is still not enough competence and not enough sense of responsibility on the part of officials, it is equally true that there is no longer any marked prejudice in favor of any special interests other than their own individual interests in such matters as prestige, power, pay, and so forth. These are probably favorable indications for the future of planning since—assuming a favorable political climate—once a greater degree of technical competence is acquired by the bureaucracy, there is every likelihood that it will be exercised on an impartial and impersonal basis.<sup>3</sup>

Behind the decision to send a team to the United States to study public management, two fundamental objectives may be identified:

1. *To provide Turkish governmental institutions with modern United States management skills and know-how.* Many of the refinements in methods analysis, personnel, administration, budgeting, accounting, and planning have been developed almost exclusively in the United States. Beyond the training in these skills, this objective involved a philosophy which laid less stress on administration as law and more on administration as direction and coordination of many complex, interrelated parts. In short, the Turks wanted to see administration in a dynamic, flexible management context.

2. *To provide experience with the functioning of public administration in a democratic society.* The year 1950 marked a turning point in Turkish government.<sup>4</sup> The country's first free elections held in that year signaled a shift away from Ataturk's "statism" and a consequent enlargement of individual economic opportunity and of personal freedoms in general. In addition there has been developing a feeling that local governments should be given greater initiative and responsibility. The need for reorientation of the bureaucracy in this changing Turkish society was apparent; but the scope, the timing, and the implementation

<sup>3</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, *Challenge and Response in the Middle East: The Quest for Prosperity 1919-1951* (Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 282. (Italics added).

<sup>4</sup> The Turkish Information Service, 444 East 52d Street, New York 22, New York, has published a series of pamphlets which provide an excellent picture of Turkish society. Titles include *The Turkish Constitution*, *Turkish Elections of 1950 and United States Reaction*, and *An American Looks at Turkey*.

were all perplexing matters. It was hoped that the experience in the United States might over the long run provide some insights.

A review of these objectives clearly underscores the limitations of sending a few United States experts abroad. The managerial skills themselves, so far as they are teachable, could be taught in one place as well as another, but the great blocks to effective governmental management, in the United States as well as in other countries, are emotional not rational. The opportunity to talk with the persons who are exercising managerial discretion, to witness the responses of subordinates in such a situation, to hear the United States bureaucrat identify himself as a "servant of the people" and mean it—these are the kinds of experiences that should accompany skill training in public administration. In brief, to be most effective, a training program must take place where the administrative policies and practices under study are actually carried out. Otherwise, there is danger that it will deal only in ideas which can never really be assimilated because they are beyond the perceptual capacities of the students.

## II

THE decision by the ECA to develop some sort of technical assistance training program in public administration for the Turks did not mean that the universities were necessarily to assume a participatory role. As a matter of fact, in providing technical assistance the government has generally bypassed the universities. Many people from various countries spent time as observers in the federal government, particularly in the Bureau of the Budget, and emphasis generally has been on work experience at the Washington level.

It is probable that the universities themselves have been as much to blame for this situation as anyone. Few of them have actively sought to broaden the area of knowledge about public management practices, and in consequence the course offerings in this area at most institutions are lean. At the University of Southern California, however, the development of effective administrative institutions has long been a matter of great concern. Its

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School of Public Administration, now over twenty-five years old, has a large full-time faculty, is conducting an active research program, and each year is training some 2,000 governmental employees (in addition to the regular student body) on a part-time basis.

A university in which theory and practice mingle would seem to have certain advantages for the training of students from abroad. In the first place, education is the main business of the university; it is not an extra chore thrust on the unsuspecting bureaucrat. Second, there is a great deal of groundwork to be laid before many visitors are ready to derive the maximum benefit from observing such things as a complicated office routine. Third, there is much to be said for the importance of the theoretical aspects of administration; to understand the environment of administration in a democratic society requires the deepest and most penetrating analysis. Finally, the fact that most of the universities are located away from Washington has advantages; for much of the strength of public administration in the United States is at the local level, and at this level size does not impede nor restrict comprehension.

There have been no authorized statements from the ECA concerning the reasons for the opening of contract negotiations with the University of Southern California. We may infer that the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph were of consequence, as well as the fact that the University of Southern California is located in an area which has long been known for effective state and local government. At any rate, negotiations to establish a technical assistance training program in public administration for a Turkish group proceeded during the spring and a contract was signed in the summer of 1951.

The contract that finally emerged was broad in scope, namely to "provide for a training, internship, and education program for persons interested in becoming directors and staff members of bureaus of public administration. . . . also to train persons to act as leaders of institutes of government, to act as administrative analysts, and to act as management consultants in public management." Emphasis was also to be given to "surveys of governmental enterprises, administrative analysis,

and methods of improvement in governmental administration."

The ECA had chosen the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Ankara as its principal link; and the professors of this organization were asked, subject to ECA approval, to select members for the projected team. Five men were chosen, four coming from the Faculty of Political Science and one from the Faculty of Law. Two had their doctor's degrees, the other three had completed all work for the Ph.D. except the dissertation. One was a full professor; the others were assistants to professors.<sup>5</sup>

Both the United States and the Turkish governments contributed to the financing of the project. The University of Ankara, a governmental institution, paid the men their regular salaries throughout the eighteen months. The costs of the trip to the United States, subsistence, and all expenses connected with the training program at the University of Southern California were paid by ECA. The result of these arrangements was a modest living standard for the participants, based on an \$8-per-day allowance from ECA, and relatively few long-term worries because native salaries were available for any obligations at home. Turkish lira, however, could not be exchanged for United States dollars. The ECA allowances, it might be noted, were not sufficient for married men to bring their families, and only bachelors therefore participated in the program.

In Los Angeles the most significant aspect of the training arrangements was the decision to establish a special leadership program. Concurred in by the ECA, the view was taken that a project staff with headquarters separate from the School of Public Administration was needed to insure maximum benefit from the program. Experience certainly bore out this belief. The making of arrangements for field trips and tutoring, the handling of administrative matters, and the provision of adequate office space on campus were of supreme importance.

<sup>5</sup> The full professor was Bedri Gursoy, an economist; the assistants were Cumhur Ferman, economics; Cemal Mihcioglu, economics; Behic Hazar, geography; and Erol Biliç, law. Assistants to professors in Turkey function much as they do in the United States; they do no teaching and are engaged primarily in research.

The leadership staff was headed by W. Howard Church, who was named to a visiting professorship. A former city manager and a holder of a Master's degree from the U.S.C. School of Public Administration, Mr. Church gave half-time to the project and also continued a private management consulting business. He was aided by two graduate assistants, identified as "counterparts," on a one-third time basis. Besides helping in general administrative matters concerned with the program, these men were expected to "interact" culturally and intellectually with the Turkish participants. The fourth member of the staff was a half-time secretary. Office space for the project was provided in a six-room house owned by the university on the campus. Each Turkish participant and American staff member was given a desk, and a conference room with a table and enough chairs for the entire group was also provided.

The total cost of the program was set in the contract at \$70,000. Actual expenses were slightly below that figure. Most interesting is the fact that approximately half the funds (\$33,000) were expended for travel from Ankara and return, the \$8-per-day subsistence, and tuition at the university. The balance went for leadership and secretarial service, special tutoring and consultation, the development of new teaching materials, local transportation, books and supplies, and university charges for administrative overhead. Since the need in Turkey is for a few qualified men, it was considered better to invite five mature men to this country and to give them all possible guidance than to bring a larger number at a smaller per capita expense.

### III

THE program which was developed by the leadership staff and the faculty of the School of Public Administration consisted of (1) formal university course work; (2) field work and observation tours in a variety of private and public organizations; and (3) individual tutoring and consultation in specialized fields.

*Formal Course Work.* Early in the planning of the program a decision was made that in an 18-month period it would be impossible to offer a formal course program that would

provide both generalist and specialist backgrounds. Hence it was determined to eliminate the usual pattern of a basic group of common courses and to permit each man to proceed to his field of specialization after a one semester introduction to the field through courses in the fundamentals, research methods, human relations, organization, and a special seminar. It was hoped, and this assumption seems to have been vindicated, that the generalist influence would come from the overall experience of the entire group.

A composite profile of its academic work indicates that the attention of the group as a whole was directed toward the basic problems of large-scale public organization and management, as is indicated by the following summary:

1. In the area of *management*, the group had courses in public organization and management, administrative analysis, and industrial management. They also had a special summer course in organization and management conducted by three top-level officials from Washington, D. C.
2. In the area of *finance*, the group had courses in public financial administration, governmental budgeting, principles and problems of taxation, tax theory, performance budgeting, municipal and institutional accounting, accounting machines, and cost accounting.
3. In the area of *supervision*, the group had courses in human relations in management, supervisory training, social distance, methods of social research, and social psychology.
4. In the area of *personnel*, it had courses in public personnel administration and in public personnel compensation.
5. In the area of *planning*, it had courses in city planning, community planning, economic geography, and a seminar in planning.

The extent to which the resources of the university were utilized to meet the needs of the Turkish group is indicated by the fact that courses in eight different schools and departments were included in the program. The School of Public Administration carried the heaviest part of this load, providing instruction in twelve distinct subject-matter fields. The School of Commerce provided work in

six substantive areas, the Economics Department in three, the Sociology Department in three, and the other departments (Political Science, Geography, Psychology, and English) in a total of six.

*Field Work and Observation Tours.* An essential part of the total training program could not be provided in the classroom. In order to buttress their classroom work and to get a "feel" for administration in a democratic decentralized society, the Turks needed to see the American administrative machine in motion. It was also thought that field trips would serve to break down the belief that public administration must look for its principal leadership to the law. Hence, visits and semi-internship experiences in private businesses and organizations and governmental agencies at all levels were arranged so that many problems common to business and government might be identified.

Approximately 20 per cent of the time of the participants during the regular academic period was spent in such field work.<sup>6</sup> Additional opportunities for practical experience occurred during the summer months, when twenty-five visitations were made during a three-week field trip to northern and central California. Aside from the California experiences, the participants spent varying amounts of time in Washington, Chicago, and New York on observation trips.

The total number of visitations in the California area (including the vacation) was seventy-three. An analysis of these trips shows that most emphasis was placed on governmental agencies, which was in keeping with the purpose of the mission, but that approximately one-half of the visits were not exclusively government-oriented. Included were trips to private businesses and to various other types of private organizations, such as taxpayers' associations, labor unions, and chambers of commerce. The need for this broad approach in field work was emphasized by the fact that many of the private agencies visited

in this country, particularly such utilities as gas, electric power, and transit, are government operations in Turkey.

Despite the fact that the university is located 2,500 miles from the nation's capitol, more visits were paid to the offices of national governmental agencies than to those of any other level. Visits to 37 governmental agencies in the California area were distributed as follows: national government (regional offices), 13; state government, 12; local government (city and county), 10; and special districts, 2.

In the course of field work and observation tours, experts in the various fields gave the Turkish professors a tremendous amount of time at no cost to the project. The value of this cooperation dwarfed the leadership costs involved in arranging the visitations.

*Individual Tutoring and Consultation.* To ensure that the Turkish participants were getting the maximum value from their academic opportunities, special tutoring and consulting arrangements were made whenever necessary. These arrangements served two important purposes. First, they gave the Turks an opportunity to spend a little extra time with their professors discussing subject matter which had been unusually difficult or which held special interest for them. Second, they provided experts who could cover areas of interest in which there were no course offerings. It was originally contemplated that individual tutoring and consultation would constitute a large part of the cost of the program. As a matter of fact, so much free time was made available, both by professors and by outside experts in the various fields, that a considerable share of the funds earmarked for this purpose was not expended.

In planning the program it was decided that the Turks should receive certificates upon completion of the training program but they should not work for the Master's degree. Whether this was a wise course is a question still debated at the university. A degree orientation would have offered at least two definite advantages: (1) it would have been a good piece of symbolism in the homeland; (2) it might possibly have given a greater sense of direction to the participants. On the other hand, work for the degree would have (1) required more generalist preparation; (2) re-

\* There were 270 school days during the three-semester life of the project. In this period members participated in 48 visitations which, in turn, averaged one day in length. This figure does not include the three-week field trip to northern and central California, taken during vacation.

duced the flexibility of individual study programs; and (3) placed emphasis on the degree rather than the usefulness of the training in Turkey.

#### IV

THE training of a group of persons from another culture involved a number of problems of varying degrees of importance. These difficulties, however, did not achieve the importance that was originally anticipated. The Turks made a remarkable adjustment to life in Southern California and real conflict was confined almost entirely to the realm of ideas, where there were stereotypes in the thinking of both the Turks and the Americans that did not always enhance the learning situation.

In this regard perhaps the greatest obstacle arose from a predisposition on the part of some of the participants to consider public administration as inseparable from the law. This habit of thought, which apparently is not restricted to Turkey, raises two serious problems in technical assistance training in public administration. First, there is a tendency to reject the experiences of nongovernmental large-scale organizations, particularly businesses, as being uninstructive. Second, the pragmatism of United States administration is more difficult to impart to students whose central orientation is legal principle.

A second area of difficulty involved the general European approach toward research. The Turks tended to emphasize the importance of accumulating all the written material on a particular subject (essentially the historical and comparative methods). They had little patience with synthesis and empiricism. The applied, problem-solving type of research that characterizes to such a marked degree the best administration in the United States was not assimilated easily by most of our Turkish colleagues.

Of American stereotypes, reverence for the role and importance of private enterprise was the least understood and accepted by the Turks. And this tune was one they got with never-ending variations from Rotary clubs, private businesses, the university, and from government officers themselves. Raised in a society where business was suspect and the government had the confidence of the people,

the Turks could not understand the emotionalism of many Americans on this point. The Americans for their part could not accept the fact that the Turks had had a different experience with capitalism and consequently had come to different conclusions. The result was often a kind of social impasse.

In addition to the stereotypes and mistaken assumptions, there were the inescapable difficulties of communication. Nevertheless it is encouraging that four of the five participants did not feel strongly enough about these problems, with the exception of language, to mention them in their final interviews.

Perhaps the most significant specific problem encountered in the training program was the lack of adequate text materials. Even for the basic course, it was quickly discovered that all the standard works had such a strong United States orientation that they imposed a tremendous burden on the instructor to separate useful ideas from their cultural entanglements. In these circumstances students tended to reject the conclusions of the textbooks. Texts which would draw illustrations from different structures of government and society could make a tremendous contribution toward the spread of more effective public management throughout the world.

#### V

M EASUREMENT of the results of the training program for the Turkish professors is extremely difficult. As this is written, one year has elapsed since the five members of the group returned to Ankara. At the time of their departure it was expected that it would take decades to reap the fruits of the project.

But events are moving fast in Turkish public administration, and it now appears that these young men will quickly make full use of their training. Four of the five are associated with the United Nations Institute of Public Administration which is located at Ankara. This institute is providing training for over 150 career people. A recent letter from Professor Bedri Gursoy, who is the director of the Documentation, Clearing House, and Public Relations Section, reports that Iran, Ethiopia, and Greece, as well as Turkey, are represented in the institute classrooms. As faculty members in this important project, the participants

in the University of Southern California program may have an impact far beyond original expectations. Two members of the institute group have also begun to serve as consultants. Among the projects they are developing is a model accounting program for local governments.

This quick survey gives concrete evidence that the results of the program so far are good. Original plans had envisioned a battery of tests to measure the progress of members of the group during their time at the university. A good testing program could have been extremely helpful in evaluating specific aspects of the project, but such a program turned out to be difficult to develop and extremely expensive. The only test given for evaluation purposes was the graduate survey examination, which each Turk took upon arrival at the university and again just prior to departure. The scores from these tests are by no means conclusive, though they do show a general improvement in most areas by all five participants.

Evaluations made by the Turks and by the faculty members who worked with them revealed a number of important gains. From an attitudinal point of view the Turks were most impressed by the importance of the individual in American society. Three classed this value placed on the individual as his *major* learning experience in the United States. Freedom of movement between the various levels of society, the ingrained belief in equal treatment by government for all members of society, and the many opportunities for citizen participation, particularly in local government, contributed to the Turks' feeling on this point. The linkage of a belief in individual dignity to the administrative and political processes could well become the significant long-term gain of the program.

In the course of gaining competence in the various subject areas, the Turks received important ancillary benefits. Perhaps the most significant was the development of familiarity with American library resources in the management field. The budget for the program included a very important fund for building a basic personal library for each of the five students. All developed extensive bibliographies and are aware of the most important

journals in each subject field; thus they should have little difficulty in consulting United States sources in future research. Furthermore, they will be in a position to guide the purchasing of Turkish libraries as they begin to accumulate American management materials.

Sophistication in American methods of graduate teaching may also prove helpful to the group. The seminar approach, with each member contributing and the professor acting primarily as a guide, is quite alien to Turkish educational practice. This approach as a supplement to the lecture method should prove invigorating in any field. It would seem to offer special benefits in public administration.

A feeling for the importance of empirical research in all the social sciences was an important gain for the group. The attitudes toward research have previously been alluded to; in addition, the integrated approach of the program permitted the Turks to see public administration in its total interdisciplinary context. They discovered that findings in social anthropology, sociology, and social psychology have practical applications in various aspects of human motivation and interaction. And it was clear that public administration must be studied in the light of these findings rather than in terms of pure theory, form, procedure, or law.

Parenthetically, this type of program also provides a significant learning experience for the American instructors. Much that is irrational in administrative lore in the United States, particularly that which is pure deduction, is shown up in the white light of intercultural scrutiny. There is little doubt that up to now, studies of public administration in the main have been far too parochial and have failed almost completely to take into consideration environmental influences on administrative institutions and procedures.

## VI

THERE is evident in this report a general attitude on the part of the authors that the program for the Turkish professors was in large measure a success. In part this may be interpreted to mean that the sponsoring faculty feels that the two primary objectives that were set have been met to the extent possible

within the limits imposed by time and cultural differences. These objectives, it will be recalled, were (1) to develop management skills and know-how; and (2) to kindle a feeling for the obligations of the bureaucracy in a democratic society.

Beyond the tentative impression of success in these primary areas, certain generalizations are possible as a result of this training experience.

*First*, there is much that is teachable in public administration in the United States. There is the general social science area, where emphasis is placed on human behavior in a group situation; there are the specific techniques of fact-finding for purposes of administrative analysis; and there are the unique elements of the American response to the basic problems of large-scale organization and management.

*Second*, there was a growing awareness by

the participants in their field work that effective democratic management, in its planning and operations, must necessarily take into account the individual as well as the state. Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the project came from enabling the group to see management activity that regards orientation to the individual as the prerequisite to effective group action.

*Third*, the project provides further evidence that technical assistance should not be a one-sided program in which United States experts are sent abroad. Just as important, and perhaps of greater effectiveness in the long run, is the bringing of native experts to this country for training and observation. The kind of learning experiences the Turks had, particularly in their many field trips, simply could not have been made available to them in their own country.

#### Miniature Hotel for Local Government Officials

Five bedrooms for use by the officials of the various towns and market towns visiting the capital were arranged in the office building of the Union of Finnish Towns completed in the spring of 1953.

This miniature hotel is situated on the top floor of the building. It has 4 single rooms and 1 double room. . . . The charge per day is mk 600: (\$2.60) for a single room; mk 750 (\$3.20) for the double room with one occupant, and mk 1,000 (\$4.30) with two. For the sake of comparison it may be mentioned that a room in a first-class hotel in Helsinki, including 15% for service, for one person costs some 900-1,300 marks and for two, 1,000-2,000 marks.

The guest rooms of the Town Union are modern and comfortably furnished. . . . The rooms have proved so popular that bookings have had to be refused at times. Experience to date has shown that the guest rooms have been no economic liability to the Union.

The Town Union building also has a lunch restaurant, used primarily for lunch hour catering. However, on special order, the restaurant is available at other hours as well, e.g. for dinners, suppers, and other related occasions. . . . The restaurant is intended primarily for those working in the office of the Town Union and in the Town Union building, but it has been found that its good food has attracted luncheon guests from elsewhere as well; e.g. the officials of the nearby Parliament House and even the M.P.'s themselves seem to be frequent visitors.

—Excerpts from a letter from Aarre Simonen, general manager, The Office of the Union of Finnish Towns.

# Some Observations on Public Administration In Indochina

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**O**F ALL the areas of Southeast Asia, Indochina remains most nearly *terra incognita* to professional students of public administration in English-speaking countries.<sup>1</sup> Although Indochina was under French control for eighty years, and its basic administrative pattern has been geared to French concepts and French techniques, there is virtually no literature on the development and operation of the Indochinese public service. Such monographs in French as exist are concerned almost exclusively with the law and procedure of colonial rule.<sup>2</sup>

The author of this article, during the summer of 1952, had the opportunity of spending two months in Indochina on a consultative mission for the United States Mutual Security Agency (now Foreign Operations Administration) by contractual arrangement with Public Administration Service of Chicago. During this brief visit interviews were arranged with approximately seventy French, American, and Indochinese officials and direct observations of administrative operations were undertaken in a limited number of national ministries and regional and municipal offices in Vietnam and Cambodia. On account of the inadequacy and only partial accessibility of documentary information, it was not possible to conduct anything approaching a systematic analysis of In-

dochinese administration in such a short period. Accordingly, the commentary presented in these pages consists of the author's tentative evaluation of situations and trends derived largely from a hurried series of interviews and fragmentary observations of administrative practices.<sup>3</sup>

There is no need here to underline the importance for free world security of our understanding, and aiding in strengthening, the administrative system of the three Indochinese nations which are now rapidly moving from colonialism to independent statehood. Unless the new national governments can somehow manage to provide greatly expanded welfare services for the population, and learn how to implement effectively a balanced program of economic development, they will have difficulty in winning the popular support essential for survival against the threat of communism. For students of comparative administration, moreover, Indochina should be of particular interest since it provides the only important case where French models of administration have been imposed upon pre-existing oriental models, resulting in a fused administrative pattern of considerable uniqueness.

## *Environmental Context of Indochinese Administration*

**N**o NATIONAL administrative system can be understood apart from its historical, cultural, economic, and political environment.

<sup>1</sup>The author's report to MSA, through the medium of PAS, is a restricted United States government document. Opinions expressed in the present article are the author's and do not reflect the views of any agency of the United States government or of PAS.

<sup>2</sup>Probably the best of the fairly recent books in French is Roger Pinto, *Aspects de l'évolution gouvernementale de l'Indochine française* (Paris, Sirey, 1946), but it deals only with the constitutional and legislative phases of Indochinese development.

This is particularly true of a society like that of Indochina which has evolved through 2,000 years of foreign invasions, controls, and penetrations, each of them leaving some imprint on its institutions. From the second century B.C. until the tenth century A.D., Annam (then constituting what is the major part of present-day Vietnam) was under Chinese rule. Not only did this long period of Chinese domination deeply influence the literature and religious beliefs of the Vietnamese people, but it laid the foundations for an elaborate imperial structure and for the "mandarin" system of recruitment for state service. For five centuries following the expulsion of the Chinese, Vietnam was engaged in a bitter struggle for survival with the neighboring Hindu Kingdom of Champa, during which the Vietnamese army organized a network, first of "military," and later of autonomous "civil," villages that were to serve as basic units of local government in a predominantly agricultural society down to the advent of French control.

French political intervention in Indochina, which began about the middle of the nineteenth century, had as its initial impulse the urge for trade and the protection of French Catholic missionaries against persecutions said to have been instigated by China. Military intervention, following futile diplomatic protests, led in 1859 to the subjugation of Cochin China (the southern region of modern Vietnam) and its conversion into a French colony. Within the next thirty years the French extended their conquests to Tonkin and Annam on the north, and to Cambodia and Laos on the west, where indirect rule through the convenient "protectorate" device was consolidated by the turn of the century.

*Administrative Characteristics of French Colonial Rule.* The system of control developed by France for her Indochinese possessions, in keeping with the traditional policy of "assimilation," was characterized by a Napoleonic type of centralization. The line of command ran from Paris to the governor-general in Saigon (usually a political appointee), to whom the governor of Cochin China and the chief residents in the four protectorates were responsible. "In principle the governor-general had quasi-absolute powers, including the right to dissolve and suspend advisory native

councils. The only limitation to his rule came from Paris in the form of laws and decrees, as well as in the persons of the inspectors of colonies, sent periodically to investigate his administration."<sup>4</sup> The administrative services within Indochina were run mainly by French career officials appointed by the Ministry of Colonies. On the eve of World War II this colonial bureaucracy numbered about 5,000 persons. The total resident French community (business, banking, and official) was in the neighborhood of 40,000.

The development of institutions of self-government, on the English model, had little or no place in French policy. Such advisory native assemblies as were set up consisted chiefly of tight little oligarchies of landlords, merchants, and local leaders, with no effective power. Nor were native Indochinese admitted to the higher ranks of the colonial civil service. Indeed, a good many subordinate posts, such as those of postmen, were manned largely by French employees. This practice led to the emergence of a dissatisfied and frustrated native intelligentsia, many of whom had been sent to France for university training and had returned home only to find the path blocked to middle- and upper-grade appointments in the public service. The old Indochinese "mandarinate,"—the cultural élite that had traditionally been given a rigorous course of classical (literary) instruction for educational, judicial, and administrative careers—at first tried forcibly to resist French rule, and then gradually became the spearhead for an intense nationalist movement that came to a head in the twentieth century.<sup>5</sup>

The French system of centralized administration, combined with the impact of foreign trade and urbanism, rapidly destroyed the traditional Indochinese pattern of village isolation and self-sufficiency. In pre-industrial times, as Paul Mus has vividly pointed out, the primary unit of Indochinese society was the "autarchic" village.<sup>6</sup> Enclosed behind a screen

<sup>4</sup> Charles A. Micaud, "French Indochina," in Lennox A. Mills and Associates, *The New World of Southeast Asia* (University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 227.

<sup>5</sup> The mass elements in Indochinese nationalism came largely from urban and plantation laborers and soldiers who served overseas with the French forces in World War I.

<sup>6</sup> See his article "Viet Nam: A Nation Off Balance" in *Yale Review* 52:38 (Summer, 1952).

of bamboo, each village community was governed by a council of elders (*notables*) chosen by a process of co-optation which had quasi-democratic features. Taxes, chiefly in kind, were assessed against the village group and it was collectively responsible for their payment. Each village would store its reserves of rice against famine, build its primitive irrigation dike, and supply its quota of army recruits. The "central" state, authoritarian and theocratic in character, kept a "ritualistic" distance between itself and its subjects, intervening only to insure conformity with religious precepts. The state acted more as a coordinating than as an enforcement agency, and its ministers constituted a "kind of high tribunal sitting in judgment upon lapses from the confucian model."<sup>7</sup>

Under French rule, government was secularized and local affairs were increasingly subjected to central administrative direction, particularly in Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin. Taxes payable in money and levied directly upon the individual were substituted for taxes in kind. Registration of births and deaths was instituted so that tax rolls could be more accurately drawn up, and election replaced co-optation for village council members. These so-called "modernizing" reforms tended to weaken family and communal ties, to undermine the whole patriarchial system, and to pave the way for the transformation of a static culture into a dynamic nationalism.

On the economic front, French colonial policy embraced a "closed door" tariff system which retarded industrialization in Tonkin and Cochin China and channeled much of the trade of all Indochina to and from France. Foreign investments in the region, amounting to about \$400,000,000 on the eve of World War II, were 95 per cent French. Most of these investments went into public utilities, rubber plantations, and coal mining. Banking was almost entirely in French hands. Rice constituted 90 per cent of the diet of the native population and accounted for nearly 50 per cent of Indochina's exports.<sup>7</sup>

However, some notable achievements accompanied French rule. Thousands of miles of highways (many of them paved) were built; an extensive railway system was constructed;

and a number of hydroelectric power projects were inaugurated. Health and sanitation conditions were considerably improved and a partially successful attempt was made to combat tropical diseases, especially malaria. A government-financed university on the French model was established at Hanoi. On the other hand, elementary and secondary schools received only niggardly support. In 1939 only 500,000 children, out of a total population of 23 million, were in attendance at grammar schools, and only 1 per cent of this number was able to go on to secondary schools. Nearly 80 per cent of the population were illiterate. On balance, French administration in Indochina, while it did a good deal to improve the material equipment of the region, failed to promote direly needed social services for the native population.

*Political Developments since World War II.* For four years—from 1941 to 1945—French control was interrupted by the Japanese occupation of Indochina. The Japanese, however, refrained from taking over the civil administration of the region from the French authorities—and in general maintained a "correct" attitude—if only because they could count on the pro-Vichy orientation of the then governor-general for the execution of their military directives. In March, 1945, the Japanese, facing imminent invasion by the Allies at home, took a stronger line and arrested numerous French officials suspected of preparing organized resistance in case of an Allied landing. Concurrently, a Japanese radio broadcast proclaimed the end of colonial status for Indochina. Similar pronouncements were issued by the Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, and by the Kings of Cambodia and Laos.

At this juncture, the Viet Minh League (for the independence of Vietnam) moved to the forefront of native opposition to the Japanese—after refusing to recognize the self-styled "independent" Vietnamese government of Bao Dai. Following the surrender of Japan, Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh leader, set up a provisional government at Hanoi and issued a declaration of independence for all Vietnam. By decision of the Potsdam Conference, British troops entered Indochina from the south up to the 16th parallel, and Nationalist Chinese forces from the north down to that line, in

<sup>7</sup> Micaud, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

order to disarm the Japanese and restore order. In the south, the British commander proceeded to reestablish French control and substantial reinforcements from France arrived to support the French colonial authorities.

In the north, however, it was several months before the French could reach an agreement with the Chinese for the withdrawal of their troops. When French forces landed at Hanoi in March, 1946, they found Ho Chi Minh's nationalist government in *de facto* control, with widespread popular support. Perforce the French negotiated with Ho Chi Minh an accord which recognized his "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" as a "free" state forming part of the Indochinese Federation (which the French then planned to set up) within the French Union (constitutional successor to the French Empire). The sticking point was whether Cochin-China should be allowed to enter the new Vietnamese state. It was agreed that this question should be decided by popular referendum. In the meantime, however, the new French governor-general at Saigon, yielding to pressure from the French colonialists, sponsored a separate regime in Cochin-China—a step held by the Viet Minh to be in violation of their March agreement with the French. A *modus vivendi* with Ho Chi Minh, negotiated at Fontainebleau in September, was never fully carried out. The situation then deteriorated and by the end of the year there was open warfare between Ho's forces and the French throughout most of Tonkin and Annam. Thus began the long and costly civil war which, after the advent to power of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949, changed into an international conflict between Communism and the Free World.

After turning to Communist China for military assistance, the Viet Minh regime evolved into a straight-out communist dictatorship, which clearly is its character today. It still controls roughly half of the area of Vietnam, including much of the hinterland plateau and mountainous region and limited strips of coastline. In any realistic calculation, the Chinese-aided Viet Minh must be considered not only as a powerful military organization challenging the French and their Vietnamese allies, but also as a rival civil authority extending over a large part of Vietnam. Its influence, moreover,

reaches into portions of Cambodia and Laos by means of constant underground activities.

The second set of political authorities in contemporary Indochina are the three legitimate governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos which have French support and enjoy diplomatic relations with the United States and other western countries. Two of these governments, the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos, are direct successors to the former protectorate regimes, and their native monarchs continue in power. The third, and by far the most important, is the Vietnamese regime headed by Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam.

Treaty agreements made by France during 1949 with each of the three governments associate them with the French Union as "independent" states, subject, however, to certain key controls retained temporarily by the French. These controls included defense, monetary and tariff policy, control of ports, the right of resident French nationals to be tried in special "joint tribunals," the granting of entry and exit permits, and the right of French citizens to invest freely in Indochina. More recently, in July, 1953, the Government of France announced its intention of negotiating with the three Indochinese states a new pattern of relationship which would provide for fuller independence, involving the relinquishment of most if not all of the reserved powers. A subsequent agreement concluded with Laos transferred control over its military establishment, police, and judicial system. At the time these lines were written (December 1953), negotiations with Cambodia and Vietnam had not been completed.

By the 1949 agreements, as implemented through various supplementary accords, civil administration was transferred to the governments of the Associated States. They were also given the right to maintain diplomatic relations with other countries and to make treaties concerning their own interests.<sup>8</sup> France has successfully sponsored applications for membership by the three states in several of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Their application for admission to the United Na-

<sup>8</sup> Vietnam now maintains an embassy in Washington and legations in London, Rome, and Bangkok.

tions itself, however, was blocked by a Soviet veto in 1952.

Since 1949, a complex set of quadripartite mechanisms has been established in Indochina with a view to facilitating interstate coordination of customs, river transport, communication and economic planning policy, and the joint development of scientific and technical research facilities. The three states form a customs and monetary union. The quadripartite bodies are partly regulatory (e.g., the Bank of Issue) and partly consultative. Representatives of France and the three states sit on each commission or committee, but since for most of them the statutes call for decisions by unanimity the French representative has what is in effect a suspensive veto. Until recently at any rate, the French appear to have regarded these semi-federalistic bodies as permanent, but neither Vietnam nor Cambodia shares this view. The impact of nationalism is so strong in both of these states that neither relishes the formation of anything approaching a truly federal relationship. An atmosphere of tension and rivalry prevails between Cambodia and Laos on the one hand, and Vietnam on the other, the people of the two former areas resenting the dominant position of the latter on the political map of Indochina.

#### *The Political Framework of the Bao Dai Regime*

LIMITATIONS of space make it necessary to restrict detailed comment on the existing governmental systems in Indochina to the State of Vietnam.<sup>9</sup>

*An Authoritarian System.* The Bao Dai regime may be described as an executive-authoritarian type of government tempered in some degree by democratic influences. His Majesty, Bao Dai, as "Chief of State," possesses full power to appoint and dismiss all national ministers and regional governors. Two general ordinances promulgated by Bao Dai in July, 1949, provide the "legislative" basis for Viet-

\* Vietnam contains 23 millions of the total population of Indochina, now estimated to be about 28 millions. Most of the important natural resources—rice, coal, rubber—are to be found in Vietnam and it possesses the principal seaports (Saigon, Tourane, Haiphong). Of the total area of Indochina (slightly larger than Texas), nearly half consists of Vietnam.

nam's central and regional governmental machinery. Both general policy-making and administrative-control functions are lodged in a Council of Ministers (or Cabinet). The President of the Council, commonly known as the President of the Government, in fact determines the composition of his Cabinet by negotiation with the Chief of State, some regard being paid to representation of the major non-communist political groups and of the three geographic regions—North, Central, and South Vietnam—into which the country is now divided for administrative purposes.<sup>10</sup> During the period since the establishment of the Bao Dai regime there have been seven successive Cabinets, the first headed by Bao Dai himself and the others by leaders chosen by him.

Internal struggles for power in the regime take place both among national ministers and in the relations of regional governors to the central government. In this context Cabinet shake-ups are frequent. Similarly, a regional governor, especially in the North, may on occasion be able to flout the national authority. While the Bao Dai regime is centralized in the legislative and executive sense, this centralization is in fact qualified by the impact of cultural and political regionalism. The exercise of governmental power is "deconcentrated" in regional and local terms. This produces a federalistic façade without the substance of federalism.

*Sociological Barriers to Democracy.* The ordinances of 1949 contemplated the creation of an elective national assembly at an early date. Continuation of the bitter conflict with the Viet Minh and various sociological factors have delayed action to this end. A limited first step was taken in the summer of 1952 when President Tam appointed a "provisional consultative council" at the national level, reportedly as a prelude to arrangements for an elected national assembly as soon as the military situation permits. In the view of the more moderate Vietnamese leaders, an assembly indirectly elected "by degrees" would, at the outset, be preferable because of Vietnam's lack of experience with democratic electoral processes on a national scale. In January, 1953, elections

<sup>10</sup> These correspond to the three historic entities of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, respectively.

for local councils were held in 2,000 villages and cities throughout the liberated areas. More than 70 per cent of the million eligible voters (adult males) participated in these elections, which returned pro-government candidates in all places but Hanoi, where anti-regime nationalism remains particularly strong.

The fact is that the social structure of Vietnam is scarcely conducive to the rapid growth of democratic institutions—irrespective of the formidable difficulties associated with war and economic dislocation. There is almost no native middle class. Only the Chinese minority, numbering about 800,000, play the role of "middlemen" (merchants, traders, money-lenders) in the Vietnamese economy. Few of the slowly emerging urban working class or of the unorganized anti-Viet Minh peasants are politically articulate; indeed, the vast majority of them remain illiterate. As already indicated, the intelligentsia are for the most part much more interested in promoting the realization of all-out nationalist aims than in helping to solve immediate political problems. The existence of a variety of religious sects (Buddhists, Cao Daists, Hoa Hao, Catholics), which engage in political agitation and actually control certain provinces with their own private troops, adds a further element of social disunity. The real meaning of democracy is little better understood than are the institutional implications of Soviet communism.

Although political groupings abound in Vietnam, they can hardly be said to be political parties in the western sense. Their character is rather that of volatile cliques attached to individual leaders or espousing a particular brand of nationalism, under either a religious or a secular banner. During the colonial period many Vietnamese intellectuals became imbued with French political ideas and organization through years of study and residence in France, but their principal concern, on returning to their homeland, was to establish propaganda groups that would mirror those French parties favorable to a progressive colonial policy. These were mainly the leftist parties—Socialist, Communist, and Trotskyite—some of which under varying names now support the Viet Minh cause.

Under existing conditions of war and insecurity, both the French authorities and the

Bao Dai government insist upon the necessity of imposing curbs on political discussion. A fairly rigorous censorship of press and radio exists and public meetings are subject to police surveillance. Accordingly, there are lacking effective channels of criticism and control such as one finds in a liberal democratic state.

#### *Significant Features of Vietnamese Administration*

THE administrative system of Vietnam bears the unmistakable imprint of eighty years of French rule. French bureaucratic models, if only for want of knowledge of other types of organization or procedure, have been copied by the architects of the Bao Dai regime. Three major aspects of the system are singled out for special comment here: (1) over-all organization for decision-making; (2) the training, recruitment, and management of personnel; and (3) budgetary and fiscal procedures.

*Decision-Making Organization.* On paper, the central administrative machinery of Vietnam has certain virtues: it consists of a relatively compact cluster of subject-matter ministries, among which line functions are distributed in a fairly logical manner, and it includes an elaborate congeries of staff and auxiliary services that might potentially provide a basis for work-programming and interdepartmental coordination.<sup>11</sup> Close observation of the over-all structure in operation, however, reveals serious deficiencies: a rigid compartmentalism, duplication of effort, waste of manpower and fiscal resources, and procedural bottlenecks.

As in France, administrative departments and other agencies may be modified, abolished, or consolidated, or new ministries created, whenever a new Cabinet takes office. A decree

<sup>11</sup> As of August, 1952, there were 19 ministries: Foreign Affairs; Finance and National Economy; Justice; National Defense; Interior; Information and Propaganda; Education; Agriculture; Public Health; Social Action and Labor; Public Works; Transport and Communications; and War Veterans. In addition, there were two line units at the sub-ministerial level—for Youth and Sports and for "Pacification." The Vietnamese state has also inherited several industrial monopolies which (again in typical French style) operate fairly independently of Cabinet control; e.g., the tobacco, sugar, salt, match, alcohol, and opium monopolies (*régies*), from which considerable revenue is derived.

issued by the Chief of State and countersigned by the President is sufficient for this purpose. Such changes occur frequently and they would appear to be dictated fully as much by political expediency as by administrative considerations. There is no arrangement for making available expert advice concerning the internal organization of a new agency. Continuing administrative management analysis is nonexistent on a governmentwide basis.

The internal setup of the various national ministries tends to conform to a uniform symmetrical pattern—again on the French model. This pattern is prescribed in an administrative circular issued by Bao Dai five years ago and it may be departed from only by approval of the President in exceptional circumstances. According to this pattern, each ministry must include a central headquarters administration, a supervisory office in each of the three geographic regions, and such operating services at the regional level as may be required. The central administration is organized in pyramidal fashion, descending hierarchically as follows: the minister's office, *directions* of line services, services, bureaus, and sections. Regardless of departmental size or function; this scheme is applied with little deviation in all ministries.

Effective devices for interdepartmental coordination have thus far not been developed. There are two or three interministerial committees at the Cabinet level, the most important, significantly enough, being the National Defense Council. But at the working level one finds no standing committees or other instruments for the adjustment of interdepartmental conflicts or the prevention of work duplication as between cognate services. A General Secretariat in the executive office of the President has legal competence to effect such coordination, but it is not equipped staff-wise for this complex task, nor does it have sufficient authority to impose decisions. This secretariat, however, does perform three useful functions: it acts as a legislative reference bureau, provides secretarial services for meetings of the Cabinet and its committees, and has charge of the documentation, library, and archives of the Presidency.

One of the by-products of the lack of adequate coordinative procedures is an excessive compartmentalization of administrative ac-

tion, tempered only in so far as the President himself, or the Cabinet, has time to deal with the minutiae of departmental operations. Clearly routine matters all too often have to be referred to the President or the full Cabinet for decision. Not only is this practice cumbersome and calculated to produce delays, but it burdens top-level political officers with trifling details and thus interferes with their unhurried consideration of important substantive problems.

Both the President and each individual minister has his own personal *cabinet* in the French sense. This group, staffed largely by political proteges, handles the minister's personal correspondence and confidential archives, arranges his appointments, and supposedly maintains informal liaison with other ministries. The minister's office also includes a "general secretariat" within which are grouped various departmental staff services, usually of a rudimentary character, such as personnel, budget, purchasing, legal counsel, and the central registry. Much of the time of these staff units is absorbed in a labyrinth of legalism. The administrative staff work available to busy department heads is thus woefully inadequate despite a superficially elaborate apparatus of *cabinets* and secretariats.

Throughout the administrative structure there seems to be an unwillingness or inability to delegate authority to subordinate officials to deal with minor matters. This is part and parcel of the rigidly hierarchical pattern of administration taken over from the French. Administrative business flows from the top down; it seldom moves up from below. All incoming correspondence is opened by the minister's *cabinet*. Important communications are passed to the minister himself for reply; the others are routed to the appropriate service or bureau with explicit directives as to how they are to be acted upon. Little discretion, or responsibility for decision-making, is devolved upon officials at the middle rungs of the hierarchical ladder. Action is reported back up the hierarchy step by step, with repeated opportunity for blockages as *dossiers* pass from desk to desk—whether by oversight, inertia, or intention. Clearances of comparatively routine matters involve successive signatures up and down the line.

When a case calls for an opinion or concurrence from an opposite number in a different service, the file on it ordinarily must ascend to the director of the originating service, who then sends it to the director of the second service for reference down to the appropriate officer. The file is eventually returned along the same circuitous route. Lateral short-cuts are the exception and not the rule. In other words, business tends to be conducted by passing pieces of paper through hierarchical channels; the telephone is seldom used to secure quick agreement by related services on matters of joint concern. Such procedure makes for bottlenecks and multiplies red tape (*papera-série* in French bureaucratic parlance.) The system of filing and record-keeping is antiquated, partly for lack of modern office equipment.

The operating relationships of central, regional, provincial, and local administrative units are governed by a net of hierarchical controls. These include the power to veto major appointments at the next lower level; the issuance of regulatory decrees and orders by the national government to regional governors; periodic formal reports on technical operation of field services to the national ministries concerned; and sporadic on-the-spot inspections. Both the regions and the provinces have extensive governmental powers, but their scope is not clearly defined. There is duplication of function between territorial units of government. Cognate national and regional services within a region are expected to cooperate and not to encroach upon each other's jurisdiction. In fact, if the regional governor is politically ambitious, considerable overlapping of activity may result, with consequent increased overhead costs. Many of the difficulties encountered in implementing the United States aid program have arisen from the involved procedures governing the release of counterpart funds and the employment of Vietnamese on field projects. It has often taken months to get relief supplies into the hands of villagers because of the multiple clearances that must be obtained from regional and local authorities. Lines of responsibility up and down the field hierarchy are not clearly fixed. In certain respects, there is too much centralization; in others, provincial and local officials are not held sufficiently ac-

countable for important administrative decisions.

A special word is in order on the subject of organization for economic development planning. Vietnam is potentially rich in natural resources and is possessed of an abundant and hard-working labor supply. A major problem confronting the government during the coming years will be how to transform the colonial economy into a national economy—a largely subsistence economy into a semi-industrial one.<sup>12</sup> Seven years of war have disrupted production and uprooted thousands of people who have to be provided with food, shelter, and other essentials of life. Expenditures for refugee relief constitute a heavy burden on the national budget over and beyond the substantial economic aid now being received from the United States. Since at present there is little or no domestic capital for investment, foreign grants or loans will be required for economic development purposes.

A Ministry for Planning and Reconstruction was set up soon after the establishment of the Bao Dai regime. In 1952, this Ministry was abolished and its staff transferred to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. Within that Ministry a General Secretariat for Planning and Reconstruction then had responsibility for two distinct functions: the formulation of measures for relief and reconstruction, especially housing for war refugees, and the development of a long-range national economic plan. The Planning Section of the Secretariat (as of August, 1952) had a small professional staff of about fifteen persons, half of whom were architects and engineers and the other half lawyers and accountants. The Planning Section had set up a number of "study committees" of outside "experts" on specific aspects of "planification," such as improved methods of exploiting Vietnam's coal and water resources. A limited amount of economic analysis was being carried on by the planning staff itself, with the assistance of technical personnel temporarily borrowed from the economic and social ministries.

<sup>12</sup> See Vu Quoc Thong, "Some Thoughts on the Economic Development of Viet-Nam in the Asian World of Tomorrow," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Southeast Asia in the Coming World* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1953).

To date, no comprehensive program for long-term economic development appears to have emerged. When one considers the rudimentary state of available quantitative data on resource inventory, production, consumption requirements, population trends, and trade potentialities, this is not surprising. Attached to the President's office there is a small Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies that collaborates informally with the planning staff, but its usefulness is severely limited by the scarcity of trained statisticians for analytical work, as well as by lack of budgetary support.

A second defect in the planning process is the failure to link it with capital budgeting. The latter subject is still an unexplored domain in Vietnam, largely because the necessity of relating capital expenditure to financial capacity and economic development priorities is not appreciated.

*The Civil Service.* The most urgent need of Vietnamese administration is a professionally competent and socially motivated civil service. As suggested earlier, few Vietnamese with extensive administrative experience were available to man the new national services when control was transferred from French to Vietnamese hands in 1949. What was left of the old "mandarinate" had been dispersed by the Viet Minh, who so viciously attacked them in the press and on the radio that they were afraid to accept office. Consequently, it was necessary to fill most of the positions at the level of bureau chief and upward with persons whose previous experience had been limited to service as clerks and secretaries. In short, an administrative corps to shoulder responsibility for independent administrative operations under extremely difficult conditions was lacking.

As a temporary expedient, to help fill the gap, a considerable number of French ex-colonial officials were employed on a loan basis as technical advisers or civil administrators. They were found, for example, in the executive office of the President, in the central bureaus of the Ministry of Finance, in the customs, tax, and police services, in the bureau of mines, and here and there in regional and provincial administration. Their salaries and allowances were paid by the government of Vietnam at

rates determined in agreement with the French High Commissariat.

Efforts are now under way to provide some special training in public administration for the younger generation of Vietnamese. To this end, a new National School of Public Administration was inaugurated at Dalat in the fall of 1952. The program for this school, inspired in large part by the French *École coloniale* and *École d'administration nationale* in Paris, provides for a two-year course combining academic instruction and practical work. Two categories of students are eligible for admission on a competitive basis: (a) men and women from 20 to 28 years of age who have completed the requirements for the *baccalauriat* degree (roughly equivalent to an American junior college course), and (b) public employees 20 to 30 years old with at least two years of experience. Students surviving the final examination are placed on a graduates' register for assignment to the staffs of provincial and local services for probationary periods of three to six months. If they successfully pass this stage, they may look forward to permanent appointments in order of merit.

Administratively, the school is under the control of the Ministry of Education, from whose budget its operation is financed. Each student in the non-civil-servant category receives a monthly living allowance, while those admitted directly from government employment retain their regular salaries without loss of seniority rights. The financial stringency confronting the government, unfortunately, has made it necessary to start this promising experiment on a very modest scale. It was anticipated that only 40 to 50 students could be admitted for the first year. The school faces the handicap of having to build up from virtually nothing a library of specialized materials. Textbooks, official documents, and technical periodicals will be particularly needed.

For teaching purposes, the plan is to draw mainly upon regular law faculty staff (from Hanoi and Saigon), administrative practitioners, and magistrates for lectures and seminars on a part-time basis. Full-time instructional personnel is apparently to be confined to a Vietnamese director (an ex-civil servant) and perhaps three or four instructors. Although the

exclusively Vietnamese character of the school is repeatedly emphasized, it is likely that one or more French professors will be utilized. The academic curriculum has a heavy public law emphasis, plus small doses of economics and accounting. Special instruction is to be given in both the Vietnamese and the French languages.

In the technical field, there are a few small schools of engineering, agriculture, and forestry, but their level of instruction is reported to be fairly elementary. Before World War II, the French-supported Pasteur Institute used to provide limited periods of advanced scientific training to graduates of these schools. Two years ago an attempt was being made to revive this arrangement with the aid of an American grant for laboratory equipment.

Two other sources of training may be noted. One is the Law Faculty of the University of Hanoi, which also has a branch in Saigon. Its curriculum, virtually identical with that of the French law schools, gives no attention to public administration in the conceptual or managerial sense. The textbook materials, moreover, are with minor variations the same as those employed in France.

In limited numbers, certain categories of Vietnamese civil servants have been sent abroad to study during recent years. From the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance a number of staff employees have held internships in the French customs, tax collection, and real property registration services. Some of the top engineers of the Ministry of Public Works take advanced professional training at the world-renowned École centrale and École des ponts et chaussées of France. So far as I could ascertain, opportunities for study abroad had not been made available in such areas as budgeting, tax economics, fiscal or personnel management, let alone the principles of general public administration.

Since 1950, the Vietnamese civil service (central, regional, and municipal) has been governed by an elaborate statute rooted in French personnel concepts. This statute includes detailed provisions on recruitment, classification, compensation, promotion, transfer, discipline, tenure, and retirement. On paper, it contains a number of admirable features, but their implementation is in the hands of

officials with little appreciation of the dynamics of personnel policy. One could find little evidence of any understanding of the role of work incentives or of group participation as elements of staff morale and improved productivity. Nor did there seem to be much awareness of what might be done to stimulate the development of standards of professional ethics in the public service. In a culture where rigid social stratification has traditionally prevailed, anything that may help to "democratize" the official bureaucracy is of the utmost importance.

The central personnel office, recently transferred for political reasons from the executive office of the President to the Ministry of the Interior, is greatly understaffed. During my visit to Vietnam, it was struggling with the complex task of adjusting scales of compensation (admittedly far too low) to changing price levels. An attempt was also being made to reduce the excessive number of special classes (*cadres*) in each of the three principal horizontal categories to which public employees now belong. Within the purview of the general statutory code of 1950, detailed regulations were being elaborated for each ministry or major service. For effective implementation of these regulations a drastic strengthening of departmental personnel units will be necessary.

In law and theory, the career principle, with minor exceptions, extends to the apex of the administrative pyramid. Recruitment is by two methods: competitive written tests (chiefly of the essay type) for junior and middle-grade positions, and presentation of educational credentials (non-assembled examinations) for higher-level professional and technical posts. Actually, many administrative appointments are obtained through political influence, personal favoritism, or nepotism. Promotions are influenced by similar considerations, as is job tenure, which is anything but secure.

*Public Finance.* One of the striking consequences of the low level of professional capacity in the Vietnamese public service is the chaotic state of its budgetary and fiscal policy and administration. This situation, to be sure, is partly attributable to growing inflation, the necessity of making constantly larger outlays for defense and relief, and the uncertainties of tax revenue due to the war. But it also connotes the absence of orderly budgetary pro-

cedures, a suitable tax system, and efficient methods of tax collection.

Since the transfer of civil administration from France to Vietnam, budgetary equilibrium, which usually obtained during the colonial period, has been succeeded by deficits. The amount and nature of the 1951 deficit, for example, was concealed until the middle of 1952 because the government did not make public its civil budget until that time, and then only in skeletonized form. The budget for 1952 was put together primarily by an able young French official detailed as a temporary adviser to the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance from the Budget Division of the French Finance Ministry in Paris. The appropriations side of the budget was set up in two separate sections: civil and defense. With minor exceptions appropriations for civil purposes were listed under two broad headings—personnel and *materiel*—with comparatively little itemization. The defense section, accounting for around 60 per cent of the total estimates, lumped together in a single item the outlay for army personnel. Costs of mobilization and the personnel of the *gendarmerie* were listed separately, while expenditures for *materiel* were confusingly shown under three different but unclear rubrics. These were additional itemized entries covering military health service, military schools, and the guard for the Chief of State (Bao Dai). Appropriations to meet outlays for the civilian staffs and equipment of the Ministry of Defense, and of a special "pacification" service, were included in the civil rather than the defense section of the budget.

Anticipated tax and miscellaneous receipts, listed in the third section of the budget document, amounted to about two-thirds of the total appropriations, the remaining third being covered chiefly by the expected contribution from France toward the cost of the Vietnamese national army. Economic aid from the United States (both direct and counterpart) provided for the remainder. The budget could be shown "in balance" by reason of this French and American aid, plus a sizable allocation from an unexplained "reserve fund." Control over the allocation of funds is exercised by the Ministry of Finance. Accounting methods are antiquated, especially as regards classification of accounts and audit.

The budgetary process in regional, provincial, and local jurisdictions, if one may judge from a limited sample of situations, is apparently as loose and informal as at the national level. In principle, each region, province, and municipality has budgetary autonomy. Since, however, their budgets are typically in deficit, grants in aid from the national government to the regions and large cities, and from the regions to the rural provinces, are frequently necessary.<sup>13</sup> The amounts of such subsidies are usually determined by political bargaining. The block type of grant is resorted to, with no pretense at relating the scale of aid to quantitative indexes of local resources or needs. Nor are conditional grants employed with a view to ensuring minimum standards of service by the recipient units.

Regional budgets must legally be approved by decree of the national Cabinet. Such approval, however, appears to be a rather perfunctory operation. The execution of the regional budget is likewise subject to control by the national Ministry of Finance, but this is not particularly effective.

The existing tax structure is extremely cumbersome and complex. The principal indirect taxes include the Indochinese customs tariff (the three Associated States sharing the proceeds according to agreed percentages), a sales tax on consumers' goods and on admissions to places of amusement, and stamp taxes on various legal transactions. The major direct taxes are those on real property, on industrial and agricultural profits, on salaries and wages, and on certain professions. In addition, there is a general tax on personal income. As expedients for obtaining more revenue for defense purposes, two special taxes were introduced in 1952: a surtax of 1 per cent added to the sales tax and a percentage contribution equivalent to one day's work a year superimposed on the general income tax. Profits from state monopolies yield a limited amount of revenue for the general treasury.

Over 50 per cent of the gross revenue receipts of the central government comes from customs and the defense surtax. Regional reve-

<sup>13</sup> The central government also allocates small annual subsidies to various autonomous quasi-public agencies, cultural enterprises, students' associations, and the like.

nues are derived chiefly from direct taxes and the general sales tax, while those of provincial and municipal jurisdictions are produced mainly by levies of *centimes additionnels* on real property assessment rates.

The system of tax collection is, in principle, highly centralized. All major taxes are collected on behalf of the national government by a dispersed network of field services under its control. The proceeds of the principal direct tax and of the sales tax are then distributed back to regional, provincial, and local administrations. Tax evasion is a serious problem. A small field inspectorate of the national Finance Ministry is charged with verification of tax declarations and conduct of a spot audit of tax returns, but its staff is inadequate and poorly trained. While I was in Vietnam, the government was waging a vigorous drive against tax evaders. It was perhaps a hopeful sign that *ad hoc* commissions were then being set up in each region to study the over-all tax structure and recommend proposals for its revision. The need for drastic revision was generally recognized, for the existing revenue system is as inequitable as it is unproductive, the lower salaried and wage-earning groups bearing a disproportionate share of the total tax burden.

#### *In Conclusion*

ONE can detect a growing sense of civic responsibility among many of the younger Vietnamese and Cambodian civil servants. Given a more imaginative personnel policy, expanded training opportunities, the restoration of peace, and the achievement of full independence, there is no reason why the new public services should not attract an ample supply of capable and socially motivated talent, and eventually attain a tolerably high level of performance. In this connection, it is significant that one of the main planks in the current reform platforms of the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments is "public service modernization."

Even under the most favorable circumstances, however, it would be unrealistic to assume that the administrative system of Indochina can be brought up to anything approaching western standards within the foreseeable future. Traditional customs, habits, and values must be respected in any program of technical aid offered from the outside. At best, administrative improvement will come only gradually, and not through any ill-advised attempt to force a wholesale recasting of institutional structures and methods.

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#### One or Three?

Your committee have investigated the workings of the civil-service law, and have come to the conclusion that certain improvements can be made. . . . We have therefore recommended a bill which is presented herewith.

The features of the bill which distinguish it from the existing law are marked. The bill abolishes the Civil Service Commission and creates the Civil Service Office. It provides for the appointment of one commissioner, who shall be responsible for the execution of the law. . . .

Your committee believe that instead of a commission as it now exists, that there would be a better administration of the law if there was one responsible head. The chief examiner, who is also appointed by the President, and must be of a different political party than that of the commissioner, will be sufficient guaranty that the examinations and the work of this office can not be run in the interests of the party to which the administration belongs.

—Report of Representative Herman Lehlbach of New Jersey for House Select Committee on Reform in the Civil Service, in House Report 4038, 51st Cong., 2d sess. (March 2, 1891).

# TVA Improves Its Communications

By HELMER M. MARTINSON

*Labor Relations Officer  
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**A**N ARMY is no better than its communications. This axiom is also recognized by the modern-day corporation. Because of number of employees, diverse activities, and widespread locations, any large organization depends heavily on the written word as a chief link with its workers and clients.

Agencies of government, like industry, must have efficient communication. Government agencies, of which TVA is one, have long been accused of using "gobbledygook"—writing that is unnecessarily verbose and difficult to understand. For example, "Retention of a position is not a vested right to which the incumbent is entitled by virtue of possession, but is conditioned upon his maintenance of high standards of performance and the continued need for his services." This idea could have been more simply stated, "No one has a right to his job just because he is holding it. An employee may expect to keep his job only if he is doing his work well and if there is still a job to be done."

But government agencies have no corner on cumbersome writing. Try this one from a large industry, "On April 18, 1952, we advised you that due to the change of the company's fiscal year from a twelve months' period ending September 30 to a twelve months' period ending December 31 and the change in the date of its Annual Meeting from the second Wednesday in December to the second Tuesday in April, the Annual Report of the company covering both the twelve months ending September 30, 1952, and the four months ending December 31, 1952, would be sent to stockholders presumably sometime in March."

TVA is a large and diversified organization. It has over 23,000 employees scattered through parts of seven states. They are working in a variety of fields such as agriculture, engineering, recreation, forestry, and health. Nearly

16,000 of them are trades and labor employees. Some are building dams, steam plants, and transmission lines. Others are operating and maintaining chemical plants and power plants. The other 7,000 are white-collar employees such as engineers, stenographers, and administrative people. TVA's employees range from persons with no formal education in the case of some laborers to persons with Ph.D. degrees. Communication poses difficult problems because of the many kinds of personnel, their different locations, and their various reading levels.

## *Decision to Improve*

TVA has long recognized its communications problem. Two years ago it decided to do something about it. It called in Paul Irvine, head of the Education Interpretation Service of Alabama Polytechnic Institute. He agreed to survey typical TVA materials—reports, letters, administrative releases, leaflets for visitors—a cross section of TVA communications. Some were internal communications. Others were communications sent outside to congressmen, businessmen, farmers, and others who write to TVA for information. The Interpretation Service analyzed the materials and reported on their reading difficulty and appropriateness as communications. Some conclusions were:

1. Most TVA communications were written at the same level of reading difficulty regardless of their intended readers. Writing style and language were generally not adapted to serve different purposes and specific groups of readers.
2. Materials directed to trades and labor employees were generally over their heads.
3. Successive drafts of materials tended to decrease rather than to improve readability.
4. Form letters, such as those sent to all job ap-

plicants, were written in technical and professional language.

5. TVA's annual report, which should be available to all employees and the public, was written at the professional level.

The analysis submitted by the Alabama Polytechnic Institute convinced TVA officials that an effort should be made to improve written communications, and TVA therefore contracted with the institute to conduct a writers' workshop on an experimental basis. The workshop was designed to give writers instruction and practice in writing for clarity and efficiency. Although some TVA writers feared that such training might ruin their style, TVA went ahead with the workshop. The writers who made up the experimental group were largely from the Division of Personnel, with a few guests from other divisions. There were several reasons for starting with Personnel Division people:

1. They write much of the material that is sent to other divisions and to all employees.
2. Other divisions would probably be more receptive to the training if the Personnel Division first tried it on itself.
3. The need for improvement in writing was as great in the Personnel Division as elsewhere.

Nine workshops followed the experimental one. Guests in the first workshop thought the training was useful and requested workshops for their divisions. The demand spread within those divisions and to other divisions. To date 426 writers and reviewers have been trained. They include engineers, chemists, administrative people, secretaries—in general, a good cross section of TVA people who write. Recent workshops have been held largely for engineers and chemists; attention has been directed toward precision and clarity in technical report writing.

#### *How a Workshop Works*

A WRITERS' workshop is set up in five half-day sessions for morning and afternoon groups of about twenty each. At each session attention is centered on a key factor in readable writing. The technique consists of instruction, discussion, and intensive practice. Each writer applies the day's instruction to forms of writing in his own field. He discovers certain

cues to directness and clarity. He also learns how to adapt his style of writing to different purposes and to different readers.

In preparing for a workshop the Interpretation Service analyzes materials that have been written in the particular division. Using selected samples, it prepares a workbook geared to the writing of that group.

The workbook is organized in three parts: (1) factors related to reading ease, (2) factors related to human interest, and (3) writing for style.<sup>1</sup> Each part contains a brief discussion of the topic. Examples of typical TVA writing are compared with suggested rewrites. Then follow a number of practice exercises which are excerpts from typical TVA materials. After a discussion of the special topic of the day, each member rewrites one or more of the exercises in the section. These rewrites are read to the group and further improved through discussion and suggestion.

This method of improving writing is based on studies of language as communication. The techniques are based largely on the studies and formulas of Rudolf Flesch. The plan of instruction has been developed by Mr. Irvine over a period of six years of working with government writers.

#### *Results*

WHAT has this training done to TVA writing? The recorded results of the first workshop can be cited. Measurements by formula indicate that materials written in the Division of Personnel have become more readable. Personal reactions have supported the same conclusion. Comments have come from the various divisions. One summed them up: "We can understand the stuff Personnel is turning out now. And we don't have to read it several times to get the meaning. Every person in TVA who writes should take that training. We want it for the writers in our division."

Measurement by formula has been applied to some five hundred pieces of TVA writing. Some of these were revisions that could be compared with material written before a workshop. Measurements of three publications that have been revised are presented as examples.

<sup>1</sup> Factors suggested in Rudolf Flesch, *The Art of Readable Writing* (Harper & Brothers, 1949).

Reading Difficulty of Three TVA Publications Before and After Workshop, as Shown in Three Measures

Publication	Flesch's Level of Difficulty	Percentage of Employees in Reading Range	Human Interest Level
<i>Teamwork</i> , monthly field bulletin for trades and labor employees			
Before workshop	Difficult	6	Dull
After workshop	Standard	74	Mildly interesting
<i>Working with TVA</i> , handbook for new employees (trades and labor)			
Before workshop	Difficult	6	Interesting
After workshop	Standard	74	Highly interesting
<i>Working with TVA</i> , handbook for new employees (salary policy)			
Before workshop	Difficult	58	Mildly interesting
After workshop	Fairly difficult	92	Interesting

Issues of *Teamwork* before the workshop were written at the "difficult" level, which Dr. Flesch identifies with scholarly magazines such as the *Yale Review*. Only 6 per cent of TVA trades and labor employees could read material at this level of difficulty. Since the workshop, *Teamwork* has been written at the "standard" level; 74 per cent of labor employees can read it. Before the workshop it measured "dull" in human interest; since the workshop it measures "mildly interesting."

Before the workshop the handbook, *Working with TVA*, for trades and labor employees, was written at the "difficult" level; only 6 per cent of these employees could read it. The revised edition scores "standard" in reading ease; it is readable to 74 per cent of trades and labor employees. In human interest the earlier edition rated "interesting"; the later edition scores "highly interesting."

Before the workshop the handbook for new white-collar employees was within the reading range of 58 per cent of the people for whom it was intended; the new edition can be read by 92 per cent. The old edition rated "mildly interesting"; the new edition rates "interesting."

TVA's letter writing also showed improvement after the initial workshop. Prior to the workshop letters that go to all employees and applicants were rated "very difficult" or "difficult"—reading levels of persons who have some college education. After the workshop these letters were rewritten at "fairly easy" or "standard" levels. Nearly all employees can read

them. Also, an analysis was made of more than four hundred communications written after the workshop for which there were no pre-workshop publications with which they could be directly compared. The analysis showed an over-all trend toward greater readability.

These examples indicate that some progress has been made toward the improvement of writing in the TVA, but there is much yet to be done. Writing habits formed during a lifetime are not readily changed by a few hours' experience in a workshop. But new ideas and usable techniques have their effect. The writers who have had the training now produce more readable materials. They find the job of writing more stimulating. They increase their efficiency in conveying information. They know how to adapt their style to a purpose.

TVA sums up its writers' workshop experience under five points:

1. Written materials now have greater clarity and greater appeal.
2. Internal communications are more readily understood and better remembered; efficiency is increased.
3. Readable memorandums reduce the cost of communication within TVA. TVA writers have found that time taken for careful preparation of memorandums pays for itself several times over. Employees take less time for reading and for explanation of the communications.
4. Morale has improved; clearer statements of policy and instruction lead to better understanding.
5. More people read TVA communications.

# Reviews of Books and Documents

## Wedding Big-City Politics and Professional Management

By Joseph E. McLean, Princeton University

**MODERN MANAGEMENT FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK.** Report of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey. New York, March 30, 1953. 2 Vols. Pp. 307, 876.

**FOUR STEPS TO BETTER GOVERNMENT OF NEW YORK CITY: A PLAN FOR ACTION.** Report of the Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York. New York, September 28, 1953. Pp. 136.

**FINAL REPORT OF THE CHARTER COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF NEWARK.** Newark, New Jersey, September 3, 1953. Pp. 111.

THE month of November, 1953, may well serve as some sort of benchmark for students of big city politics and administration. New York City's Mayor-elect Robert F. Wagner, while basking in the sunshine of Nassau, the Bahamas (not a borough of Greater New York), announced his decision November 10 to appoint Luther H. Gulick, president of the Institute of Public Administration, as city administrator. It is important to note here the obvious: (a) Mr. Wagner, the son of a New Deal Democrat, had been elected on November 3 by a large plurality with the support of various New and Fair Dealers, including Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Herbert Lehman, Averell Harriman, and Representative Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., and of, one may add, Tammany Hall and the Bronx Democratic organization—in other words, the election had a somewhat partisan flavor; (b) Mr. Gulick was not only a personal symbol of a long-term trend toward administrative professionalism in American government but he had directed a three-year study of New York City government that had pointed out that "the 'top management' job has never been clearly visualized and

separated out for specialized handling," and that greater recognition should be accorded to the differences between top policy and general management.

Here, then, is a marriage of professional partisan politics and administrative professionalism. As in the case of any marriage, the obvious questions will be raised by relatives, friends, and neutralists: Will the marriage last? Will the partners prove compatible? Will or should one partner dominate the other? Whose in-laws will exert the greater influence? Will the offspring be efficiency, economy, better service, and civic virtue, or will they be failure, frustration, and mediocrity, or worse?

This marriage was preceded by a rather long courtship. The Mayor's Committee on Management Survey was appointed by Mayor William O'Dwyer on January 10, 1950, to undertake a general management survey of the government of the city and of its problems of taxation and finance. Mr. Gulick was selected as executive director and opened the office of the committee on March 1, 1950. Three years and one month later, and after the expenditure of \$2,200,000 on the work of many experts, a final comprehensive two-volume report was submitted by Committee Chairman Lazarus Joseph to Mayor Vincent R. Impellitteri. The courtship was aided and abetted by the shorter, hard-hitting report of the (Devereux C. Josephs) Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York; this report, submitted on September 28, 1953—a month before New York City's mayoralty election—was appropriately entitled: *Four Steps to Better Government of New York City: A Plan for Action*.

Though action was to take place, the last few months of the courtship furnished evidence that the path of true love is not always

smooth. On the occasion of the Gulick appointment, the *New York Times* (November 11, 1953) noted:

Mr. Wagner's views on the city's need for improving management practices appeared to have undergone substantial revision during the election campaign. On Aug. 12, during the Democratic primary campaign, he issued a statement indicating he would place his main reliance on the appointment of able administrators as heads of the various departments with a staff of highly qualified administrative assistants in the Mayor's office to coordinate the work of the various city agencies. The work of these administrative assistants was to be supervised by the Deputy Mayor.

In a second statement, on Oct. 6, after the primary, Mr. Wagner expressed his opposition to having both a City Administrator in charge of housekeeping tasks and a Deputy Mayor to supervise policy matters.

A third statement, issued Nov. 2, on the eve of the election, gave full approval to the idea of creating the office of City Administrator.

It said the occupant of this office "should be an expert in governmental administration, well-paid and supplied with expert assistants to effect the installation of modern management methods throughout the city government. It should be his responsibility that the work of the departments be properly supervised."

Eight days later, Mr. Wagner announced the appointment of Mr. Gulick, who in turn stated that he had accepted appointment "because there is a real job to be done."

Across the river, in New Jersey's largest city, Newark, another romance was taking place. This involved casting aside the discredited commission form of government and substituting therefor a strong-mayor business-administrator form, in accordance with the (Faulkner) Optional Municipal Charter Law of the state. A contrasting feature in this development is the emphasis laid upon nonpartisan elections. The New York City and the Newark developments reflect some of the basic current trends and conflicts in urban government and politics. They suggest the need of a thorough reexamination of our fundamental concepts and beliefs, and, indeed, of our shibboleths.

#### *Three Reports*

THREE official documents have been singled out here for review and discussion. Obviously, the singling-out process must be ex-

tended to a few predominant central features of these reports.

#### *Modern Management for the City of New York*

The Mayor's Committee on Management Survey offered its full recommendations in two volumes of some 1,200 pages, which summarized sixty-two reports of consultants on various departments and problems. As an indication of the scope and complexity of this over-all report of modern big-city government, the following general outline of the survey program is offered:

- (1) Study of the over-all financial problem
- (2) Study of the administrative structure of the City
- (3) Surveys of specific departments as follows:
  - (a) Education
  - (b) Welfare
  - (c) Health
  - (d) Hospitals
  - (e) Police
  - (f) Fire
  - (g) Sanitation
  - (h) Transportation
- (4) Study of other specific problems, which were subsequently defined as:
  - (a) Records management
  - (b) Civil Service examination and recruitment
  - (c) Pensions
  - (d) Inspection and licensing
  - (e) Fuel use
  - (f) Office mechanization
  - (g) General review of personnel administration
  - (h) General review of economy opportunities
  - (i) Career and salary plan
  - (j) Water supply.

Many of the items covered in the report would serve as vehicles for individual essays.<sup>1</sup> But, a central feature of the report, for our purposes, is its recommendation for a general administrator—a director of administration—to relieve the mayor of detailed administrative duties, and the creation of a management cab-

<sup>1</sup> For example, Chapter III of Volume I is devoted to a "Program for Economy" and lists six kinds of economy: (1) "Get Along Without It" Economy; (2) "Cheaper Service" Economy; (3) "Better Methods" Economy; (4) "Penny Wise and Pound Foolish" Economy; (5) "Take a Look Ahead" Economy; and (6) Finally, We Have "Blue Sky" Economy.

inet composed of the mayor, deputy mayor, director of administration, director of the budget, corporation counsel, and representatives of the city planning and civil service commissions. Weekly meetings are recommended for the management cabinet. The director of administration would have the responsibility of preparing agenda for such meetings and for executing cabinet policy. Top management should act "as a governmental directorate" and should "keep out of detailed operations." An effort is made to separate operational from managerial functions; a considerable degree of autonomy is recommended for the various operating departments.

A host of other conclusions and recommendations is presented in the report: the creation of the position of personnel administrator, appointed by the civil service commission with the approval of the mayor; the adoption of a program budget in place of the line budget; the inclusion of the city colleges in the state's university system; an increase in state and federal aid; and the creation of a transportation authority.

#### *Josephs Commission Report*

Building upon the Management Survey Report, the Josephs Commission, with the aid of Wallace S. Sayre, director of research, and Arthur H. Goldberg, counsel, found that:

The managerial crisis of New York City requires that the leadership and accountability of the Mayor, as the elected chief executive of the City, should be reinforced and clarified.

For that Purpose, the Commission Recommends:

1. There should be a City Administrator, second-in-administrative-command under the Mayor, responsible for the effective management of the City's administrative agencies.
2. There should be a Deputy Mayor, responsible for representing the Mayor at Board of Estimate meetings and on many public occasions.
3. There should be a performance budget, providing a clear and comprehensive financial plan for the City.
4. There should be a new and complete system of personnel administration clearly responsible to the Mayor, safeguarding the merit system and providing an effective career staff for the administrative agencies of the City government. (p. 11)

The commission was guided by two basic

premises, which, in turn, focus attention upon the critical issues of big-city management:

*First*, the Commission decided in the very early stages of its work that the crucial need of the New York City government is for top-level professional management, and for an improved organization of the City government which will insure the recruitment and full use of this needed managerial assistance. The concept of professional top management is in essence the managerial idea which has been applied with such wide success in large business corporations, in the national government, in a number of state governments, and in many cities which use either the mayor-manager or the council-manager plans. Professional management has been an acknowledged need in the New York City government for many years.

*Second*, the Commission concluded, at the same time, that the Mayor of New York City, as the elected chief executive of the City, is the indispensable center of leadership and responsibility for the policies and the performance of the City government, and that the top-level managerial assistance which is so badly needed must, therefore, be subordinate to the authority and direction of the Mayor. Thus the quality of the Mayor inevitably determines the quality of the City government. This conclusion led necessarily and clearly to the Commission's rejection of the conventional council-manager plan of city government, in which the power and responsibility of the mayor is reduced to ceremonial dimensions. In contrast, the mayor-manager plan, which is an apt phrase for describing the Commission's first major proposal, captures for large cities all the advantages of the council-manager plan while at the same time preserving the great values of the elected mayor as the city's chief executive.

These two principles underlying the Commission's recommendations—the Mayor as the center of leadership and responsibility, and the Mayor's crucial need for top-level professional management assistance—have been supported by a broad and fundamental agreement in all the information and advice which the Commission has received from the whole community of New York City. (pp. 9-10)

Going to the heart of the issue, the commission boldly stated:

New York City is fortunate in its long and frequently reaffirmed tradition of the elected chief executive as the center of energy and responsibility in its government. This tradition conserves and maximizes the values of the American Executive—a unique political institution representing the

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most successful contribution by the United States to vigorous democratic government, uniting as it does the elements of popular control and the means for energetic action—combining responsibility with flexibility. (p. 12)

With this thinking in mind, the commission then recommended that the mayor's greatest immediate need is for:

*First*, a City Administrator who would serve as general manager and coordinator for the Mayor over the large and expanding administrative organization which the Mayor must now supervise without experienced general-managerial assistance.

*Second*, a Deputy Mayor who would continue to represent the Mayor in the meetings of the Board of Estimate when necessary and who would assist the Mayor more fully in carrying out his ceremonial functions.

*Third*, a modern budget system built upon programs and performance standards, operating under the supervision of the City Administrator, and providing the Mayor, the City legislators and the public with a clear and comprehensive financial plan for the City government.

*Fourth*, a modern personnel system clearly responsible to the Mayor, through the City Administrator, safeguarding the merit system and providing an effective career staff for the administrative agencies of the City government. (pp. 13-14)

### *Newark Charter Commission Report*

The Charter Commission of the City of Newark submitted its final report September 3, 1953, and the voters acted upon it favorably. The report contains a devastating indictment of the commission form of government and a persuasive argument on behalf of the strong-mayor business-administrator plan as authorized under New Jersey's optional Municipal Charter Law.

The Charter Commission decided to recommend the mayor-council Plan C, as set forth in Article 5 of the optional Municipal Charter Law, because:

. . . it embodies six basic principles deemed essential to efficient and responsive local government. None of these principles, set forth below, is now effective in Newark under the commission form of government.

1. The new charter provides a *clear separation of powers* between the council as the legislative body, and the mayor as the head of the city administration. The council will legislate on matters

of public policy, subject to the veto power of the mayor. The mayor will have the executive power, but the council will serve as an independent critic of the exercise of this power. A system of checks and balances is established.

2. The mayor, who will be directly accountable to the people, is placed in a position of *strong policy leadership*. He will be the chief policy maker, exercising leadership in long-range planning as well as in providing for the immediate needs of the city.

3. *Unified administration* of all local services is provided in the office of the mayor. There will be a single executive to supervise all departments of the city government, responsible for the efficiency and standards of all municipal services.

4. The charter will provide a *more representative city government, with majority rule* in the election of the mayor and council. For the first time in years, the principal areas of the city and the important elements of its population will be assured representation.

5. *High standards of performance* in the conduct of the city's business and *new safeguards against abuse* by city officials are both written into the provisions of the new charter.

6. Last but not least, the new charter will provide a *flexibility of structure and a wide grant of home rule* to enable the new city government to adjust to changing conditions and to benefit by the results of its operating experience. This will be a home rule charter in the broadest sense that the Legislature may grant under the State Constitution. (pp. 5-6)

Aside from the strong-mayor business-administrator concept, the Newark report is noteworthy for its emphasis upon the values of nonpartisan elections. The case is persuasively stated:

The *Charter Commission* favors the retention of non-partisan municipal elections for Newark. Approximately seventy per cent of all American cities now elect their local officials on this basis. Of 23 cities between 300,000 and 600,000 in population, eighteen have non-partisan elections and five use the regular political parties to nominate and elect their city officers.

It is the *Commission's* belief that Newark's poor election history has been the result of the commission form of government, rather than a failure of the non-partisan method of elections. The very nature of commission government has prevented the building of active citizens groups to support candidates under a non-partisan banner.

Non-partisan elections are in accord with the

best thinking on municipal government for the following reasons:

1. There is little or no relationship between national and state issues, on the one hand, and purely local questions on the other. Local problems inevitably are submerged when city officials are elected on a partisan basis in conjunction with state and national elections. While national and state issues commonly involve basic questions of policy, local questions generally are more concerned with the quality and cost of accepted local services. Thus, there is no Democratic way of cleaning the streets or Republican method of operating the public baths.<sup>2</sup>

2. Partisan elections narrow the opportunities for a united effort for civic betterment by all elements in the community, regardless of political affiliations, thereby impeding the realization of the full benefits of home rule. There are deterrents to crossing party lines for party "regulars," and a hesitancy on the part of independent voters and non-political organizations to join in party-sponsored or supported municipal activities.

3. Party nominations for municipal office under partisan elections are determined by the primary elections. Large numbers of independent voters do not vote in the primaries, leaving the field clear for party "regulars," endorsed by political leaders. Should one political party be dominant in the city, the primary elections of that party in effect would select the mayor and councilmen. Partisan elections, therefore, do not develop on the municipal level a broad participation in the selection of city officials.

4. Partisan elections inevitably result in an emphasis on the patronage needs of the successful political party, at the expense of efficiency and economy in municipal services.

5. Partisan elections leave the city with little influence with the county, state and Federal governments, should they be controlled by administrations of the opposite political faith from the city administration. On the other hand, a strong mayor elected on a non-partisan basis is likely to have substantial influence with other governmental bodies, regardless of which political party is in power.

It is clear, however, that the method of nominating and electing municipal officials on a non-partisan basis places a burden on civic-minded citizens and organizations to join together under a non-partisan banner to endorse and support candidates for municipal office. In the absence of

<sup>2</sup>The Essex County Republican Clean Government organization might well disagree.

a strong non-partisan movement such as that maintained for years in Cincinnati, political influence and control is likely to gravitate to the organized political parties or to personal political organizations of the mayor and those who aspire to be mayor.

An alert and active citizenry is required to maintain the spirit as well as the form of non-partisan elections (pp. 61-62).

#### *Reconciling Politics and Managerialism*

THE classic study of the city-manager movement commented on three fundamental principles of the city-manager form of government as follows:

First, there was the idea that the most capable and public-spirited citizens should serve on the governing body as representatives of the city at large, to determine policies for the benefit of the community as a whole, rather than for any party, faction, or neighborhood. This idea was embodied in the nonpartisan ballot and in the system of election at large of a small council.

Second, there was the idea that municipal administration should be delegated to a thoroughly competent, trained executive, who should get and hold his job on his executive ability alone and should be given a status and salary comparable to that of an executive in charge of a private corporation. This idea was embodied in the concentration of administrative authority in the city manager.

Third, there was the idea that the voters should hold only the councilmen politically responsible and should give the city manager a status of permanence and neutrality in political controversy. This idea was embodied in the unification of powers in the council as a body comprising the only elected officials in the city government.<sup>3</sup>

In the last few years, there has developed with respect to the conventional manager plan a certain degree of unrest, of criticism, and—in the view of some—of heresy. The unorthodox view has been held particularly in relation to the large city; frequently, the thought has been expressed that the problem of governing our big cities could be met only by a strong-mayor chief-administrator plan combined with partisan elections. Certainly in the big cities, whatever the motives or reasons, there has been opposition to the city-manager concept and

<sup>3</sup>Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, Kathryn H. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 236.

there has been a view that a partisan political system was here to stay.

Although imperfectly stated and applied, the strong-mayor chief-administrative-officer idea has been strongly supported in New York City, Philadelphia, and some other large cities. This support has frequently been coupled with strong opposition to the conventional manager plan—whatever its theoretical merits. This situation suggests that some disinterested group should study carefully and dispassionately the experience of the several large cities that have embraced the strong-mayor chief-administrative-officer concept.

In recent years, students of government cautiously or otherwise have expressed skepticism about the universal applicability of the conventional manager plan. The attempt on the part of many advocates of the manager plan to draw a too-neat line between policy and administration has drawn increasing criticism.

The debate over whether a city manager should be a leader in policy formation seemed to have died down, with the weight of evidence indicating that a successful manager inevitably normally performs such a function in one way or another. While such a conclusion modifies appreciably the original theory behind the council-manager plan, it does not vitiate that theory by any means, and the plan continued to add to its long list of supporters. At most a few minor practices of council-manager government, such as hiring managers without regard to their orientation toward public policy, might have to be rethought.<sup>4</sup>

The general current state of confusion with respect to the universal applicability of the conventional manager plan suggests that political scientists, public administrators, and civic leaders, as well, should reexamine the basic concepts underlying the major political inventions and reforms of the past fifty years in municipal government.

#### 1. How meaningful is the separation of powers doctrine at all levels of government?

<sup>4</sup>Edward W. Weidner, "Municipal Highlights of 1952," *The Municipal Year Book 1953*, p. 3. See also, E. O. Stene and George K. Floro, *Abandonments of the Manager Plan; A Study of Four Small Cities* (Lawrence, University of Kansas, Governmental Research Center, 1953), 107 pp., and Dorothy I. Cline, *Albuquerque and the City Manager Plan, 1917-1948* (University of New Mexico, 1951), 48 pp.

2. How great is the need for a philosophy of urban government, related in turn to questions of structure?

3. Does a national party structure require parties at the local level?

4. Just what do we mean by policy and administration? Can they be separated?

5. Do we know enough about the role of the council, the role of the individual councilman, the proper size of the council (related in turn to size and character of the community), and the bases of representation (at-large elections, representation by wards, combination election systems, proportional representation)?

6. Is there a need to reexamine the doctrine of home rule in the light of changed and changing fiscal and other factors?

7. What is the relationship of the structure of city government to the urban county and the metropolitan problem?

8. Is there room in our thinking and experience for both nonpartisanship and partisanship at the local level? Has the nonpartisan movement tended to sterilize the political process?

9. Have we in general tended toward unimaginative thinking, dogmatic assumptions based upon fragmentary evidence, and overly defensive attitudes toward criticism?

The New York City experiment will not be conducted in the most favorable setting. Yet this perhaps is as it should be. Mayor Wagner has indicated that the city administrator "would assist the various commissioners without in any way intruding upon their authority. . . . He would not have the power of appointment and the Budget Director would continue to report directly to the Mayor and the Board of Estimate." The position will obviously involve a trial-and-error approach, and much will be left to evolution and to chance. Yet, a sophisticated student of public administration has accepted the post with the promised backing of the new chief executive. As a New Year dawns upon the nation's largest city, one hopes with Mr. Gulick that we now stand "on the threshold of an historic contribution to good government. . . . This is the right way to celebrate New York City's 300th anniversary."

## Applying Principles of Public Administration

By Otto K. Engelke, M.D., Washtenaw County (Michigan) Health Department

**ADMINISTRATION AND THE NURSING SERVICES**, by Herman Finer. The Macmillan Company, 1952. Pp. 333. \$4.00.

PERHAPS the most notable feature of this book is that it represents an effort at *applied* public administration. With some notable exceptions,<sup>1</sup> the bulk of the literature of public administration deals, quite naturally, with principles, ideas, and issues in abstraction. The specific functions or disciplines of the public service are mentioned only as things or people or situations to which the generalities might be applied. In *Administration and the Nursing Services*, Mr. Finer, who has previously made notable contributions in the distillation of administrative doctrines, now turns his attention to the development of administrative guide lines for use by a sizable segment of the public and quasi-public service.

One of the most serious problems confronting the health and related professions is the severe shortage of nurses. This shortage currently affects the public through service adjustments made by many organizations—private and public hospitals, industrial health facilities, private-duty nursing services, nursing schools, private health agencies, official public health departments, and others. *Administration and the Nursing Services* recognizes this situation as a "crisis."

With wisdom and courage Mr. Finer and his associates have carefully avoided a sketchy general health appraisal and a "gunshot prescription" for all of the alleged nursing ills. They have instead confirmed the existence of at least one ailment, namely questionable administrative practices, and have recommended a "specific treatment" for it. Wisdom is evident not only in the limitation of the study, but also in the technique employed by Mr. Finer in arriving at his diagnosis, prescribing his therapy, and providing counsel for the prevention of relapses or recurrences of the malady. An overpowering array of nursing talent and consultants in hospital administration and related

fields, who participated in a one-year research project, stand with the author in his findings and recommendations.

This study, financed by the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, is known as the "Kellogg Foundation Nursing Service Administration Research Project, 1950-1951." Mr. Finer directed the project. *Administration and the Nursing Services* is Mr. Finer's report of the deliberations of the consultant group and the director.

Courage is demonstrated throughout the report as Mr. Finer frequently restates his diagnosis "that modern nursing service has truly pressing need of a knowledge of administration—a need of signal importance demanding the earliest possible satisfaction. The need is a chronic, a continuing, not merely a transient one. The absence of a knowledge of administration spells confused and dispersed responsibility, wasted resources, sick morale and a defeat of proper patient care." Courage is also evident in that this book is among the first, if not indeed the first, comprehensive writing directed toward a remedy.

Part One of the book elaborates upon the definition of the problems confronting the research group: "to discover whether the study of administration and the social sciences can contribute to the improvement of nursing service administration. If so, how significant may the contribution be? If the contribution is significant, how can the study of administration be introduced into the education of nurses—at what stages, with what content and through what curricular arrangements?" The history of business and public administration is reviewed briefly. The similarity of the broad principles established in good public administration and the principles needed in the nursing services is clearly established.

The paucity of writing on general nursing administration is emphasized. A rather politic suggestion is made that nursing has reached the stage "when its more sensitive, philosophical, and prophetic leaders are convinced that the time has arrived for a systematic overhaul of its educational preparation and the science and art of its practice, this is partly a result of the intensification of the community's need

<sup>1</sup>Such as Donald C. Stone, *The Management of Municipal Public Works* (Public Administration Service, 1939) and the International City Managers' Association's *Techniques* volumes.

for its services, and the weight of its own internal problems."

This paucity of writing in administration for nurses is largely overcome for those who are not easily bowled over by academic definition and philosophy in the balance of Part One devoted to the aim and quest: "The Care of the Patient." Meditations on "The Ethos of a Profession," the "Nature of Authority," the "Authority of Situation vs. Command," and "Responsibility, Moral and Sanctioned," set the pace for Part Two which in turn fairly accurately describes six "Compulsions to Awareness of Administrative Skill." They are:

1. The scarcity of nursing personnel in relation to need
2. The substantial size of the personnel in nursing service, and even on each ward
3. The multiplicity of diverse "auxiliary" departmental skills that are the ingredients of patient care, with the nurse or nursing service as focussing agent
4. The multiplicity of nursing skills within the nursing service department itself
5. Recognition that quality of service is not amenable to accurate statistical measurement or expression
6. The lack of regional system in hospital and nursing provision (pp. 43-44)

Anyone who is able to stay with Part Two will better understand the *nurse* viewpoint of the complexities of the nursing functions and relationships in institutions. More evidence is presented for the need for better nurse and institutional administration and coordination.

Many will be a little puzzled with the unsympathetic handling of the practicing physician in the nurse-doctor relationship. It is apparent that Mr. Finer and the panel of experts either failed to secure or ignored the counsel of the professional group ultimately charged with the responsibility for the end result of patient care. The "doctor's clinical paramountcy, his professional independence of mind, and his limited effectiveness without skilled assistance, especially nursing," are subjects of discussion which appears to be based on a lack of comprehension of the complex nature of sound medical practice. *Administration and the Nursing Services* seems to overlook the fact that the hospital stay is but a part of the total community and home plan of patient care. Many physicians revolve through the hospital

sphere on a part-time basis, and properly so, in a program of total patient care. Good administration would seem to involve all reasonable adaptations of the operations of the auxiliary personnel and facilities of the hospital to this program. To borrow Mr. Finer's manner of expression, many health authorities believe that nurse and hospital administration should remain patient "centric" and doctor "centric." The practice of medicine, in contradistinction to Mr. Finer's own description of nursing, is not a sheltered profession. Some readers will question the wisdom of the brief excursion into the realm of nurse-doctor medical economics as well as the fundamental philosophy involved in the section advocating "regionalism," i.e. regional organization. One wonders how much of the priceless art of total patient care may be lost in such a program.

*Administration and the Nursing Services* moves easily and well through sections on the "Content of Administration" and the "Spirit of Education for Nurses." The author's rich background, experience in public administration, and grasp of the professional "know-how" of his consultants are blended in a presentation which may come to be regarded as "must" reading for all nurse administrators and nurse teachers. Fundamentals of administration, as they affect every-day problems such as planning, organization, budget, and personnel, are reviewed in a practical manner. For nurse educators one finds suggestions for techniques which are needed and can be applied.

While the book is primarily dedicated to hospital nursing administration and education, the material presented is broad enough to be of interest to any organization involved in nursing services.

Note must be taken of the dearth of "practitioners" on the list of consultants employed in the research project. Recognizing the limitation of time and funds encountered in any study, one still wonders whether or not this exhaustive study might not have been improved by the counsel of a few practicing staff physicians, staff nurses, laboratory technicians, physical therapists, dieticians, maintenance men, and the like. Somewhere, too, it seems there might have been room for the contributions of a few intelligent average citizens with recent hospital experience.

## The Automatic Handling of Office Paper Work

By Howard Gammon, U.S. Bureau of the Budget

**AUTOMATION: THE ADVENT OF THE AUTOMATIC FACTORY**, by John Diebold. D. Van Nostrand Co., 1952. Pp. 175. \$3.00.

**REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON NEW RECORDING MEANS AND COMPUTING DEVICES**, Malvin E. Davis, Chairman. Society of Actuaries, 208 South LaSalle St., Chicago 4, Ill. September, 1952. Pp. 107. \$1.50.

**ELECTRONICS IN THE OFFICE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**. American Management Association, 33 West 42nd St., New York 36, N. Y., December, 1952. Pp. 36. \$1.25. Office Management Series, No. 131.

**TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO COST REDUCTION**. American Management Association, New York City, 1953. Pp. 36. \$1.25. General Management Series, No. 164.

**A SYMPOSIUM ON COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE GENERAL-PURPOSE ELECTRONIC DIGITAL COMPUTERS OF MODERATE PRICE**. Office of Naval Research, Washington, D. C., 1952. Pp. 41. (Available from Office of Technical Services, U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D. C. \$1.25.)

**SYMPOSIUM ON MANAGERIAL ASPECTS OF DIGITAL COMPUTER INSTALLATIONS**. Office of Naval Research, Washington, D. C., 1953. Pp. 36.

WITHIN the past year the *ASPA Newsletter* has reported on two well-attended chapter sessions devoted to the subject of "Electronic Brains and Public Administration." These meetings—one of the Capital District Chapter, Albany, New York, and the other of the New York City Metropolitan Chapter—give evidence of the very live interest of public administrators in considering the possible effects upon their work of greater use of electronic methods for processing information.

There is an abundant technical literature on the design and construction of electronic computers, but most of this literature is addressed to an engineering and mathematical, rather than to a management, audience. More straightforward descriptions are needed of what electronic data processing can do for management and how management may ap-

proach the problem of determining the applicability of these new methods to a given organization's work. A review of the literature that is now available which is not too technical to appeal to public administrators may stimulate other readers of the *Review* to make further contributions to the literature from a public administration point of view. Although the age of robots is *not* just around the corner, organizations which have a sufficient volume of repetitive work, whether in production or stock control, handling orders, processing mailing lists, or a hundred and one other activities requiring the accumulating and sorting of information, can make substantial savings and render better service through the application of electronic information processing methods.

The Sunday-supplement descriptions of so-called "electronic brains" have focused attention on the tremendous costs and the lightning speed of the new devices. As a result, many people have come to regard them as more or less magical and beyond their comprehension. As in the case of the automobile, it is not necessary to know how to make, or even to repair, these machines in order to make use of them. For the public administrator, as for the businessman, the emphasis needs to be placed on *how* and *when* to use these new devices; for even if they could very soon be made much smaller and cheaper, there are organizational, procedural, economic, and social problems which must be resolved before automatic operation of a factory or an office can be realized.

### Some Recent Publications

*Automation*, by John Diebold, is addressed, not to public administrators, but to businessmen and industrial managers to describe the problems (other than the construction of electronic computers and other control mechanisms) involved in making an office or a factory operate on an automatic basis.

Diebold has coined the word "automation" to denote both automatic operation and the process of making things automatic. The process includes product and process redesign, the theory of communication and control, and the

design of machinery and equipment. As Diebold uses the word, it connotes a combination or grouping "of these otherwise loosely related studies as being a distinct area of industrial endeavor, the systematic analysis and study of which will yield fruitful results." The word represents a contraction of "automatization."

Diebold makes no pretense of contributing new technological knowledge. Rather, he pulls together a variety of information from technical and research papers, periodicals, and other sources not generally accessible to businessmen or public administrators and presents a thoughtful and provocative analysis of the business problems which must be solved before the full benefits of the new technology can be realized.

His book grew in part out of an extended research project in which he participated while a graduate student in the Harvard Business School. With seven associates, Diebold wrote an extended report, *Making the Automatic Factory a Reality*. This report, published privately, described a hypothetical automatic piston factory that consisted primarily of a series of automatic production machines connected with automatic materials-handling equipment and controlled in part by their own built-in operating controls. Over-all control of these machines was provided by a small digital electronic computer which took the place of human operators and existing production control systems. The report concluded that it is possible to build the flexible materials handling equipment that is necessary to make an automatic factory economical for short runs of product, and also that it is possible to produce economically the flexible control equipment that can take the place of the human machine tender.

Chapter 5, "Automatic Handling of Information," is likely to be the most stimulating part of Diebold's book for public administrators. Here he considers the problems of automation of the office and predicts the most immediate, widespread, and fruitful application of the new technology. Although the office is engaged in handling masses of papers and cards, "the primary function of the office is the handling of information." The need for more and more information to be used for managerial control and to comply with a growing

body of governmental regulations has resulted in tremendous increases in the number of office workers. Between 1920 and 1950 the number of office workers increased nearly three times as fast as the number of factory workers. Production costs have gone steadily downward, while office costs have climbed to new highs. Automation will help management to meet the problems of high office costs.

*Report of Committee [of the Society of Actuaries] on New Recording Means and Computing Devices* describes the systems study of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which occupied a group of its senior management staff for more than two years.<sup>1</sup> It is the most comprehensive study of the problems of applying electronic data processing to business office routines that has been described in published literature. This report, popularly called the Davis Report, deserves careful study by any public administrator who is concerned with electronic information processing. In this reviewer's opinion it is the most valuable piece of literature on the subject from a managerial point of view. The public administrator who is looking into the possibilities of electronic data processing for his agency will be interested in this advice:

. . . Probably, the first thing is to get together a group of people who already know quite thoroughly what we now do and why, and who are able to see how our whole operation hangs together without losing sight of the very many different ways in which the work can be done . . . machinery of this kind does not require that you fire everybody in the Home Office . . . as of now, the things that we are sure the machines can do are only the mechanical operations—the simple repetitive arithmetic and look-up actions which are generally performed by the large numbers of relatively young clerks amongst whom the rate of turnover is usually high. It is not unreasonable to expect that the rate of turnover will be sufficient to keep pace with

<sup>1</sup> Malvin E. Davis, vice president and chief actuary of Metropolitan Life, was chairman of this committee, which also included William P. Barber, Jr., secretary, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company; John J. Finelli, assistant actuary, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; and Walter Klem, vice president and associate actuary, Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. Mr. Davis gave a brief description of this work in a paper entitled "The Use of Electronic Data Processing Systems in the Life Insurance Business," at the Eastern Joint Computer Conference in Washington December 8, 1953.

the speed at which equipment of this kind can be made to reduce the need for clerks. (p. 25)

In the course of determining the application of the electronic computer to the practices of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the authors of the Davis Report evolved a set of guiding principles:

1. *An electronic computer should be applied to the whole job, not to some separately departmentalized piece of it.* With such machines to work with it becomes a matter of sound economics to get as many things as possible done from one handling of the policy information regardless of whether or not such work is now being performed in one department or in several departments. We must remember that one of the reasons we have separate departments is that we cannot reasonably expect clerical groups to become thoroughly familiar with all the details in many different procedures. Therefore, we have to parcel out assignments, someone to calculate the dividends, someone else to figure loans. Now these machines have marvelous memories. They remember everything you tell them to do, down to the minutest detail, and what is often even better, they remember only what you tell them. Accordingly, the idea of breaking down a whole job in pieces in order to assign it to separate departments in manageable sizes requires much re-examination.

2. *Small jobs should be combined with others.* Electronic computers can be given the procedures for handling many different jobs and can switch over from one job to another with no elaborate change-over operation. This makes possible the mechanization of many areas in which the volume is now too small to warrant mechanical methods. Also, it appears to make possible the use of powerful machinery of this kind in smaller companies where the desired volume of work can be created by bringing together many different kinds of activities.

3. *Source records should be consolidated.* One of the most expensive phases of computer operation is the "make ready" costs. There is a relatively large amount of work involved to get the proper information into the machine. Often it must be extracted from different card records, converted into the punched hole form or magnetic tape form which the machine requires, batched up into controllable consignments, shipped to another department, proof-checked for completeness in the receiving department, and scheduled for machine processing. A great deal of this cost can be avoided by reducing the number of different places from which the information must be collected and, of course, if that information is kept in machinable

form in the first place an expensive conversion operation is avoided.

4. *Make all calculation at one time.* It adds little if anything to the cost of an electronic computer operation to double or triple the amount of arithmetic which the computer is required to do with the information it has received. Once the information is in the machine, practically every useful figure should be developed, even though it may not now be customary to develop any such figures.

5. *Use a self-checking machine.* These computers apply a long series of operations automatically, move from policy to policy automatically, change the procedures automatically. In a short space of time, they run through thousands of calculations. Certainly, we do not want to wait until after a large amount of work was done to find out that at an unknown point the machine had failed to recognize a signal or had inadvertently lost some of the information. On the other hand, we do not want to build in so many external clerical type checks, controls, and comparisons that we defeat the whole idea of automatic operation. Accordingly, machinery which controls and checks its own operations is highly desirable. If anything goes wrong it would not require an analysis of a very complicated machine, hours later, in order to set it right again. (pp. 22-23)

*Electronics in the Office: Problems and Prospects* consists of five papers which were presented at the Office Management Conference of the American Management Association, held in New York City, October 16-17, 1952. The first and last of these papers would seem to have special interest for the public administrator. In the first paper E. J. Cunningham, assistant comptroller of the Monsanto Chemical Company, tells the experience of his company in applying electronic data processing to its entire accounting system. For something more than one year Monsanto had been using the IBM card-programmed calculator (or CPC as it is colloquially named) to prepare monthly financial reports to management. This installation had reduced preparation time from about forty man-days to six or eight hours. According to Cunningham, Monsanto regarded its use of the CPC as an accounting research project; and the company planned to go much further in using electronic methods as large-scale electronic computers designed especially for business use become available.

The conversion of the gathering of accounting

data from a manual to a fully automatic basis will eventually result in a reduction in the number of employees required to complete this laborious phase of our accounting. . . . this simply means that our accountants will then be free to do the more important job of analyzing and interpreting financial reports for management.

Finally, I might say that we visualize in the future electronic equipment which will transcribe accounting data at their source to a wire for transmittal to a central accounting calculator. This central electronic unit would do all the computing and recording of information in record and statement form. (p. 8)

This reviewer believes there are strong organizational reasons for not centralizing accounting to the degree proposed by Cunningham. It also seems probable that the costs of communicating information by leased wire to the central accounting facility will be so large as to outweigh the economies of centralizing the data processing operation.

The last paper in the group is "A Look at the White Collar" by C. Wright Mills, associate professor of sociology at Columbia University.<sup>2</sup> In his view the old incentives which induced people to work are running down and there are no new incentives to take their place.

The work incentives of our employees and our own work expectations are inherited from a time when most of the people at work were on their own. But today less than one-fifth of the people of America work for themselves, and most of these are farmers. America is a nation of dependent employees trying to operate on a work psychology appropriate to a nation of independent, free enterprisers. (p. 33)

In Mills' opinion the relative position of the white-collar worker has worsened since 1900 both in money income and in social prestige. "As the mechanization of the office proceeds—and it has only begun—many white-collar jobs will become more routine, and they will be subject to the same unemployment threat as wage work. And the white-collar people know this."

\* Professor Mills is widely known as the author of *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (Oxford University Press, 1951), for which he received a Guggenheim Fellowship. Other papers in the report deal with the experience of Shell Oil Company, American Hard Rubber Company, and Hughes Aircraft Company in considering electronic information processing in their office work.

(p. 34) Mills expects that by 1975, with drastically decreased hours of work, there will be substantial displacement by machines of people who now work in offices. He also predicts that large-scale unionization of offices will come in a few years, as a result of lowered prestige, relative decrease in real income, threat of unemployment, and routinization of many office skills.

Diebold appears to be somewhat less pessimistic about the social and economic effects of mechanization of office work. With the increasing proportion of older nonworking people in the population, he foresees the need to increase the productivity of the active working force in order to maintain the present standard of living. He regards automation as the answer to this problem.

*Technical Approaches to Cost Reduction*, which contains four papers given at the General Management Conference of the American Management Association in Los Angeles, January 12-15, 1953, also deserves the attention of public administrators. The first paper by Simon Ramo, vice president for operations of the Hughes Aircraft Company, is entitled "Future Possibilities and Limitations of Electronics in Management." Mr. Ramo is an electrical engineer and physicist who did research for General Electric for ten years before joining the Hughes Company, with which he has also served as director of guided missile research and development. Mr. Ramo believes the times are technologically right for the development of electronic information processing systems which could displace a very large portion of routine clerical workers. The field of guided missiles requires the use of such electronic systems for military applications; and the techniques developed out of military necessity can be applied to nonmilitary requirements also.

The number of slips, forms, and cards that must be filled out concerning every person and everything that happens or can happen is increasing so rapidly that the systems are bottlenecking. Our great need is for simplification and systematization with a view to obtaining some sort of relief from the burden of red tape and paper, if we are to be able to get something done. These, then, are some reasons why this revolution in the replacing of man's brains in business and industry can be expected. (p. 5)

But the shortage of qualified experts to design, build, program, and service these electronic data processing systems will keep this possible revolution from taking place rapidly.

The final, successful design, development, and "de-bugging" of even embryo synthetic intelligence devices that will make substantial improvements in business and industry will require the efforts of experts in the running of that particular kind of business working for years in close cooperation with the engineers and scientists who understand what synthetic intelligence is all about and what modern electronics can accomplish. To bring together these experts in a hard-working project assignment is not easy. It is hard for the scientist to get out and understand the problems of the details of a particular business. It cannot be done by generalities; it has to be done by really difficult, thorough, scientific, and inventive study of the details of the business or industrial problems. (p. 7)

Mr. Ramo suggests cooperative efforts on an industrywide basis in studying the applications of the new electronic processing systems. Businesswide study in the field of life insurance has already been noted. Similar study is getting under way in banking where the American Bankers Association has recently created a Committee on Electronics to work with the manufacturers and the universities in developing the systems and devices that are needed to facilitate banking operations.

Mr. Ramo emphasizes that benefits to a particular organization will flow from a thorough analysis of the existing organization and procedures to produce a set of logical thought processes for possible electronic information processing, even if no electronic equipment is acquired quickly.

In any case, it is clear that the people within an organization (sometimes assisted by management consultants from outside) must go over the operation, spell it out in flow charts, and know and set down the reasons why things are done, before the electronic expert can prescribe an installation for information processing.

A second paper in this pamphlet, by Beardsley Graham, is entitled "The Reduction of Clerical Costs through Mechanized Processing." Mr. Graham is assistant director of the Stanford Research Institute, which has assembled a group of engineers and management

consultants to provide consulting service in the field of electronic information processing. He starts from the premise that it is feasible from a technical point of view to mechanize all office functions, but he also recognizes that in many organizations it is not yet financially feasible to do so. He sees the brightest prospects for early mechanization in insurance companies, banks, public utilities, and mail order houses—in all of which clerical costs are a very large element.

Like Mr. Ramo, Mr. Graham urges businessmen to make their needs known to the designers of electronic data processing systems. He calls for joint effort between the business managers and the engineers, so that engineers may learn enough about the businessman's problem to translate the requirements of the job into machine procedure and so that management staff may learn enough about the capabilities and limitations of electronic machines to allow management staff to visualize how the new devices can be applied and how the company organization must be changed to take full advantage of the capabilities of the new equipment.

A program of this nature requires a great deal of work on the part of management, and this effort must come from a fairly high level. Rapid progress can be made during such an investigation only if the management representatives are high enough in the organization to make the broad decisions regarding the methods of operation which the company is able to adopt. These people must also be sufficiently removed from the every day detailed work to prevent their perspective from being warped and hampered by current operations, but they must have at their call all the details when these are required. In other words, this is a typical operational research problem in dealing with which it is mandatory that the investigators report directly to top management. (p. 15)

Graham sets out steps which must be covered in such an investigation and the questions which must be answered. He illustrates his paper with a case story of an investigation undertaken for the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. For each department of the company, the team of experts had to find out what essential data came into and flowed out of the department, which operations performed on the data were really necessary, and which cleri-

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cal operations could not be reduced to a set of fixed rules.

Electronic devices are much faster than human operators and can follow a very complicated set of rules, but every contingency must be provided for in the instructions to the machine. The size and speed of machinery required depend upon how much information must be handled, how much must be transcribed for each entry into the machine, how much must be stored and for how long, how much must be printed out for distribution, and against what time schedule this printing out must be done.

*A Symposium on Commercially Available General-Purpose Electronic Digital Computers of Moderate Price* tells the story of seven electronic computers each of which can be purchased for less than \$100,000.00. The symposium was sponsored by the Navy Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel (Mina Rees, chairman), and was held at the Pentagon on May 14, 1952. A representative of the manufacturer described and discussed each machine, and the audience was given an opportunity to ask questions, although the questions-and-answer period is not recorded in the published report of the symposium. The manufacturers represented and the machines described were: Jacobs Instrument Co. (the JAINCOMP-B1); Monroe Calculating Machine Co. (the MON-ROBOT); Computer Research Corporation (the CADAC); Hogan Laboratories (the Circle Computer); Electronic Computer Corporation (the ELECOM 100, now being made by the Underwood Typewriter Corporation which has purchased the Electronic Computer Corporation); Consolidated Engineering Corporation (model 30-201 electronic digital computer); and Physical Research Laboratories (the MINIAC). More than 250 persons attended the symposium, and the report was published by the Office of Naval Research for distribution to government agencies and to contractors engaged in work for the federal government.

*Symposium on Managerial Aspects of Digital Computer Installations* consists of six papers which were presented at a symposium held in the General Services Administration auditorium on March 30, 1953. The Navy Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel or-

ganized the symposium in order to get an exchange of ideas and experiences concerning problems involved in the management of large-scale computer installations and to provide guidance to those setting up new installations. Approximately 200 persons representing the agencies of the federal government and its contractors attended the symposium.

The scope of the symposium is indicated in the preface to the report, which was published by the Office of Naval Research for distribution to government agencies:

The speakers at the symposium were asked to discuss: (1) computing equipment and computer codes; (2) the methods for selecting the best machine for a given problem; (3) the handling and storage of computer routines and sub-routines; (4) installation problems; (5) personnel statistics and qualifications; (6) the life expectancy and the stocking of computer components; (7) operating rules; (8) instructions to users remote from the computer; (9) basis for assigning priorities; (10) the cost of maintenance and operation, and considerations in fixing costs; and (11) the availability of and charges for computer facilities.

The computer installations described were the National Bureau of Standards Computation Laboratory (the SEAC, or standards eastern automatic computer); the Ballistic Research Laboratories of the Army Ordnance Corps at Aberdeen, Maryland (ENIAC, EDVAC, and ORDVAC computers); the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia (which operates for the Bureau of Ordnance the Aiken relay calculator—Mark II, the Mark III electronic calculator, IBM 604 and card programmed calculators, and other auxiliary IBM equipment); the Technical Computing Bureaus operated at New York City, Washington, and Los Angeles by International Business Machines Corporation on a Service Bureau basis for customers; and the Census Bureau, Suitland, Maryland (which put the first UNIVAC into use two years ago). The IBM Technical Computing Bureau in New York City has a variety of equipment, including the IBM-701 on which a demonstration of translating from English to Russian was recently run for the Georgetown University.

This symposium report will be of particular interest to public administrators who believe they have problems on which electronic digital

computers can be applied to advantage but who are not in a position to consider the purchase of such equipment. If they are willing to do the thorough organizational and procedural studies of their operations that will permit them to be programmed for test runs on computers owned by other agencies, they may well find that they can have particular jobs done outside their organization on a service bureau basis at substantial savings in time and money.

#### *Electronic Computers Invade Business Machines Market*

**I**N ORDER to cope with the burden of office work, business and government offices have been making increasing use of various types of business machines. Over \$1.5 billion worth of adding, accounting, and other business machines were sold in the United States in 1952. All of the principal makers of these office machines are engaged in research on and development of new electronic equipment which will replace their mechanical models in varying degrees. Electronic computers, which were originally designed to win wars and solve intricate scientific and mathematical problems, are successfully invading the business machines market.

Among the business machine firms currently producing electronic computers are Remington Rand, which makes the small-scale 406-2 electronic punch card calculator and the large-scale magnetic tape data processor called the UNIVAC for business applications, and the ERA 1101, 1102, and 1103 for mathematical and engineering applications; International Business Machines Corporation, which makes the small-scale IBM 604 and card programmed (punched card) calculators and the large-scale IBM-701 magnetic tape computer for mathematical and engineering applications, and the large-scale IBM-702 (or tape processing machine) promised for next year for business applications; Underwood Typewriter Corporation, which in 1952 bought the small company making the ELECOM for business applications; Victor Adding Machine Company, which produces the VIC-DAR data accumulating and reduction system; National Cash Register Corporation, which in 1952 bought the Computer Research Corporation, makers of several elec-

tronic computers; and the Monroe Calculating Machine Company, makers of the MONROBOT desk-size electronic computer for office use. Other makers of large-scale electronic computers include Burroughs Adding Machine Corporation, General Electric Company, Raytheon Manufacturing Company, Telecomputing Corporation, Logistics Research, Inc., Hughes Aircraft Company, and Radio Corporation of America.

#### *Applications in the Federal Government*

**I**N THE federal government, the Department of Defense has thus far made the widest use of electronic digital computers.<sup>3</sup> The Office of the Air Comptroller at the Pentagon, the Army Map Service under the Corps of Engineers, and the David W. Taylor Model Basin at Carderock, Maryland, under the Bureau of Ships, each has a UNIVAC installation. Other Defense activities have a wide range of types and makes of electronic computer systems. A partial listing of the other Defense organizations which have large-scale electronic digital computers includes the Ordnance Corps, the Signal Corps, the Office of Naval Research, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Bureau of Ordnance, the Air Research and Development Command, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. Most of these installations are using electronic methods to attack scientific research and engineering problems, but attention is also being given to business type problems involving the processing of large quantities of office paper work. The Office of the Air Comptroller, for example, is applying electronic methods to linear programming and logistics computations. The Bureau of Ships is using its UNIVAC for computing material requirements and related logistical and ship program scheduling operations.

Outside of the Department of Defense and classified security installations, only three federal agencies have purchased large-scale electronic digital computers. The Atomic Energy Commission has two UNIVACs, an IBM model

<sup>3</sup> The Department of Defense is the largest user in the federal government both of conventional punched card tabulating equipment and of electronic computers. A complete listing of the electronic computers which are owned and used by the Department cannot be given here, because many of the installations involve classified security information.

701 computer, and three other large computers. In the Commerce Department, the Bureau of the Census has a UNIVAC and the National Bureau of Standards has a SEAC in Washington and a SWAC in Los Angeles. The installations mentioned are confined to large-scale electronic digital computers. In addition, there are nearly two score federal installations of "baby computers" such as the IBM-604 and CPC and the Rembrandt 406-2, which are advanced punch card equipment rather than magnetic tape data processors.

Census Bureau representatives report that their experience with tabulating population statistics indicates that tabulating on the UNIVAC costs less than half as much as tabulating on standard punch card equipment. This is not to say, of course, that using the UNIVAC cuts the cost of making a census in half, because the major part of the cost of making a census comes in the collection of the information which is to be tabulated. Further cuts in the cost of census work will be made as it becomes possible further to mechanize the processes involved.

For example the FOSDIC (film optical sensing device for input to computers), recently developed by the National Bureau of Standards for the Census Bureau, translates pencil or pen marks on census enumerators' sheets into electrical impulses which can be fed on magnetic tape into the UNIVAC. When FOSDIC scans the microfilmed census enumerator's form, its beam of light moves across a page until it senses a black index mark indicating there are possible answers in the column above. Then, after looking twice and measuring to make sure the index mark is not some other printing, FOSDIC scans up the checkoff column, reading and recording out on the magnetic tape each tally mark. It does its work at the rate of thirty census documents per minute; this speed contrasts with the manual rate of two documents a minute. Its rate of error is about 1 mistake in 100,000 items, and this is blamed on poor film.

The manufacturers are getting away from using the name "electronic computer," because many office applications involve little or no computation; they call, rather, for storing and processing information, some of which may not be numerical at all. An example of such information storage is the air traffic control op-

eration of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Whenever bad weather requires instrument flying, every plane must file a flight plan with the CAA air traffic control network of twenty-eight stations that cover the United States. A traffic controller, or "traffic cop of the air," keeps in continuous contact with all planes in flight in his territory so long as instrument flying conditions continue to apply. With the large volume of air traffic, traffic control is a serious problem.

In order to make more room in the air, Remington Rand's Engineering Research Associates Division, at the request of the Air Navigation Development Board (a joint military-CAA organization), has built a magnetic drum flight-plan storage system. By making possible effective control of more planes in a given space, the new device allows the air traffic controller to permit more traffic to flow in instrument flying weather. This new system has been put into experimental use by the CAA at Indianapolis. It receives by teletype such flight plan facts as departure time, destination, route, fuel load, pay load, and other pertinent data up to 125 alphabetic and numerical characters per flight plan. In less than half a second, the new device electronically compares the facts on as many as 2,000 such flight plans stored in its drum memory, revising, canceling, and bringing the information up to date to reflect current conditions. It completes the process by teletyping the results back to the sending station.

Several examples of business users of electronic computing equipment may be mentioned. Three large life insurance companies have recently contracted for the purchase of electronic data processing systems: Metropolitan and Franklin bought UNIVACs, and Prudential has purchased a Computer Research Corporation electronic computer known as a CRC. General Electric has bought a UNIVAC for its new appliance factory at Louisville for payroll, accounting, and other applications—the first application of large-scale electronic digital computers to industrial accounting.

An example of information processing which involves little or no computing as such is the Speed Tally system built by Remington Rand for John Plain and Co., a large Chicago wholesale mail order firm. This system pro-

duces an inventory analysis by item for some 12,000 different items stocked and sold by this firm. The results of the daily tallying of all orders filled are made available within twenty-four hours; the old order tallying system required four or five days. Input to the magnetic drum memory is provided by ten clerks who write out the items ordered by customers on a 10-key input device.

In many installations, as in the Census Bureau, electronic data processing has partially replaced punch card tabulating; but in some applications the change has been from purely manual methods of information recording and sorting to electronic information processing.

#### *Possible Additional Installations*

PAPER work is costing business and government too much. There are now in the United States as many office workers as there are workers in agriculture. Much more management attention has been devoted to mechanizing factory operations than to the problem of streamlining office operations. More than half of all the workers in banks and insurance companies are engaged in shuffling papers, rather than in trying to procure new business.

*Federal White-Collar Workers: Their Occupations and Salaries, June, 1951*, gives the results of a special survey of federal employment conducted by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. It shows that 900,000 white-collar workers constituted approximately 50 per cent of all civilian employees of the executive branch of the government in the continental United States as of June 30, 1951. The largest single occupational category was clerk-typist, with about 111,000 workers. About half of all the government's white-collar employees were classified in the general administrative, clerical, and office services group. This broad occupational group includes a variety of specific occupational titles, such as: general clerical and administrative, mail and file clerks, stenographers, clerk-stenographers, secretaries, typists and clerk-typists, general supply clerks, property and stock-control clerks, procurement officers, storage assistants, card punch operators, tabulating machine operators, and telephone operators. Included within this group were a total of more than 200,000 typists, stenographers, and secretaries. More than 72,000 work-

ers were engaged in procurement, property and stock control, storage, and other activities having to do with providing supplies for government use. There were nearly 30,000 operators of tabulating, bookkeeping, and other office machines.

Several federal agencies are currently investigating the possibilities of effecting large savings in manpower through the installation of electronic devices that are now available or whose development is technologically possible. One example is the mass information processing operations connected with wage history records of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. At the Western Computer Conference, held February 4, 1953, Edward E. Stickell read a paper on "Requirements of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance for Electronic Data Processing Equipment." Two kinds of devices, if they were developed commercially, would be most helpful to BOASI. These are: (1) *electronic scanning devices* to read information returns sent in by employers and turn the information into either punched card or magnetic tape form for electronic processing; and (2) *a rapid random access electronic information storage system* to take the place of the system of manually looking up information now stored in punched card form or in the file of 138 million flexoline strips showing the identities of persons to whom social security account number cards have been issued.

Electronic processing of employer's payroll tax withholding information returns in the Internal Revenue Service is also being explored as a possible basis for substantial future manpower savings. Such savings will have added future significance if Congress acts favorably on the plan put forward by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T. Coleman Andrews, which would eliminate the necessity for filing some 35 million individual income tax returns by wage earners with little or no income other than that on which income tax is withheld at the source by the employer. Commissioner Andrews described this plan in an interview published in *U.S. News and World Report*, May 8, 1953.

Another possible future application of wide public benefit would be the processing of in-

formation necessary to weather forecasting. A report of the Advisory Committee on Weather Services<sup>4</sup> of the Department of Commerce, issued December 1, 1953, entitled *Weather Is the Nation's Business*, recommends increased spending for research on the use of electronic computers in weather forecasts.

Both in the Navy's Aviation Supply Office at Philadelphia and in the Ordnance Corps of the Army considerable staff work has been done looking to the use of electronic information processing methods for worldwide inventory control and stock distribution analysis. If the systems and reporting problems involved can be worked out, there is reason to believe that electronic information processing can provide faster, cheaper, more complete, and more usable information on military inventories to serve as the basis for top-level decisions.

The Office of the Quartermaster General in the Army has also been looking into possible applications of electronic information processing to its work. One such application is already being made on an experimental basis: the National Bureau of Standards is applying its SEAC computer to mechanize bid evaluations in complex procurements where the choice of optimum bid to be accepted includes analysis of several thousand possible combinations based on price, freight to twenty or more delivery points, time and quantity discounts, and other considerations.

#### Rethinking Organization and Procedures

THE effective application of electronic methods in a given organization requires a rethinking of its organization and procedures. When electronic methods are applied, many of the intermediate reports and steps in the transmission of information become unnecessary

\* This committee is made up of eminent meteorologists outside the federal government and is headed by Brigadier General Joseph J. George, formerly with the Air Force and at present superintendent of meteorology for Eastern Air Lines.

At the Eastern Joint Computer Conference held in Washington in December, 1953, Joseph Smagorinsky of the U.S. Weather Bureau gave a paper entitled "Data Processing Requirements for the Purpose of Numerical Weather Prediction." This paper will appear in the proceedings of the conference, which will be titled *Information Processing Systems—Reliability & Requirements*. It will be issued by The Institute of Radio Engineers, 1 East 79th St., New York City.

and should be eliminated. Such elimination means the top management of the agency must consider many factors, including the disturbance of established bureaucratic "empires" based upon the division of labor which was necessary under manual work methods.

With the new devices it is possible to replace a large number of files in various divisions of an agency with a central electronic file from which information can be obtained by a process as simple as dialing a number on the inter-office telephone system. Similarly, voluminous informational reports can be abandoned in favor of reports which warn that a situation requiring action may be anticipated. The people who know the particular business of an office must think through the types of critical situations which may arise; the machines cannot *think*, but if the various alternative possibilities are set down in the program of instructions the machine will take the action or print out the information that will permit the required executive action to be taken without wading through a large quantity of undigested information.

The goal in government as in business is not just to have information on tap, but rather to have *action information* quickly available for the consideration of those who are charged with deciding the action to be taken.

The use of electronic processing is based on the premise that the information produced should activate the necessary procedures so far as possible without human intervention. For example, instead of reporting that an inventory of an item is low, the machine should print a purchase or a shipping order to replenish the inventory when the predetermined low point for reordering is reached and is sensed by the electronic system. Similarly, the electronic system can be made to print such items as checks, insurance premium bills, and tax withholding receipt forms without the need for preparing long statistical listings. The great advantage of the new electronic information processing systems over the conventional punched card systems is that a long series of predetermined operations on a given batch of information can be run through without having to load and reload the machines manually.

What kinds of problems accompany the in-

introduction of these new methods, and what know-how is required to deal with them?

One quick generalization may be made: the introduction of an electronic information processing system is not like buying a new adding machine which can be plugged in as part of an existing established clerical routine. It would be foolish and wasteful to make the large investment required to install electronic methods without first conducting a careful study which begins with considering the basic objective of the operation. This basic rethinking of the job to be done requires a knowledge of the business. It also requires a broad point of view which looks to the good of the organization as a whole without being too much concerned about the effects of changes in methods on particular vested interests in the agency.

The analysis of an agency's problems to determine the wisdom of introducing electronic methods is not primarily a job for an electronics engineer. Rather, it is a systems job which depends more on knowledge of what must be done, and why, than on knowledge of what makes electronic computers "tick." As the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company found in its study, it is far easier to teach company management specialists what they need to know about the possibilities and limitations of electronic data processing than it is to teach electronic engineers about the internal operating problems of the life insurance business.

For the reason stated above, any agency which is thinking about trying the new electronic methods should plan on making extensive systems study before it invites proposals from equipment manufacturers to deal with its problem.

#### *A Look Ahead*

THIS paper has been concerned primarily with pilot studies and explorations in the application of electronic equipment in the

processing of routine information in administrative organizations. There may be possibilities of even more interesting and promising developments in the use of such devices. In recent years there has grown up a new branch of applied mathematics which deals with problems important to management. It has been called variously "formal programming," "linear programming," and "activities analysis." Closely related developments are the beginnings of a "theory of games" and a "theory of information," both of which provide for the formal-logical statement of the best way for a group to achieve an objective.

All of these new approaches deal with the problem of obtaining the "best" or lowest-cost system ("optimum strategy") for carrying out a large system of operations, where decisions depend on very large numbers of interrelated variables. The tools are a formal-logical approach to simultaneous conditions and the mathematical techniques which have been invented to handle this class of problems. The goal of these approaches is to erect a consistent system of decisions in areas where "judgment" can be reduced to sets of clear-cut rules such as (1) "purchase at the lowest price," or (2) "never let the supply of bolts fall below the estimated one-week requirement for any size or type."

Whatever the new developments, there will still remain many problems that cannot be cast into the form to which these formal methods can be applied. Actually, in many cases the problem is much more one of systems, differences in concepts within the organization, and lack of firm program information on which to base a mathematical model or logical formulation than it is a problem of mathematics as such. In any event, there is no real possibility that the executive or the top administrator will become obsolete as the result of foreseeable advances in the use of electronic equipment.

# Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Public Administration Clearing House

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## Reorganization Footnotes

Although the pattern for reorganization proposals has become more or less standardized, every new plan tends to present variations of interest to students of administration.

Plan No. 2 of 1953, providing for reorganization in the Department of Agriculture, is a case in point. This plan was similar in many respects to one submitted by President Truman in 1950 together with five other plans designed to carry out recommendations of the Hoover Commission by transferring all functions vested in various officers, employees, and agencies of the Departments of Treasury, Justice, Interior, Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture to the respective Secretaries. All of these plans except the one relating to the Department of Agriculture became effective—the Department of the Treasury through a revised Plan No. 26. A similar plan affecting the Post Office Department (No. 3 of 1949) had already become effective, and basic legislation incorporating like provisions for the Departments of Defense and State had been approved by the Congress. Thus, at the time President Eisenhower submitted Plan No. 2, the Department of Agriculture was the only agency of departmental status in which the functions had not been vested in the Secretary.

Nevertheless, there was still a certain amount of determined opposition in Congress to the grant of this authority to the Secretary of Agriculture. To reassure this group, there was written into Reorganization Plan No. 2 a provision not found in any other plan, requiring the Secretary "to the extent deemed practicable . . . [to] give appropriate advance public notice of delegations of functions proposed to be made by him and [to] afford appropriate opportunity for interested persons and groups to place before the Department of Agriculture their views with respect to such

proposed delegations." Secretary Ezra Benson, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Operations on this subject, stated that he regarded this provision as imposing upon any Secretary an obligation to advise and consult with the appropriate committees of the Congress before making any major organization change, and that he would also expect to advise and consult with farm organizations and other leaders in agriculture. (See Senate Report No. 297, 83rd Cong., 1st sess.)

This plan became effective on June 4, 1953, and on October 13 the Secretary issued a long, detailed press release announcing his intention to reorganize the department along the lines indicated therein. It was noted in the release that the proposals were being made "after consultation with Congressional agricultural leaders, the National Agricultural Advisory Commission, representatives of the Land Grant Colleges, representatives of the President's Committee on Reorganization of the Government, farm organization leaders, and others." A final paragraph invited "anyone desiring to express his views regarding this proposed reorganization" to communicate in writing with the Secretary by November 1.

During the two-week "squawk period" designated by the Secretary there were a number of public statements objecting to the proposed reorganization. Chief opposition came from the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts, which objected strenuously to the announced plan to abolish seven regional offices of the Soil Conservation Service and delegate more responsibility to the states. A number of members of Congress also voiced objections to the plan, some of them demanding that the reorganization be held up until it could be reviewed by the Congress.

Despite these demands, Secretary Benson announced at a news conference on November 2 that he was putting the plan into effect im-

mediately, substantially as announced. This was being done, he said, with the full knowledge and approval of President Eisenhower.

This controversy raises interesting questions with respect to the appropriate relationships between Congress, the President, and interested pressure groups on the subject of the organization of the executive departments.

Plan No. 9 reorganized the Council of Economic Advisers to abolish the position of vice chairman and give to the chairman of the council the function of reporting to the President on the activities of the council. This change is in general agreement with the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and others favoring an Office of the Economic Adviser with a single head. At the same time, the President stated in the message he sent to Congress with the plan that he was asking the heads of several departments and agencies or their designated representatives to serve as an Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability, under the chairmanship of the chairman of the council. This board, consisting of representatives from the White House staff, the Bureau of the Budget, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury, holds weekly meetings with Chairman Arthur Burns. It also maintains close liaison with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, another interdepartmental committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Plans Nos. 7 and 8 submitted to Congress on June 1, 1953, effected a basic reorganization of United States programs operating overseas. No. 7 established a new Foreign Operations Administration and abolished the Mutual Security Agency; No. 8 established another new agency—the United States Information Agency—and transferred to it the international information programs formerly administered by the Department of State and the Mutual Security Agency.

An Executive order, issued the same day the plans were submitted to Congress, transferred the Technical Cooperation Administration from the State Department to the jurisdiction of the Director of Mutual Security, which meant, of course, that it would become a part of the Foreign Operations Administra-

tion when Plan No. 7 became effective sixty days later.

Although this reorganization removed a number of operating programs from the direct jurisdiction of the State Department, the President went to some pains to make it clear that he regards the Secretary of State as the Cabinet officer with primary responsibility for the formulation and control of foreign policy. Both plans provide that the Secretary of State "shall advise with the President concerning the appointment and tenure" of the directors of the two new agencies—the Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Agency—and in the message accompanying the plans the President stated that he intended to exercise his powers of appointment to insure that these offices should be occupied "only by men who support and enjoy the full confidence of the Secretary of State." Furthermore, in a letter addressed to the heads of all the executive departments, defining relationships under the new plans, the President directed the heads of the new agencies to "assure the concurrence or participation" of the Secretary of State before taking up with him any policy matters of concern to the Secretary. A similar obligation is placed on the directors of the two agencies with respect to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Defense on policy matters for which they have primary responsibility.

#### FOA Reorganization

In order to facilitate policy coordination with the Department of State, the internal organization of the Foreign Operations Administration is roughly parallel to that of State. Line responsibility is assigned to a deputy director for operations, who supervises a group of offices for geographic regions, each of which is further subdivided into "country desks." The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, a government corporation which served as the operating division of the Technical Cooperation Administration for Latin America, will serve a similar function in FOA, although it has been reorganized on a geographic basis to fit the FOA pattern. Two additional deputy directors are in charge of Management and Technical Services. Technical Services is organized by function, with groups of specialists

in various fields to advise the country desks and provide guidance to technical assistance specialists overseas.

A Public Administration Division was created by pulling together the public administration technical advisers in the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration, and by transferring to FOA the Foreign Technical Assistance Group of the Bureau of the Budget, which is now known as the Training Operations and Resources Branch. Coordination of technical assistance in closely related fields was sought by combining the Public Administration Division with divisions for Education, Health, and Community Services in an Office of Public Services. Alvin W. Roseman, former deputy director of the MSA Mission to Greece, and previously head of Organization and Planning for MSA, is acting director of both the Office of Public Services and its constituent Public Administration Division.

Harold E. Stassen, director of FOA, has announced that it will be the administration's policy to emphasize participation in overseas programs such as emergency relief, aid to refugees, and technical assistance by United States nongovernmental organizations. This policy includes cooperation with foundations and philanthropic agencies with overseas interests; encouragement and financial aid to colleges and universities in undertaking technical assistance projects or establishing "cousin college" relationships with foreign institutions; and contracts with private firms to provide technical services overseas.

The consolidation of the mutual security and the technical assistance programs had been frequently recommended in recent years, notably in the Rockefeller report of 1950, *Partners in Progress*, but the question of change has been controversial. Critics fear that combining in a single agency the technical assistance function and large-scale military and economic aid for mutual security will result in neglect of technical assistance and loss of the value of Point 4 as a symbol of America's unselfish interest in the welfare and progress of less fortunate peoples. However, Mr. Stassen has repeatedly stated his belief in the importance of technical cooperation, and a December, 1953, report of the International

Development Advisory Board, headed by Eric Johnston, strongly recommended the continuance of such a program on a long-range basis at roughly the current level of expenditure. The board endorsed the administration of mutual security and technical assistance by the same agency, but it recommended that so far as possible the separate identity of the technical cooperation program should be preserved. Separate presentation of the program to the Budget Bureau, Congress, and the public would help preserve this identity, the board felt.

#### Reorganization in the Post Office Department

The Post Office Department has set up in Cincinnati the first of fifteen projected regional offices which are being established to facilitate decentralization of postal operations. This "pilot" office in Cincinnati will be headquarters for the region serving Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky.

Decentralization of postal operations has been the object of various bills introduced in the Congress for almost fifty years, and the Hoover Commission recommendations in 1949 contemplated a pattern similar to that now being put into effect by Postmaster General Summerfield.

Other important changes in the organization and management of the Post Office Department are being developed on the basis of a number of special studies conducted by management consulting firms under contract arrangements. Among these is the firm of Robert Heller & Associates, which has a small team of its own men working with a number of post office inspectors regularly employed in the department. G. B. Allen, vice-president of the Heller firm, was a member of the original Hoover Commission task force which studied the Post Office Department, and is in charge of the team making the present study. George Fry & Associates is making a study of the wage structure of the field service; and a firm of accountants, working with a number of regular employees on loan from the General Accounting Office, is working out a revised budget and accounting system.

**Administrative Procedure Office Recommended**

Establishment of an office of administrative procedure in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Attorney General, was recommended by the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure at a two-day meeting in Washington in November, 1953.

The conference was established by President Eisenhower in April, 1953, to eliminate unnecessary delay, expense, and volume of records in some federal administrative proceedings and "to evolve by cooperative effort principles which may be applied and steps which may be taken severally by the departments and agencies toward the end that the administrative process may be improved to the benefit of all." Representatives of more than fifty federal agencies, together with practicing lawyers, federal judges, and hearing examiners, are members of the conference.

At its first meeting in June, 1953, the conference selected various problems for study by committees, including the question of the creation in the federal government of an office to carry on continuous studies of federal administrative procedures and perform the functions with respect to hearing examiners which are presently performed by the Civil Service Commission.

The recommendation adopted at the November meeting omitted any reference to the hearing examiner functions, which cannot be transferred without legislative action. Establishment of the office in the Department of Justice, on the other hand, can be accomplished by executive action. The report of the committee appointed to study this question recommended immediate creation of the new office, and urged that it be directed to initiate promptly a cooperative effort with the Civil Service Commission and the agencies employing hearing examiners for the improvement of policies and procedures with respect to the recruitment, promotion, and tenure of this group.

A number of study groups during recent years have recommended creation of an office of administrative procedure, although opinion has varied as to the appropriate scope of its activities and the nature of its organization. In 1941 the Attorney General's Committee on Ad-

ministrative Procedure recommended that an office be established by law as an independent agency, to be administered by a board composed of a justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and a director of federal administrative procedure to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Within the next few years, similar recommendations were made in two large states—California and New York; and in 1949 a Task Force of the Hoover Commission recommended creation of a separate office of administrative procedure in the Executive Office of the President. The whole commission did not go this far, but it did recommend further studies by the Administrative Management Division of the Bureau of the Budget with the aid of legal consultants.

No action has been taken to date on the recommendation adopted by the conference last November.

**Conference on Resources**

Almost 1,500 persons from business, government, science, education, and other fields attended the Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future which met in Washington December 2-4, 1953, to examine the present resources situation of the United States and discuss the problems to be faced in the coming quarter-century. President Eisenhower spoke briefly to the conference on its opening day to express his deep interest in conservation, which he defined as use without waste. Former Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas was chairman of the conference.

Since the purpose of the conference was to assemble facts and exchange views among the widely representative participants, there was no attempt to reach conclusions or formulate recommendations about the different and frequently controversial problems discussed. However, the eight sections into which the conference was divided (see Autumn, 1953, *Review*, p. 278) made reports on their sessions that noted the general areas of agreement discovered and the main points of disagreement.

Administrative problems were touched upon

throughout the conference. The desirability of further integration of agencies dealing with resources at all levels of government was one of the areas of general agreement. The need for up-to-date research on resources administration, particularly in the fields of intergovernmental relations and public-private agency cooperation, was pointed out. It was also emphasized that in the future our domestic programs and agencies must be organized so as to reflect our increasing concern with the total world supply of resources and raw materials.

The conference was the first major project of Resources for the Future, Inc., a new non-profit corporation financed by the Ford Foundation for fostering research and education on natural resources problems. Reuben G. Gustavson, president and executive director of the organization, said that a number of project proposals were being studied with a view to grant support. The proceedings of the conference, which will be available to all interested public and private agencies and groups, will provide program guidance to Resources for the Future.

#### Transition—State and Local

"Transition" arrangements reminiscent of the joint briefing sessions, the "blackbooks," and the preliminary "designations" which accompanied the change in the national administration last year have marked changes of administration this year in the populous state of New Jersey and in New York City.

In New Jersey, the then Governor-elect Robert B. Meyner was invited by the retiring Republican Governor to meet with him and the members of his Cabinet early in December "to plan for the orderly transition of administrations." The Governor-elect brought with him to these conversations three advisers who were active in promoting his candidacy and who had worked closely with him in the development of the program on which he won election. One of these three, Joseph E. McLean of Princeton University, had managed the Meyner campaign. Arrangements were made at this general meeting for further talks with each department head to discuss in detail the work of the various agencies.

In New York City, the newly elected mayor, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., had announced a num-

ber of major appointments by the end of November, among them that of Luther Gulick to the office of city administrator—a new position which the incoming mayor proposed to create.

The importance of the change of administration in New York City was heightened by the fact that two major studies of the city government had been recently completed, both of which had recommended adoption of a performance budget and the appointment of a top-level administrative officer to assist the mayor with the business management of the city. The Gulick appointment was in line with these recommendations. A few days later the mayor-elect announced that a special task force had begun work on the city's 1954-55 budget under the direction of the incumbent budget director, who had been asked to continue in that office under the new administration. Other members of this task force were announced as Mr. Gulick and Construction Coordinator Robert Moses, another incumbent officer who would remain with the new administration.

During the interval between his election and the date of his taking office, the incoming mayor maintained an organization headquarters comparable to the "shadow White House" at the Hotel Commodore in New York City from which President-elect Eisenhower operated prior to his inauguration. A number of advisory groups were also established to supply expert advice and guidance to the new city administration. The *New York Times* (December 13, 1953) described these groups as follows: "One is a political group concerned primarily with the electoral consequences of proposed answers. The second is a committee of technical experts familiar with city problems and able to suggest solutions. The third is a coordinating committee able to do research and public relations. The fourth is a group of personal friends which has come to be known as the 'taxi cabinet' since its members get the Mayor-elect's ear usually by riding with him from home to office or vice versa. . . . Proposals can originate in any one of the four groups but must be considered by the other three before they become a definite policy."

#### Making the Case for Annexation

Officials of central city areas, beset by the problems of fringe area developments, are find-

ing that straightforward discussions of the relative advantages and disadvantages of annexation help bring these areas under their jurisdiction.

Boulder, Colorado, has prepared an information sheet for distribution to residents of outlying communities to spell out what annexation would mean to them. It tells fringe residents these facts which may be considered disadvantages if their area is annexed:

- You will pay city property taxes.
- You may be subject to utility extension costs.
- You may be subject to street improvement costs.

The leaflet then goes on to name these advantages of annexation:

- Your city water bill will be lower.
- You are eligible for city sewer and water extensions.
- Your gas and electricity rates will be lower.
- Your fire insurance rate will be less.
- You will have better police and fire protection.
- Your property values will be protected by city zoning and building codes.
- Your property will increase in resale value.

In Seattle, Washington, residents of a fringe area north of the city formed study groups to learn of such advantages of annexation as garbage collection, sewers, lower fire insurance rates, transportation, schools, and other municipal services. Since then, annexation has been approved by a two-to-one vote for this area, which covers nine square miles and has a population of 40,000. An area of 22 square miles adjoining the southern city limits is expected to vote on annexation within the next year. The population of this area is estimated at 60,000.

#### Study of Combined Police and Fire Service

Public Administration Service has undertaken a one-year investigation to determine the good and bad points of combining police and fire protection into a single unit. The object of the study is to discover whether the traditional separation of police and fire departments is desirable in the light of today's municipal needs, responsibilities, resources, and technology.

Seven communities in the United States and Canada have revamped their public protec-

tion systems so that the same staff does both police and fire work. The PAS inquiry will involve a close look at those communities and their experience with the combined program in an effort to find out such things as how effective the arrangement has been; how the public has accepted it; whether the system can be used in large, industrial cities; what training problems are involved in educating workers to do the two different jobs; and what type of organization appears most workable.

Other information to be assessed will be provided by the International City Managers' Association, which has sent out questionnaires to fire and police chiefs throughout the nation asking about the present operation of public safety programs.

Established authorities in police and fire work will be used throughout the study, in addition to the regular staff. Advisers will include prominent police and fire chiefs and experts in municipal affairs and public works. Fire protection engineers will be asked to give their views on the effects consolidation might have on the rating of cities for fire insurance.

Representatives of several groups especially concerned with public safety will be asked to criticize the progress and findings of the project, in order to make sure that all pertinent aspects of police and fire work are covered.

Most recent adoption of a single safety department came this year in Buena Park, California. Other localities having some form of an integrated system are Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania; Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan; Huntington Woods, Michigan; Montreal-East, Quebec; Oakwood, Ohio; and Sunnyvale, California.

Sunnyvale, with a population of about 15,000, is the largest community to have a consolidated system. What used to be the police and fire departments have been joined in a Department of Public Safety. Employees are called public safety officers and are supervised by one chief.

Sewickley Heights, population 671, is the smallest community to have integrated public safety services. When incorporated in 1935, it kept the combined setup that had been managed by a local association since 1920. Huntington Woods, population 4,919, has also had 18

years of experience with the same personnel serving as policemen and firemen.

Officials of localities that have a single-unit system generally agree that a major advantage is saving money without sacrificing efficiency. Montreal-East, with a population of 5,000 and a business district containing 22 stores and 29 industrial plants, has saved about \$26,000 a year by having a combined department, its officials have reported.

### Public Authorities

The 1952 census of governmental units, which showed an increase of almost 50 per cent in the number of special districts created during the ten-year period 1942-1952 in contrast to a noticeable decline in the over-all number of governmental units during the same period, emphasizes the extensive use of the public authority which is being made in government today. This trend has attracted the attention of a number of groups and individuals who are attempting to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of this device.

A contribution to the published information on this subject is the recently issued study by the Council of State Governments, *Public Authorities in the States*. This study was made as a result of a resolution adopted by the 1952 meeting of the Governors' Conference, following a discussion of the widespread use of public authorities in the several states as agencies to finance the construction of toll roads and various types of public buildings and to operate various public enterprises. The resulting publication traces the development of the public authority and includes detailed descriptions of the organization, financing, and legal considerations involved in the use of this type of governmental body.

The Governmental Research Association, at its annual conference last September, devoted one of its round tables to this subject, with participants from the Tennessee Valley Authority, The Port of New York Authority, the staff of the Council of State Governments, and a reporter on the *Newark Evening News*.

The speakers from the TVA and the Port Authority emphasized the usefulness of the corporate device for regional programs which cut across political boundaries and indicated their belief that adequate controls existed with

respect to their organizations to insure accountability. The newspaper reporter, however, cited the New Jersey Turnpike Authority and the New York Transit Authority as examples of what he referred to as "evasion, escapism, and exemption."

Luther Gulick, speaking to the League of Women Voters of New York City shortly after he had been appointed to the new post of city administrator, cautioned against over-reliance on "the creation of a flock of new authorities" as a solution for the problems of metropolitan government and urged instead that the search for new inventions in the forms of government be actively pursued.

Similar doubts about the increasing use of authorities were expressed by Joseph E. McLean of Princeton University in an article in the October, 1953, issue of the *National Municipal Review*, "Use and Abuse of Authorities."

### Public Records Management

A general guide for the destruction of public records has been drawn up by the New Jersey Bureau of Archives and History and approved by the New Jersey Local Government Board for city and county offices.

Of the 63 kinds of records listed—from accident reports to warrants—the bureau recommends the permanent retention of only 15. Records to be kept permanently are: state audit reports, general books of account (both journal and ledger), general receipts and expenditures, budget reports, debt statements, destruction requests and authorizations, annual financial reports, minutes, municipal plans, master set of resolutions, delinquent tax register, collectors' duplicates, maps, and sale books.

Retention for twenty years was recommended for subsidiary books and accounts (both journal and ledger). Records of refunds should be kept for ten years, and records of officials' oaths and surety bonds should be retained for ten years after the termination of office.

The bureau indicated that all other records should be kept for periods ranging from two to seven years, with these three exceptions: copies of financial reports (retention optional), administrative correspondence (to be reviewed

periodically), and machine tapes (to be kept until audit).

#### Cooperation Between "Town" And "Gown"

Intergovernmental cooperation between cities and colleges can result in improved municipal services to both, two recent examples show.

Michigan State College and the city of East Lansing, Michigan, have joined forces on several services needed by both. One of the cooperative services is a \$500,000 sewage disposal plant to serve both the college and the city. Construction costs were shared on a 50-50 basis, but the college pays two-thirds of the plant's annual maintenance and operating budget of \$42,000.

The city and college also divide the \$35,000 yearly cost for fire department equipment and share the annual operation and maintenance costs of \$77,000. The campus and city police and fire departments share a radio transmitter and pay equal operating expenses.

The college and the city each has its own water distribution system, but they are joined by a valve and meter so that one system can furnish water to the other if needed.

In California, Stanford University has asked Palo Alto to annex 266 acres of university land, including a site where Stanford plans to build a \$15 million shopping center. Also included in the area is land for a professional office building, a residential apartment area, a hospital, and a convalescent home, and land for commercial use. Under the proposal, the university and other developers will pay for their own streets and water and sewer lines, which will be connected with existing city lines.

#### More Continuous Testing Programs

Job seekers in an increasing number of public jurisdictions may take civil service tests whenever they apply, according to a recent survey made by the Civil Service Assembly and the Oregon State Civil Service Commission.

Sixty-four out of 79 large state and local personnel agencies replied that they have established programs of continuous testing for recruitment, in place of systems that held examinations and hired workers once or twice a year.

Some jurisdictions reported that they let an applicant take the test any time he comes to the agency's office. Others said they schedule examinations once a week. Both methods help make sure that potential employees are tested while their interest is high. Then the papers are processed quickly, and successful candidates are ready for immediate appointment.

Forty-seven agencies reported that because tests are given more often, they have to take steps to preserve the secrecy of the questions asked. They do this by using different forms of the tests. As a further protection, 45 of the agencies queried noted that they do not permit anyone to take an examination more than once in three months. Twenty agencies said they restrict candidates to one try every six to eight months.

Most jurisdictions limit their continuous testing programs to those job classes for which there is constant demand, such as clerical workers.

#### Municipal Administration Correspondence Course

The first correspondence course ever offered in Canada in the field of municipal administration is being given this year by the University of British Columbia at Vancouver.

Subjects taught include accounting, law, finance, and administration. At the end of two years, students will receive a Junior Diploma in Municipal Administration. Completion of the courses for the third and fourth years will entitle the student to a Senior Diploma in Municipal Administration.

About sixty persons have enrolled for the first year—all of them engaged in some municipal government work in the province.

#### NAHO Changes Name to NAHRO

The National Association of Housing Officials, by vote of its membership, has changed its name to the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials.

The addition of the word redevelopment to the names does not indicate new activity within the association but brings its name up-to-date to conform with its long-time activity and interest in redevelopment, the association said in announcing the change.

The purpose of the association has always

been to better all phases of public administration in housing and community redevelopment through slum eradication and rebuilding. The association was one of the sponsors of the pioneering Urban Redevelopment Study. And when redevelopment became a formalized program under the Housing Act of 1949, the association that same year instituted its Redevelopment Information Service for public agencies and officials working with redevelopment programs. In 1951, members who were especially interested in redevelopment set up the Redevelopment Section as a part of the association.

#### New Management Association Formed

A new organization—the Armed Forces Management Technicians Association—has been established in the Defense Department. Its membership includes military and civilian personnel engaged in management work in all of the departments of the Defense Establishment: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The objectives of the new organization are: (1) to cooperate in the interchange of the highly specialized techniques and knowledge required for the continuance of improved management methods, (2) to foster a spirit of good will among its members and to perpetuate the friendships, memories, and traditions growing out of their service together in the Armed Forces, (3) to provide a vehicle for the discussion of management techniques that are unique to the Defense elements. The association is not an official instrumentality of the government and is politically nonpartisan. However, it has the sanction of the top military and civilian heads of the various defense agencies.

James M. Mitchell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) and a former president of ASPA, was elected chairman of the board.

#### Committee for Young Men in Government

A group of young men interested in strengthening the processes of self-government has organized under the name of the Committee for Young Men in Government. One thousand

businessmen and corporations are being enlisted as a Sponsoring Committee. From this group an Advisory Board of outstanding citizens will be selected and a national Board of Directors, forty-eight members representing the several states, will be established as the official authority of the organization.

A national office has been established in New York City and a National Advisory Program Committee is assisting state, county, and local groups in the establishment of effective and practical programs of action. The national office and local groups will issue factual statements of a nonpartisan nature to clarify and give a basis for judgment of current issues.

The Program of Action supported by the new organization includes a recommendation that "a manpower reserve will be created from among the members of the organization, and from other business, industrial and professional men who are qualified for such service," to meet governmental needs in case of war or similar emergencies.

#### Measuring Living Standards

One of the problems confronting the United Nations and other groups interested in the organization of systematic attempts to raise living levels in underdeveloped areas is the lack of satisfactory methods for defining and measuring standards of living and changes in various countries to facilitate international comparisons. A resolution urging special attention to this subject was passed at the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1951, and the Economic and Social Council at its Fourteenth Session in 1952 requested the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the International Labour Organization and other appropriate Specialized Agencies, to convene a small group of experts to prepare a report on the matter.

Members appointed by the Secretary-General to undertake this study were: K. R. V. Rao, director, Delhi School of Economics, India, chairman; Philip Hauser, professor of sociology, University of Chicago, rapporteur; Raymond Firth, professor of anthropology, University of London, United Kingdom; Erland von Hofsten, chief, Statistical Office, Social Welfare Board, Stockholm, Sweden; Father Louis Joseph Lebret, editor, *Economic et Hu-*

*manisme*, France; and O. Alexander Moraes, acting secretary-general, Inter-American Statistical Institute, Pan American Union, Washington.

Prior to the meeting of the group of experts in closed sessions from June 8 through June 26, the UN Social Affairs Department solicited the views of experts from interested countries to guide the Special Committee, and a number of preliminary studies were made. Among these was a three-day meeting of United States experts convened by the Public Administration Clearing House in New York City. Dr. Stuart A. Rice was chairman and Professor Seymour Miller of Brooklyn College was rapporteur for this group, which included statisticians, sociologists, economists, nutritionists, physiologists, and anthropologists. Copies of the report of this conference may be secured from the PACH office in New York, 45 East 65th Street.

The Report of the UN Special Committee, which may be secured from UN Headquarters in New York, notes the absence of frequency distributions of available data and differentiation of the population by such variables as age, sex, ethnic, social, economic, urban-rural and regional groups, and the lack of data for family groups. The committee rejected the "monetary approach" to measurement because of discrepancies in the buying power of different currencies which could not be reconciled by the official exchange rates, and because in many societies a major part of the social product does not enter the market system.

Instead, the experts proposed the use of a variety of "components" which would give a picture of the material and nonmaterial aspects as they affect net satisfaction with a total life situation. The choice of "components" was modified to take into account manageabil-

ity and availability of data. Among the components recommended by the group were: health, food and nutrition, education, working conditions, employment situation, aggregate consumption and savings, transportation, housing, clothing, recreation, social security, human freedoms. To measure each component, "indicators" were suggested by the committee. Thus health might be indicated by life expectancy at birth, crude death rate, infant mortality rate, number of hospital beds, number of physicians in relation to the population, etc. For many of the components the group recognized the difficulty of attempting to get global statistics and urged the development of sampling and survey methods, stressing especially the need for "family living surveys" as a way of measuring actual living conditions. The group also urged the need for distribution data, stressing that "average" figures were often misleading.

In order to facilitate the collection of this information, and to ensure international comparability, the committee urged the development of common conceptual frameworks, uniform coverage of subjects, standard definitions, use of uniform schedules and questionnaires, uniform tabulation procedures, and detailed descriptions of methods and procedures used. In particular, the committee recommended that statistical systems, especially in the less developed areas of the world, should be strengthened, that the censuses taken in and around 1950 should be analyzed and tabulated according to a uniform system, and that multi-purpose sample surveys should be undertaken. Finally, the committee suggested that the UN and Specialized Agencies offer technical aid to member nations on request to strengthen statistical systems, train personnel, and conduct surveys.

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